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ABSTRACT 
 
 The purpose of this study was to discover if and how the EU and US have approached 
dual-class shares and the one share-one vote principle in different manners. The EU and US have 
become thought leaders in security regulation and installing methods of best practice into their 
laws and corporate governance guidance. However, the EU and US have a history of divergent 
corporate governance systems and have legislated company law independently of each other. 
Looking at the oft-debated best practice of one share-one vote within this context would yield an 
interesting appraisal of where transatlantic views on corporate governance, whether divergences 
still exist, and why these divergences may persist.  
 The research employed a qualitative methodology. It utilized both a review of securities 
laws and guidance that related specifically to shareholder voting rights as well as a formal case 
study. The case study aimed to consider how companies within the EU and US across different 
industries have used dual-class shares and approached the one share-one vote principle. Twenty-
four firms were reviewed and analyzed against eight corporate governance provisions to add 
robustness to firm use of corporate governance best practices. 
 Results show that dual-class shares do not necessitate disproportionate voting rights, 
single class stock can yield disproportionate voting rights among shareholders, and also, 
policymakers, scholars, and institutional investors have not reached consensus that one share-one 
vote is a best practice or that provisions that safeguard minority shareholder voting rights are in a 
firm’s best interest. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A. Statement of Purpose 
 
 One share-one vote and the use of dual-class shares on stock exchanges have become hot 
topics in the media today. Business journalists are pressing scholars to decipher their use in the 
market and their impact on shareholder rights. Dual-class shares are complex and must be 
unpacked in order to fully comprehend the operating dynamics and forces currently pushing 
them into the spotlight. To do this, it is important that my research look at the one share-one vote 
debate within the context of corporate governance as people, international organizations, 
governments, and precedent frame it. The purpose of my research is to analyze how dual-class 
shares and one share-one vote are handled across the EU and US, and whether there is a 
convergence of opinion on this topic between the differing corporate governance systems within 
the EU and US. An additional objective of my research is to develop a better understanding of 
how the EU and US are dealing with shareholder voting rights in light of past crises that have 
had a global reach. Reactions to crises often cause regulatory changes.  As we have seen firms 
fail both their shareholders and their countries of incorporation, it begs the question: Will we see 
a regulatory change relating to one share-one vote?  
 
B. Introduction 
 
 Both the European Union and the United States have experienced turmoil in their 
financial markets recently. Owing sometimes to corporate governance failings from Parmalat, 
Enron, and Lehman Brothers, the EU and US have been witness to a dazzling array of 
possibilities that show what can go wrong in business and markets. As these scandals unfold, so 
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too, do corporate governance deficits. Their ripple effects can be seen in company catastrophe 
and market volatility. The subsequent questioning by citizens and policymakers looking for new 
solutions to prevent further and evermore substantial scandals now have increasingly powerful 
spillover effects in our interconnected markets and financial systems today.  
 Within the context of today’s ongoing financial crises, there is momentum to fortify 
national and global business practices. Investors and policymakers alike believe that it is 
valuable, however, to consider the extent to which regulation and best practices should be added, 
reformed or removed. Furthermore, determining the precise provisions within corporate 
governance that may have a material impact on how businesses can better function, is a 
necessary first step in this endeavor. In the OECD’s outline of Principles of Corporate 
Governance (2004), it states, “[t]here is no single model of good corporate governance” (13). 
Seeing scandals unfold in both the EU and US show that any system can fall prey to unethical 
and fraudulent behavior. The OECD’s words strike on an important question, though. Which 
provisions are chosen to be a best practice and how are they codified in soft and hard law?  
Differences between EU and US corporate governance systems can affect industry 
behavior and how investors, and ultimately firms at large contribute to overall stability or 
volatility within companies and markets.  
Shareholder rights are a key corporate governance provision that research has considered. 
It is a broad provision, yet quite important and very relevant given the loss that shareholders 
carry when a business fails and corporate governance practices do not save firm value from 
being destroyed. My focus on shareholder rights is narrowed and considered through the lens of 
dual-class stock issuances as it revolves around the principle of “one share-one vote.” The one 
share-one vote debate highlights a controversial and ongoing dialogue among business 
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professionals, scholars, and policymakers on the acceptability of utilizing anything other than 
one share-one vote in publicly listed firms (Jog, Zhu, and Dutta 2010; Morgan 2011; Byrd 2012; 
Gladman 2012). Dual-class stock can often separate voting rights from equity rights. At the heart 
of the one share-one vote debate is shareholder democracy. Many (Belcredi and Caprio 2004; 
Masulis, Cong, and Xie 2009; Milton and Raviv 2010) ask the extent to which shareholders 
should be given equal voting rights within a firm, how much power executive management 
should be given in regards to their shares and if those shares hold special or increased voting 
rights. The arguments that swirl around this topic are part ethical, moral, political, and economic. 
 The dual-class share and one share-one vote debates of today have existed since the 
1920’s. A good or bad year for a company can have lasting effects as can a particularly bad year 
for stock markets across the globe. Shareholder reaction to such outcomes can bolster annual 
general meeting (“AGM”) participation, shareholder proposals or even government regulation. If 
we consider shareholder rights, one can decipher similar conversations but of a different nature 
and recognize that these are timeless debates that cue corporate governance standards and the 
appropriateness of securities laws in ensuring that these standards are maintained.  
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 allowed us to witness a spectacular failure of 
sophisticated investment bankers. In their creation of new investment vehicles and portfolio 
management, they failed. The crisis also unveiled a weakness in human understanding of 
investment valuation and highlighted an assumption that corporate governance practices 
underscoring these investments would create a strong safety net. Not only were investment 
products mismanaged and improperly valued, but the companies that were responsible for these 
products’ ultimate creation and their maintenance, had perpetrated grave errors in their 
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responsibility to fix problematic investments and preserve shareholder value. Ultimately, the 
overall health of shareholders, companies, and the economy at large were put in danger.  
 Coming out of the crisis, the one share-one vote debate strikes supremely on the tip of 
corporate governance conversation: Where and how do we strike a balance between shareholder 
and company rights? Should shareholders be given equal rights? Are shareholders interested in 
long-term firm goals and value? Are shareholders more interested in short-term gains? Does 
executive management have a disproportionate amount of power? Do family-owned companies 
have more at stake when they have concentrated control? Are either the EU or US making a push 
to reform disproportionate voting rights? These are all questions that the issue of dual-class 
shares and one share-one vote hit upon. To answer them, it is important to take stock of the 
current regulatory climate that businesses operate within and the theoretical arguments that 
underscore debates on shareholder voting rights.  
  
C. Background 
 
 Dual-Class shares are shares that have been separated into two separate classes with a 
separate set of rights for each class. An example is Class A and Class B stock where Class A 
stock carry one vote per share while Class B stock carry 10 votes per share. There are some 
instances where Class B will carry fewer and/or more than 10 voting rights, however, the key 
point is that both classes of stock carry equity rights that are not proportionate to their voting 
rights. A commonly held tenet by some is that for each share purchased, a single vote should 
come with it. The idea is one that can be traced back to property rights-based arguments. If an 
investor has purchased an equity stake in a company, then the shareholder has also purchased a 
stake in the management and operation of that same company. To allow an investor to purchase 
equity in a company and strip his voting ability is antithetical to the idea of creating stock with 
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voting rights and a firm going public to raise capital. Dual-class shares are only one example of 
this practice of creating different classes of shares to which different voting allotments are 
dispersed. There are firms that issue three classes of shares with three different levels of voting 
rights. Hence, when I consider dual-class shares, I must likewise consider the debate that comes 
with. Is one share-one vote a best practice that exists to protect shareholders and businesses, or is 
it an ideal best fit for a particular type of corporate governance, industry or firm?  
 For my research, I analyzed dual-class shares against single class shares through a series 
of case studies of firms in the EU and US. By doing so, I also analyzed how one share-one vote 
is realized across the EU and US. However, I must lay an explanatory framework since voting 
rights and EU-US preferences and actions can be viewed from multiple perspectives: ethical, 
moral, political, and economic.  
 
1. An Economic Value of Votes 
 
 A significant amount of economics scholarship questions the legitimacy of dual-class 
shares and their varying voting rights, asking how those shares perform related to common or 
ordinary shares that carry one vote for every share, or one share-one vote. The efficient market 
hypothesis, or, “EMH,” has underpinned this question. The EMH states that markets operate on 
all information available about a firm and its shares as soon as such information is released. The 
price that you see a firm trading for, then, should be the price that it is worth at that point in time 
and any price fluctuations would be a result of new information being absorbed. In my case 
study of Google as a firm that uses dual-class shares, its stock has performed well within the 
market. If EMH is to be believed, then Google’s preferred stock structure may not be a 
significant detractor to the smooth functioning of the business. My review of Google also notes 
that other corporate governance provisions considered being best practices are maintained. 
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Google investors are either confident in the product management of Google or are less concerned 
with their decreased voting rights, caring more for overall firm performance. Yet which, if either 
possibility, is our operative answer? 
As Donald Langevoort (2002) states, it is difficult to manipulate under and overvalued 
stocks in order to make money off of them unless the individual has the skill, resources, and 
network to take an advantageous position. Instead, Langevoort suggests that most investors 
should be passive and have a “risk-adjusted portfolio designed to seek normal market returns” 
(8). But this does not occur. Langevoort goes on to note that unusual market swings have 
besieged the market. These market swings can be seen from the fracture of the market in 1987, a 
jump in stock prices that occurred after news broke of biotechnology firm EntreMed’s scientific 
breakthrough, which then turned out to be non-news as it had been previously reported (and thus 
should not have had an effect on biotechnology stock prices), to seemingly minor mistakes 
revolving around confused and mistaken ticker symbols by market participants.  
 The efficient market hypothesis has its flaws and humans have an uncanny ability to play 
folly with the efficiency this theory has been said to infuse into stock pricing. Market players 
may be suspect and at-risk to making valuation errors. Further research critiquing EMH has 
suggested that there is “momentum” behind stock prices and that stocks are more likely to 
continue in one direction or another after they begin their initial move (Langevoort 2002). To tie 
this finding to dual-class shares, many believe that by diminishing voting rights from a share, it 
reduces its value because the shareholder of a stock with fewer voting rights does not have as 
much voting power in AGMs and decreased participation in how a firm chooses to run its 
business. Separating voting and equity rights is counterintuitive to the predominant idea that 
handles stock ownership in a property right framework. If dual-class stock, then, has a share 
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class with 10 votes per share while its second class allots 9 or fewer votes per share, 
theoretically, following our understanding of property rights and tying equity to voting rights 
would give us a reasonable logic that says the share price of the stock with fewer votes would be 
valued less than the stock with superior rights. However, research heretofore has not been able to 
adequately prove this hypothesis. In fact, Schultz and Shive’s (2010) investigation into share 
pricing found that the share class with inferior voting rights had a higher value than its 
counterpart with superior voting rights. The results could be on account of greater liquidity in the 
shares with superior voting rights, but even so, that does not suggest that dual-class shares 
translate into immediate and direct profit losses for shareholders. If dual-class shares cannot be 
proven to be a guaranteed bad investment from an economic standpoint, then how are they 
wrong? Perhaps our answer is in the ethical, moral or political arguments we must then consider.  
 
2. An Ethical Value of Votes 
 
 Public firms issuing shares on a stock exchange for investment have an ethical obligation 
not to hoodwink potential investors into purchasing a stock that would deprive them their rights 
or their financial stake in the firm. This obligation towards ensuring shareholder rights was 
codified by the OECD in their Principles of Corporate Governance, Part II, “The Rights of 
Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions,” which states that “the corporate governance 
framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights...[including the right 
to] participate and vote in general shareholder meetings” (OECD 2004, 18). This right alongside 
others mentioned by the OECD could be considered a firm’s fiduciary duty to their shareholder, 
but it also becomes a contract between firm and shareholder. That contract ties firm stock to 
votes that can then be taken together to exercise investor sentiment and opinions of firm 
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operations. This contract exemplifies the trust and risk that both firm and shareholder place in 
one another.   
 A shareholder trusts that her firm’s actions will, ideally, reflect well on her investment. 
Cablevision acts as a good example of a firm that has used dual-class shares in a way that could 
potentially harm a shareholder’s investment. As I show in my case study of Cablevision, the 
Dolan family controls the firm. As founders of the company, they own a majority voting stake, 
but not an equal equity stake. Shareholders must trust that the family will be responsible 
stewards of firm capital, but that role may not be held accountable through shareholder votes. On 
this point, it is of value to consider the merits of arguments that champion shareholder primacy. 
We must not forget that firms have ethical duties to their stakeholders as well. Perhaps a firm 
such as Cablevision is more concerned about providing its employees and management team an 
environment where they are not at the folly of shareholder opinion. 
These two entities, shareholders and stakeholders, can often be separated and used as 
measures of influence and differing interests when implementing corporate governance standards 
and best practices. According to the OECD, both shareholders and stakeholders reach agreement 
that good corporate governance practices require firms to maintain transparency, accountability, 
fairness, and responsibility (Frémond 2000). Where a firm has followed every disclosure 
requirement and maintains a dual-class share structure, a question arises: Does this behavior 
signify an act of breaking an ethical contract with shareholders or stakeholders when voting 
rights are separated from equity rights? Does the responsibility lie with the shareholder or the 
firm to decide which share structure is best suited for the business at hand?  
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3. A Moral Value of Votes 
 
 Investors have a rational set of choices that they can make based on firm disclosures of 
relevant business-centric information prior to a firm’s stock issuance. Opinions have been levied 
that call for a ban of anything other than one share-one vote. Yet, putting an outright ban on 
dual-class shares would eradicate an investment option available to investors who may not be as 
concerned about voting rights, but more attuned to higher returns (Peters 1986). As a potential 
shareholder, it can be argued that each individual has a personal responsibility to conduct due 
diligence on a firm before making an investment. The nature of a firm’s business, operating, and 
leadership structure or the composition of its existing investors are all characteristics of a firm 
that investors may decide to rank order in importance. The weight that one of these provisions 
may have over another will vary among investors based on their personal values and their 
investment goals. In the same way that not every firm has duplicate short and long-term goals, 
each investor will have different goals. Therefore, an overarching statement that places an ethical 
value on share structure may also not fit for every nation state, investor or firm.  
 How shareholders value their equity stake, their amount of interaction, and voice in firm 
operations may arise from an individual moral understanding of the contract between firm and 
shareholder. Langevoort’s (2002) sentiments that shareholders may be better financially situated 
if they are passive can be countered by Peters’ (1986) comment that a shareholder may not want 
a voting right. Some shareholders are passive investors and simply want a balanced portfolio. 
Individuals who choose to invest in companies such as Acando and Google may not be 
concerned that their votes are not as strong as the founders. As technology firms, perhaps they 
feel that the products these firms produce and the innovation inherent in the industry will yield 
strong returns on their investment. Upon my analysis of these firms, they also have utilized best 
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practices in corporate governance in other areas of their business. They are illustrative of firms in 
a well performing sector that has begun to favor multiple voting rights.  
How investors approach a company with such a share structure is up to that investor 
alone. Nevertheless, shareholders and firms alike must operate within a rule framework 
constructed at the state and national or supranational level. There is significant political pushback 
when crises arise and often shareholder needs are considered first and foremost. Where these 
needs are put at risk, it is not uncommon to see governments regulate and create general rules 
that become “one size fits all.” 
 
4. A Political Value of Votes 
 
 The relationships between firms, shareholders, and stakeholders vary widely among 
countries; corporate governance is then affected by these relationships, which are also affected 
by and subject to different laws and regulation, variable adoption of standards and market forces 
(OECD 2004). Which best practices become standards can be controversial at both the national 
and international level. However the OECD believes that if countries would like to maximize the 
benefits of global capital markets, any set of corporate governance principles or arrangements 
must be deemed credible across borders and acceptable at an international level. This reinforces 
the question that remains surrounding dual-class shares and one share-one vote. Uniform 
implementation of one share-one vote does not exist across firms within countries, let alone 
outside of them. Nor are corporate governance standards uniform across countries.  
 How equity and votes are placed alongside each other is a valuable concern and one that 
has clearly been targeted for study by many academics. Yet whether or not voting rights attached 
to shares are a shareholder’s decision, a firm’s prerogative or of intrinsic value to country 
economics and investment interests has yet to be determined. Furthermore, Mark Roe has made 
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particular headway on political arguments that suggest corporate governance practices are 
tailored to a country’s political and social environment. As investors differ, so too, do countries. 
Each year the International Finance Corporation and The World bank release the “Ease of Doing 
Business” report that allows anyone to see a variety of factors as they differ among countries. 
One of the factors is investor protection, which has been discussed within literature on dual-class 
shares. Variable levels of investor protection will have an impact on how other corporate 
governance provisions play into investor and market reaction to a firm’s shares as they originate 
from a particular country with a particular set of investor protections.  
We can then begin to understand that one share-one vote does not operate alone nor in a 
bubble, separated from other corporate governance provisions. To fully understand how dual-
class shares and one share-one vote are viewed and implemented within a firm, it may then be of 
more value to analyze how these two issues operate across industries and countries where ethics, 
morals, politics, and economic values may vary. 
 
D. Statement of Problem 
 
 Through my analysis of the one share-one vote principle and firm use of dual-class 
shares, I seek to discover whether or not different corporate governance systems across the EU 
and US support or oppose disproportionate voting rights.  
 Previous research of dual-class shares has focused on share value and the impact that 
disproportional voting rights has on market reactions to firms not employing the one share-one 
vote principle. My research will focus on the question,  
   
  Is there a material difference in the use and disclosure of share issuances offering 
  different voting rights among and across EU and US-based firms?  
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This question will allow me to analyze firms that use dual-class shares, how they disclose the 
information based on corporate governance law, guidance, and the nature of how this guidance 
may differ between the EU and US. It is valuable to see how the EU and US differ on their 
guidance because as strong economic players, they play the role as thought leader and can set a 
standard followed by other regions and nations of the world. Focusing on potential differences 
between EU and US perspectives on one share-one vote will assist us in understanding if 
convergence in corporate governance is occurring. Additionally, understanding the nature of 
different reactions to dual-class shares and one share-one vote may assist in understanding if 
corporate governance models are destined to remain variable in nature.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Within the structure of the firm, there exists a separation of ownership and control 
between shareholders and managers (Berle and Means 1932; Jensen and Meckling 1976). This 
separation could then become the fissure for future agency problems between shareholders and 
insiders (managers and directors). Much research has been carried out to analyze the operating 
dynamics that may cause strife between these actors. According to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), 
dispersed ownership structures create an environment for managers to shirk responsibilities 
because shareholders will have coordination problems and are less likely to be effective monitors 
of management. However they note that certain industries that have greater risks and are less 
stable would benefit managers who structured their firm with more concentrated control 
structures.  
The mechanisms, intents, and levers that compel firm insiders to act in the best or worst 
interest of the firm, its shareholders, and stakeholders is of upmost interest when corporate 
governance discussions seek to establish best practices. Discussing one share-one vote and dual-
class shares allows us to magnify a corner of today’s corporate governance debate regarding a 
seemingly perpetual struggle between firm insiders and outsiders. Acting as our outsider, the 
shareholders of today have been given unique responsibilities to monitor management. However, 
as is often seen in the US, UK, and Ireland, dispersed shareholder ownership permeates; until a 
shareholder develops a majority stake in a particular company, the true monitoring benefits that 
one share-one vote accords to shareholders may not be fully realized if they do not feel a 
personal risk tied to the firm’s market value. Where dual-class shares have become a mechanism 
 14 
to safeguard against short-term investors and hostile takeovers, there are some that see it as firm 
insiders’ grab for power without giving proper recourse to the diverse interests of potential and 
existing shareholders. Thus, we have competing arguments for the elimination and protection of 
dual-class share structures against the backdrop of the one share-one vote principle.  
Amongst corporate governance scholars who have focused on one share-one vote and 
dual-class structures, there appear to be two broad categories: (1) those that view dual-class 
shares as seizing shareholder rights and diminishing firm value, and in contrast, (2) those that 
regard dual-class shares as a purposeful device having valuable utility as an anti-takeover 
mechanism. These two perspectives will be approached from value-based and institutional-based 
critiques. Through looking at the literature from values and institution-based perspectives, a 
wider net can be cast to better understand the complex arguments that surround the pros and cons 
of dual-class shares. The views associated with these arguments, as well as supplementary 
literature giving much needed tertiary information and reasoning to the foundations of this 
topic’s debate, will be articulated in my review of the scholarly work that analyzes one share-one 
vote and dual-class share structures.  
Recent empirical literature on dual-class shares has taken a comprehensive approach to 
consider a variety of different perspectives that may serve to explain why companies choose to 
use dual-class structures over a single-class structure. However, the conclusions gathered from 
the literature show a cornucopia of opinions that are both at odds and in support of each other. 
Therefore, it is difficult to separate the literature into clearly defined theoretical platforms. 
Although many will fall into two camps that view dual-class shares as either an anti-takeover 
utility or a mechanism to strip shareholders of their rights, the studies that may serve to support 
either side of the discourse have resulted in complicated and multi-factor conclusions that do not 
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necessarily point towards dual-class shares as entirely good or bad. This is a telling sign of the 
complexity of dual-class structures and the one share-one vote concept. It is neither simple nor 
straightforward to understand the intent of a company when it may diverge from one share-one 
vote. It is also difficult to pinpoint an overarching trend that can encompass different corporate 
governance models throughout the EU and US, as well as the requisite legal codes that serve as a 
roadmap for each country. Because of these factors that weave together, and in recognition of 
changing market dynamics and expanding global businesses over time, it is important to present 
the literature as it is: a survey. 
 
B. Valuation Effects  
 
Scholarship critiquing dual-class shares and the issuance of multiple voting rights has 
focused on analyzing potential variations in share prices across share classes that have different 
voting rights attached. The prevailing thought in this research is that a share with fewer voting 
rights will trade at a lower price in contrast to its sister share that comes with one or more votes. 
A decrease in value to a share with fewer voting rights is a hypothesis in the literature because if 
we consider the logic of an efficient market, it would take into consideration all information 
available to it and if a company has differential voting rights attached to its shares, there is an 
assumption that a market would not value such a share over one that comes with the right to 
vote. However, an Anglo-American-centric perspective perhaps precipitates the assumption that 
markets would prefer one share-one vote. 
 
1. Determining Firm Value Through Dual-class Share Pricing and Voting Premiums 
 
As discussed in a seminal work by Grossman and Hart (1988), one share-one vote in a 
corporation can be used to incentivize shareholders to monitor management and ensure best 
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practices and proper use of firm resources. Grossman and Hart discuss the forces at play that 
enthuse insiders to implement a one share-one vote structure. In general, Grossman and Hart 
establish that one share-one vote once established, should be maintained by a company and that a 
structural change thereafter, redistributing and/or eliminating voting rights should be viewed 
skeptically. They make special mention to reinforce, however, that companies have the ultimate 
choice in how they structure their securities and that in the market, small shareholders have more 
incentive to vote with management rather than to analyze proxy statements and form their own 
opinions.   
As Grossman and Hart note the potential for diminished shareholder care exercised 
through their questionable proxy voting, or under-utilization of their vote, questions on the merit 
of shareholder control gain traction. Questions arise such as, to what extent should companies 
give their shareholders mechanisms of control, such as the vote, if they are not fully invested and 
tied to the firm’s overall management and governance? Do these shareholders understand the 
specialized nature of the target business and the competitive market that the firm operates 
within? Proponents of dual-class shares have argued that firm insiders (executives and directors), 
will have a much better grasp of their industry and how to best maximize firm value – thus, 
making them better equipped to hold superior voting shares in their firm, above and beyond 
shareholders carrying fewer or in some cases, zero voting rights.  
Nevertheless, Grossman and Hart maintain that one share-one vote is still preferable to 
dual-class shares. Many studies suggest a correlation between dual-class shares and a firm’s 
subsequent loss in value. Bennedsen and Nielsen (2005) extend this conversation through 
researching the extent to which disproportional ownership mechanisms degrade firm value in 
Europe. In particular, they look at the usage of dual-class securities in IPOs and find that out of 
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three mechanisms that can concentrate ownership (dual-class shares, adding cross ownerships 
and pyramiding), dual-class shares are the most detrimental to firm value. Alongside this finding, 
Bennedsen and Nielsen find a puzzling result that says despite the drop in firm value, firm 
performance is not negatively impacted. Their work was meant to disentangle the relationship 
between ownership and firm value, but in answering this question, another arises regarding how 
dual-class shares impact a variety of value-based considerations for a firm. Literature heretofore 
has begun to establish that there can be benefits from disproportional ownership structures 
(Grossman and Hart 1988). Results from Bennedsen and Nieslen’s research of European firms 
has suggested that disproportional ownership itself, may not be performance destroying, but the 
particular type of mechanism used may have significant impact on value. Moreover, their results 
show that private benefits of control seem to be “higher in countries with low investor protection 
and the lowest in countries with good investor protection” (Bennedsen and Nielsen 2005, 8).  
Mello and Parson (1998) believe that the IPO stage of a firm’s business cycle can be an 
opportunity for it to create a long-term ownership strategy and value. They believe that the IPO 
is not an ideal stage for selling control in a firm, but instead better suited to selling dispersed 
ownership with a supplemental controlling share sale after the IPO. In the second sale, Mello and 
Parson suggest that selling controlling blocks at a discount after gaining capital through the IPO 
would be the most effective method for a company to enrich its capital holdings. Mello and 
Parsons take a vastly different tack from a majority of scholars and believe that controlling 
shareholders can play a fruitful and active role in the firm. Going a step further, Mello and 
Parsons state that firms can sell controlling shares at a discount or premium based on “the public 
and private benefits associated with the controlling block” (80). Acknowledging private benefits 
of control, they accept that it is a part of controlling stakes and move on. Part of their reasoning 
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stems from their belief that markets cannot secure optimal ownership structures at all times and 
that it is necessary for insiders to make choices that will ensure an efficient ownership structure 
while gaining necessary equity. Contrary to seeing controlling structures as an outright dismissal 
of equality in shareholder rights, Mello and Parsons see controlling shareholders as a source to 
add to firm value by being engaged and having a vested stake in a business. 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2007) are a bit more skeptical of an inherent benefit in the 
separation of voting and cash flow rights. Their study seeks to tie dual-class shares to firm 
valuation. In their analysis of dual-class shares in US firms, they are interested in the effects of 
voting and cash rights on a firm when separated. Ultimately, the intent of the study is to uncover 
the relationship between ownership and firm value. In US firms considered, the most common 
voting to equity rights ratio was found in 6 percent of firms having dual-class shares where the 
superior voting class (non-traded) had 10 votes per share whereas the inferior shares (traded) 
typically had only one vote per share. Moreover, the split between ownership and cash flow 
rights was around 60 percent to 40 percent, respectively, suggesting that insiders exhibited 
significant controlling power without an equal equity stake. From their regressions, Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick find that “firm value is positively associated with insiders’ cash flow rights, 
negatively associated with insiders’ voting rights, and negatively associated with the wedge 
between the two” (37) where the “wedge” symbolizes insider voting rights without 
corresponding cash flow rights.  
The utility of this study comes from the authors’ ability to separate the various factors 
that may be at play: voting rights, equity rights, the ratios between these, and the extent to which 
one factor may have a dominant influence. Generally, their results convey that value increases 
with dual-class shares and separate voting rights, but only when a smaller percentage of the firm 
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is controlled, up to 30 percent. When control rises too high, 35 percent and above, value begins 
to diminish. Thus, we are left with a study that suggests that dual-class shares can both add and 
diminish value.  
In a related study, but qualitatively different, Smart and Zutter (2003) look at both single 
and dual-class shares issued at a company’s IPO and establish that there is less incentive for 
insiders in firms using a dual-class structure to undervalue their share price versus those with 
single-class shares. Their hypothesis for why this is so depends on the level of control held by 
insiders. Through a dual-class structure where votes are already realized and contained within the 
firm, there is less need to underprice shares in order to entice a diversified group of shareholders 
that will be less likely to vote as a block. This outcome is supported by other studies of IPO 
pricing and ownership concentrations, finding that underpricing is an effective mechanism for 
single-class firms to create a dispersed ownership structure for protection against large bidders 
(Brennan and Franks 1997; Field and Sheehan 2000). Smart and Zutter’s data reveals that firms 
listing dual-class shares were priced 2.9 percentage points higher than single-class shares and 
that this price differential contributed to an extra $3.8 million raised through firms issuing a dual-
class IPO. This is a significant contribution to the literature suggesting that perhaps dual-class 
shares are not value destroying, but may actually add value to the firm in an IPO. Although firms 
more often choose one share-one vote, the risk of voting blocks being created may not 
necessarily allow them to price their shares at a level that is financially optimal for raising 
capital. However their results also show that single and dual-class firms do not have significantly 
different levels of revenue growth after the IPO. Again we are left to wonder the extent to which 
dual-class shares leave a lasting impact on firm value and performance. 
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Schulz and Shive (2010) look at how dual-class shares affect price, also they explored 
potential reasons that could explain price discrepancies occurring between dual-class shares on 
trading platforms. Altogether, Schulz and Shive find that price differentials correspond to an 
increase in trades taking advantage of relatively cheap and expensive shares, switching from 
selling to buying of the former and buying to selling of the latter; suggesting that traders 
involved in long-short positions of these shares are seeking to gain from the mispricing. 
Moreover the share prices seen do not reflect the true value of the share class at hand, but instead 
market mispricing. Possible differences in share class liquidity is considered a potential source 
for price fluctuations since non-voting shares are considered to be slightly more liquid than 
voting shares, however liquidity did not appear to be an influencing factor for why shares traded 
at different prices.  
Shulz and Shive sampled 141 dual-class stock pairs listed on the NYSE, Amex and 
NASDAQ starting from 1993 through 2006. During one of their regression analyses, they find 
that leading up to a company’s general meeting or before a proxy fight, voting shares increase in 
price relative to non-voting shares. Although the data is not statistically significant, it does 
correspond to commonly used trading strategies of shorting (selling) the higher priced share and 
going long (buying) in the lower priced share. In this case, the logic that a voting share would be 
valued greater prior to a general meeting was true. However multiple studies looking at trading 
volumes of both classes of shares where they trade independently of one another show that price 
discrepancies are most prominently being capitalized on through medium sized share sales and 
purchases; suggesting that small investors are not at play here. Schulz and Shive defined 
medium-sized trades as a range between five hundred and two thousand shares. Of the dual-class 
pairs, non-voting shares tend to be traded more often than voting shares, however Schulz and 
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Shive attribute this to more investors, some of which they term “uninformed noise traders” (546), 
being present in the market. This contrasts to voting shares that will still be affected by price 
discrepancies, and will still fluctuate in value against non-voting shares, but price gaps will be 
clearer as they reflect a pool of traders with less market noise.  
Understanding the true value of a voting or non-voting share at a given time should 
theoretically be based on a variety of factors. These include corporate governance standards, 
industry competitiveness, country of incorporation, as well as the stock exchange on which 
shares are traded. Schulz and Shives’ work adds to the dialogue by conveying that a market is 
made up of informed investors that use information available for a company and make decisions 
therein. These decisions represent value maximizing trades based on price discrepancies rather 
than on standards of shareholder rights; in turn, this raises questions about shareholder 
knowledge that will be touched on later.  
 
2. Voting premiums on the Oslo Stock Exchange: A Case Study 
 
A paper by Bernt Ødegaard (2007) considers influencing factors for price differences 
between share classes for companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange from 1988 through 2005. 
The study finds that for part of the sample period, non-voting shares traded at a premium to 
voting shares, that is, they traded at a higher price. This outcome for a segment of the sample 
period aligns with the results of Schulz and Shive, that non-voting shares can be priced above 
voting shares. Yet the conclusion that can be drawn for which factors influence an outcome in 
prices differs between Schulz and Shive and Ødegaard. According to the latter, changes in prices 
on the Oslo Stock Exchange can be attributed to market segmentation, corporate governance, and 
liquidity factors whereas Schulz and Shive show that underpricing plays an active role in price 
differentiation.  
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Before 1995, a regulation in Norway stipulated that foreign owners could not own greater 
than one-third of the voting stock of a Norwegian company. Along with the rule, the government 
allowed companies to create a separate group of Class F shares for foreign ownership alone. 
Where listed Norwegian companies had Class F shares, foreign investors could not purchase 
Class A shares. However both Class A and F shares came with full voting rights. The alternative 
to Class F shares for foreign investors would be to invest in the inferior non-voting Class B 
shares (Ødegaard 2007).  
Comparing these share classes across the sample period, Ødegaard finds that Class F 
shares traded at a premium to Class A shares, despite having equal voting rights. Class F shares 
also traded at a premium to Class B shares – the latter claiming zero voting rights (Ødegaard 
2007). For the latter case, the preference for Class F voting shares over class B non-voting shares 
can be attributed to corporate governance and liquidity factors. What is particularly interesting 
from Ødegaard’s study is that he found from the same time period, pre-1995, Class B shares 
traded at a premium to Class A shares, despite lacking votes. At that point in time, it was 
preferable for a foreign company to have shares that minimized market segmentation than to 
have shares with voting rights. Therefore Ødegaard’s research exemplifies how the legal 
restrictions in Norway prior to 1995 against foreign ownership played a significant part in how 
non-voting and voting shares were purchased. Price differences in shares are not necessarily 
predicated on an ability to vote as much as simply an ability to invest.  
 
3. Dual-class Shares Giving Value to Private Benefits of Control 
 
Nenova (2003) looks at voting shares as they relate to private benefits gained. From this 
perspective, the debate on dual-classes considers the willingness of a potential shareholder to pay 
a premium for control that can come with shares with preferential voting rights in exchange for a 
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gain elsewhere. Generally the added value will be in the form of additional influence with firm 
insiders or higher payouts in the event of a control contest. Nenova’s study considers vote values 
across countries, taking into consideration country-level legal structures and shareholder 
protections. She analyzes 661 dual-class firms across 30 stock exchanges for the year of 1997.  
By looking at vote value relating to private benefits of control, unlike previous studies 
that look at the monetary value and utility of different share classes, Nenova specifically 
considers shares with votes accruing value via control. A shareholder desiring a large stake in a 
firm can see more value in a voting share priced higher than can a shareholder who is interested 
in having a diversified portfolio and little activity in a firm’s strategy and governance.   
Surveying legal measures across countries and their impact on control-block vote values, 
Nenova finds that different protections produce different effects. The “worst case” scenario 
attributes to a widely held firm with the fewest protections and has a control value of 48 percent 
of firm value. This suggests that it is quite a bit easier and more desirable to obtain control. This 
number then drops to control over 32 percent of firm value when regulators enforce control-
restricting rules and greater investor protections are ensured. Additionally, takeover and charter 
laws both serve to push the value down to control of 5 percent of the firm’s value (Nenova 
2003). Such data further emphasizes the variability of influence that dual-class shares have 
across countries and the likelihood that private benefits of control will be realized.  
Doidge (2004) introduces his study analyzing the voting premiums between non-US 
firms that employ a dual-class share structure and cross-list on US exchanges versus those that 
do not cross-list. Again, the literature shows an interest from scholars to pinpoint what factors 
impede voting and non-voting shares, as well as what factors work with share classes to display 
their value through price. Looking at 137 firms that are cross-listed in the US out of a total 
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sample of 745 from 1994 through 2001, Doidge is able to capture data from firms across 20 
countries. His study adds to the existing literature by pinpointing dual-class shares of non-US 
firms and the influence that the US corporate governance structure has on cross-listed shares. 
Although Doidge is quick to note that foreign firms do not have to comply with US corporate 
laws, his study of American Depositary Receipts (“ADRs”) of levels 2 and 3 allow him to secure 
a sample required to meet a higher threshold of listing requirements through the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”). ADRs come in three levels based on their access to US 
markets. A level 2 ADRs allow a company to have a presence on a national US exchange, but the 
firm cannot use it to raise capital. However foreign issuer who wishes to have both a presence on 
a US exchange and raise capital uses a level 3 ADR. Both ADR levels must file 20-F forms 
(equivalent of the annual report) with the SEC. The specter of the foreign companies reporting to 
the SEC is a considerable feature of level 2 and 3 ADRs since disclosure of large shareholders 
and ownership structure is required (Doidge 2004).  
Through choosing to cross-list on US exchanges, Doidge shows that foreign firms with 
dual-class shares must be sensitive to the US regulatory environment. Research conducted for 
my case studies of Dassault and SAP, French and German firms in the Software and Technology 
industry respectively, have chosen to cross-list in the EU and US. Both firms opted to submit 
financial statements in accordance with the accounting standards of IFRS and US GAAP. 
Dassault used US GAAP for 2006 and 2007 while SAP used US GAAP for 2006 to 2008. This is 
an example of two EU firms that were sensitive to the complexity existing in two separate 
accounting standards used between the EU and US. This aspect contributes to the higher 
likelihood of increased disclosure from these firms.  
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The results from Doidge’s study also consider voting power. This is captured by the 
fraction of total votes of superior voting shares relative to the total cash-flow rights tied to them. 
A higher voting power number signals that fewer superior voting shares are necessary to control 
a firm and that a greater separation exists between voting and cash flow rights. According to 
Doidge’s data, the UK had the second highest voting power score, second to Canada. In terms of 
private benefits of control, Doidge shows that firms with level 2 or 3 ADR programs have lower 
benefits of control against those firms that issued a lower ADR class and were not subject to the 
same level of SEC disclosure and reporting requirements. Moreover, firms that listed level 3 
ADRs had significantly lower voting premiums than firms that did not cross-list (Doidge 2004). 
Of the firms listing the ADRs with greater transparency requirements (75 firms), 55 of them 
listed the inferior voting class. Thus, firms with dual-class shares cross-listing in the US gain 
significant value by adhering to some of the increased disclosure and shareholder protection 
rules of the US.  
Doidge’s paper draws helpful conclusions on how foreign dual-class shares may be 
perceived across borders and the positive influence that disclosure laws have on the value of 
shares with different voting rights. His research begins to show the influence of disclosure as a 
corporate governance element on legitimizing dual-class shares.  
Research of heir and founder-controlled US companies by Anderson, Duru, and Reed 
(2009) find a positive relationship between heir or founder ownership and firm performance 
when transparency was at its highest. This is another signal that disclosures of practices and 
values can add a great deal to investor and market reaction towards firm and share value. “[T]he 
entrenchment effect dominates the monitoring effect in publicly traded US firms…outside 
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investors only value founder or heir presence when it is coupled with a high level of financial 
transparency” (Anderson, Duru, and Reed 2009, 207).  
 
4. Assessing Dual-class Share Values and Shareholder Primacy 
 
Thus far, it is apparent that the empirical literature is very interested in unraveling how 
dual-class shares represent firm value, whether through share price reflecting current market 
sentiment and firm performance, private benefits of control to insiders or greater protection from 
hostile takeovers. By analyzing share prices and vote value, the preceding authors have tacitly 
put forth a frame of thought within the one share-one vote debate that places shareholder 
primacy front and center. As a leading line of thought in the US, shareholder wealth 
maximization has been at the center of corporate governance best practice. The EU has a history 
of family block-holders and ownership structures that are more highly concentrated, taking 
power and arguably, value away from shareholders. Although these do not take away from the 
popularized notion of shareholder primacy and support of it in the EU, corporate governance 
models in the EU have not always been thought of as being the most ardent champions of 
shareholder protection. But is it still wise to view the US governance model raising shareholder 
primacy above all other stakeholders as the ideal system? May the EU have devised a different 
model as a measure to protect stakeholders? As Margaret Blair is wise to note in her own 
research, it is valuable to question the tenets of shareholder primacy and distinguish how it may 
play a role in the ideation of dual-class shares today (Blair 2003).  
From her own research into corporate governance practices, Blair finds that the US has 
been a great example of promoting shareholder wealth maximization. Her critique is uniquely apt 
for reviewing dual-class shares because shares carrying zero to multiple voting rights directly 
impact shareholders’ power to influence the firm they have invested in. Because of an existing 
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diversion between the US, Anglo-American style of corporate governance and the Continental 
European style, it is valuable to cover literature that has taken a serious look at a model that has 
had exceptional prominence for years: the US, shareholder primacy model.  
In her assessment of shareholder primacy, Blair points out how an emphasis on the 
shareholder contributes to the notion that share price is the dominant, representative gauge of 
firm performance. Shareholder value-based arguments assume that investors have certain control 
rights and can claim “ownership” over those rights. As Blair (2003) exemplifies the perspective 
dominating US corporate governance debates of the 1990s, this understanding of shareholder 
value placed corporations against a background of property rights; establishing that a unique 
group or class of shareholders were rightful owners of a portion of a firm. Enron is a notable 
example of a firm trying to maximize shareholder value through risky bets and liabilities. Once it 
was clear that the firm had been overextended and displaced liabilities in order to showcase 
shareholder wealth did Enron then have to enter bankruptcy proceedings. This essentially 
stripped its stocks of their worth and thus, in its attempt to maximize its shareholders’ wealth, it 
destroyed most of it.  
“[M]aximizing the value of equity shares is [not] the equivalent of maximizing the 
overall value created by the firm” (Blair 2003, 58). As she states, the idea that shareholder 
wealth is the golden ticket to firm health is shortsighted and particularly so when focusing on a 
simplistic measure of share price, overlooking other measures that may yield informed insights 
into a firm’s operations. Furthermore, Blair proposes an alternative corporate governance model 
that she calls the “team production” model.  
“[T]he team production approach emphasizes [that] directors and other team members are 
expected to cooperate with each other rather than try to extract gains at each others’ expense” 
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(Blair 2003, 70). Their model presumes that directors are trustworthy and that the calculating 
nature of people that is hypothesized by economic models is not supported by evidence from 
cooperative game experiments. Blair raises the importance of social signals impacting 
management decisions. If these signals advocate for amassing spoils despite being harmful to 
investors, then management will follow suit. Barring strong legal requirements to do the “right 
thing,” Blair has argued that strong social norms in a distinct context will induce trustworthy 
behavior. This concept of social norms being a strong factor relevant to corporate governance 
piggybacks off of Mark Roe’s work on the influence of political environments on corporate 
governance models. Noting the unique position that Nordic corporate governance has played as 
an outlier in many studies, the literature thus far further distinguishes how important the socio-
political aspect is.  
 
C. Institutional Effects  
 
1. Country and Institutional Variables Impacting Dual-class Share Structures 
 
While examining the dual-class share debate, the impact of different countries’ 
institutional arrangements becomes too significant to overlook. Most of the literature on dual-
class shares and one share-one vote has been careful to run multi-country studies as well as more 
focused single-country analyses. By doing this, scholars have been able to outline nuances that 
exist at the regional, national, and company level.  
 Leading corporate governance scholars La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishney (2000) studied how investor protections vary in corporate governance structures across 
countries. They find that legal structures affording protections therein are extremely influential 
indicators on corporate governance reform above and beyond the type of financial system that is 
in place. As seen in the results of my case studies, Dodd-Frank implemented a rule requiring a 
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mandatory, advisory shareholder vote on executive compensation packages, bolstering 
shareholder rights. Table 1 on the next page shows how all US firms in my case studies have 
now implemented the rule and because EU firms are not required to, only a few have. However it 
is notable that EU firms had a higher usage rate before 2010 whereas US firms did not use it 
prior to the Dodd-Frank requirement. 
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Table 1. Firms Using Advisory Shareholder Vote on Compensation 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
Top to bottom: EU software and technology, oil and gas, packaged foods, cable and satellite, ditto US 
 
 
To La Porta et al., investor protections such as the one above are of primary concern due to the 
extent of potential benefit extractions by insiders. Dual-class shares, some may argue, are 
symbolic of a failing in shareholder protection due to their ability at times to strip shareholders of 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS Industry: Software and Technology 
Acando N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Dassault ✔ ✔ N/A - - - 
SAP ✔ ✔ - - - - 
 Industry: Major Integrated Oil and Gas 
British 
Petroleum 
✔ ✔ - - - - 
Royal Dutch 
Shell 
✔ ✔ ✔ did not 
approve 
✔ ✔ ✔ 
Total - - - - - - 
 Industry: Packaged Foods 
Naturex N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Danone - - - - - - 
CSM - - - - - - 
 Industry: Cable and Satellite 
SES - - - - - - 
British Sky 
Broadcasting 
✔ - - - - - 
ZON 
Multimedia 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ - 
US FIRMS Industry: Software and Technology 
Google ✔ - - - - - 
Apple ✔ ✔ - - - - 
IBM ✔ - - - - - 
 Industry: Major Integrated Oil and Gas 
Chevron ✔ - - - - - 
ConocoPhillips ✔ - - - - - 
ExxonMobil ✔ - - - - - 
 Industry: Packaged Foods 
Hershey ✔ - - - - - 
General Mills ✔ ✔ - - - - 
Kellogg ✔ - - - - - 
 Industry: Cable and Satellite 
Comcast ✔ - - - - - 
Cablevision ✔ - - - - - 
Time Warner ✔ - - - - - 
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voting rights and place managers in a position to extract personal gains. Understanding dual-
class shares’ potential for harm or benefit can be dependent on the requisite legal structure 
protecting shareholders in a given country (La Porta et al. 2000; Adams and Ferreira 2008). The 
difference between common and civil law countries plays a significant role in the nature of rule 
enforcement as well. In a civil law framework, La Porta et al. remarked that in the event of self-
dealing, courts will not intervene on behalf of the shareholder if a firm can give a plausible 
reason for its actions. Where dual-class shares are concerned, this is significant because many 
European countries have a civil law tradition and of those that do, some have already established 
systems favoring concentrated ownership structures. How dual-class shares are treated in the EU 
and US must fundamentally consider what legal protocols have been developed to protect 
shareholders.  
As Bennedsen and Nielsen (2005) review the use of dual-class shares across a diverse 
European corporate governance environment, they highlight diverging dynamics operating 
within Europe’s varying corporate governance regimes. A one-size-fits-all result is not sought 
after here and seemingly does not apply as the authors highlight the importance of the nature of a 
legal regime in a country. Adams and Ferreira (2008) also seek to establish the heterogeneity at 
play throughout the one share-one vote and dual-class share debate. They remark that competing 
interests between shareholders and stakeholders can skew how dual-class shares yield private 
benefits of control. Additionally, the true impact of one share-one vote may be quite different 
across firms, industries, and countries. The level of activism of shareholders could signal an 
engaged investor base, but it cannot be proven ahead of time that a shareholder will act in the 
interest of the company (including stakeholders such as employees or community members) or in 
the best interests of him or herself (Adams and Ferreira 2008).  
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Based on this variability between countries and institutions, the control mechanisms may 
not result in similar outcomes due to the different legal and cultural circumstances within which 
they exist. Or in the case of ZON Multimedia (“ZON”), a company can interpret a governance 
recommendation however it sees fit. Through my case study of ZON, I find that instead of using 
dual-class shares to amass control, ZON’s articles of association state within its single share 
class, every 400 shares have one vote. In the words of ZON, responding to the Portuguese 
Securities Market Commission’s preference of proportional voting rights for shares held, “that 
principle is merely preferential, so not following it does not necessarily mean not complying 
with the recommendation” (ZON Multimedia 2011, 192).  
As Adams and Ferreira (2008) further emphasize that country-level institutional factors 
matter, Pajuste (2005) begins to show that general corporate governance movements in the EU 
seem to have begun a shift away from dual-class share usage and more towards a one share-one 
vote principle. However, the literature at large notes repeatedly that other mechanisms for 
control such as pyramiding and cross-shareholding are still utilized by companies. This may 
hinder one share-one vote from being perfectly championed as a solution to disproportional 
ownership rights. ZON is a good example of a company using a control enhancing mechanism 
(“CEM”) against the prerogative of national code. In this case, Portugal favors one share-one 
vote, but only as a recommendation and as a non-binding recommendation, ZON can say it 
“complies,” but gives an unconvincing explanation for why it does.  
 
2. Proportionality vs. Disproportionality: Investors’ Rights 
 
Furthering the debate on dual-class shares as a disproportionate mechanism, other authors 
such as Poulsen (2012) have suggested that the very phrase “proportionate” is inappropriate in 
the context of shareholder voting rights. As Poulsen argues, shareholders are automatically at-
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risk of being on unequal footing based on the ability of an investor with the financial resources to 
take a significant stock position within a company through share purchases. Unless caps are 
placed on share sales, any investor that is willing to contribute significant monetary resources 
into a company, where a one share-one vote structure exists, above and beyond the average small 
investor with a highly diversified portfolio, would then have an unequal advantage above those 
with smaller equity stakes in the company. However he does note that dual-class shares can 
exacerbate this problem. Yet he suggests that instead of simply saying that disproportionality is 
hurtful to shareholders, studies should take a greater look at voting power scores. The voting 
power score, according to Poulsen (2012) and Doidge (2004) serves to underline the wedge 
between the largest shareholder’s voting rights and cash flow rights. Rather than splitting 
shareholders by the voting rights they hold, which can differ even across single-share class 
structures, Poulsen stresses that the literature analyzing dual-class shares needs to reimagine how 
we frame “disproportional.”  
Alongside the impact of shareholder purchases of large stock allocations, Kandel, Massa, 
and Simonov (2011) study the shareholder composition of Swedish firms and the behavior of 
shareholders to firm news. What they find is that a similar shareholder base has a greater 
likelihood of voting or selling together upon release of negative firm news. It is not the same for 
purchasing shares however, but their findings convey that similarity of shareholders can increase 
firm profitability and returns. Their research also introduces another vein, albeit small, in the 
literature on dual-class shares: shareholder composition matters and it has utility as a method for 
maximizing the value of firm shareholders (Rock 2012). 
As Rock (2012) notes, a few very well respected US firms (Berkshire Hathaway, Google 
etc.) have employed dual-class share structures as a way of weeding out investors that they do 
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not think will help the firm maximize its own value. But Rock also says that where a company 
decides to incorporate and the exchange that a firm opts to list on will also impact the types of 
shareholders that will then buy-into the firm and that has long-lasting value. The UK is known 
for having strong shareholder protections, as well as providing the means for shareholders to 
push through resolutions at AGMs. The UK has given shareholders a legally defined control over 
a portion of a firm, whereas in the US the Board has ultimate control. These differences will and 
do attract different shareholders, according to Rock. How a firm approaches listing dual-class 
shares will be impacted by where it decides to list. Similarly, whether or not a firm becomes 
multinational or expands its international footprint, its shareholder base will become less 
homogenous and possibly, less understanding of the social, political, and business culture the 
firm was creating within.  
The UK has been likened to the Anglo-American corporate governance system, yet it has 
neither an exactly Anglo-American nor a Continental European structure. It may be helpful to 
consider their corporate governance methods in contrast to the two other systems. Research by 
Doidge (2004) shows that even in the UK, firms with dual-class share structures had one of the 
highest voting power concentrations out of the sample data. This suggests that there may not be a 
major divergence between the Continental European and Anglo-Saxon, new-UK model for dual-
class shares. Where the EU has been singled out for a supposed adherence to dual-class shares, 
this practice is still common in the US and UK, too. Concentrated shareholder structures seen in 
Sweden has also been singled out for dual-class share use and has made for very interesting 
studies of shareholder protections amongst block-holders. Sweden may represent an outlier 
country in much of the literature due to its unique combination of dual-class favoring firms and 
strong minority shareholder protections.   
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Therefore, depending on control and capital goals of a firm, the share structure adopted 
can yield valuable information about the needs of the firm and its preferred corporate governance 
structure. My review of British Petroleum (“BP”) and Royal Dutch Shell show that two firms 
incorporated in the UK, both with dual-class shares, are not identical. Where Royal Dutch Shell 
has chosen to give each share class one vote per share, BP still has a disproportionate voting 
structure. There must be another reason, apart from dual-class shares, that drives application of 
voting rights. Additional literature on dual-class shares also considers the role of stock exchanges 
on control mechanisms and voting rights. Perhaps stock exchanges exert more influence on firms 
than shareholders or corporate governance codes can.  
 
3. Stock Exchanges As Mechanisms of Influence on Dual-class Shares 
 
 Since the 1920s, reform of dual-class listings has been variable across exchanges and 
countries, adding to the confusion and shifting of perspectives towards the use of dual-class 
shares amongst a backdrop of shifting corporate governance standards. According to Burkart and 
Lee (2007) as well as others (see; e.g., Manne 1965; Easterbrook and Fischel 1983), 
shareholders’ most important contractual right is their ability to vote on corporate affairs, making 
dual-class shares a significant detractor to that embedded ideal by specifically decreasing the 
voting proportion of shareholders or taking it away completely. It is no surprise, then, that the 
New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) banned the listing of firms that had non-voting stock in an 
attempt to strengthen shareholder protections (Seligman 1986; Burkart and Lee 2007). 
Throughout the 20th century, non-voting stock lost its favor with many corporations and became 
uncommon on stock exchanges both in the US and in Europe. However in the 1980s, hostile 
takeovers gained in popularity and with them arrived a resurgence of corporate controls that 
could concentrate ownership as an insiders’ attempt to safeguard against potential acquisitions. 
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Thereafter, dual-class shares once again became a method for centralized control of the firm. In 
1986, the NYSE walked away from its one share-one vote requirement on account of growing 
competition from the American Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, both of which accepted listings 
from firms issuing dual-class shares. The move by the NYSE was clearly a strategic one in that it 
found itself at a competitive disadvantage by not listing companies with dual-class shares. 
Despite listing firms that could be seen as having better corporate governance standards and 
fairer ownership-to-cash-flow-rights ratios, it seems as though corporations and exchanges, as 
well as shareholders, were not on the same page about core corporate governance tenets at the 
time. It appears that by the 1980s, one share-one vote had not been fully adopted as a standard of 
best practice.  
Indeed, many parties to this ongoing debate still vacillate between the pros and cons of 
dual-class shares. To be clear, both exchanges and national governments around the world have 
taken differing stances on their use. In an empirical study of US firms using dual-class shares 
from 1995 to 2002, Gompers et al. (2008) found that it is possible for a firm owner to make a 
rational decision to lose a portion of firm value in order to maintain control. Ownership may 
prove to have greater long-term benefits than short-term losses through enacting a 
disproportionate voting scheme. Given the considerable differences between US and European 
corporate governance practices, it could be conceived that one share-one vote can have differing 
operational effects across countries and exchanges.  
 
4. EU and US-level Best Practices on Shareholder Rights 
 
Corporate governance literature considering global aspects of the one share-one vote 
debate has concluded research of potential effects via strengthening of European Union (“EU”) 
standards on dual-class shares. In a review of potential adoption of regulation for one share-one 
 37 
vote in the US and EU, Guido Ferrarini (2006) has analyzed the EU’s Takeover Directive, the 
proposed “break through rule” and other scholars’ research on possible effects this rule and 
others may have on one share-one vote. The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in 
the US adopted Rule 19c-4 which prohibits firms listed on exchanges from retroactively 
“nullifying, restricting or disparately reducing the per share [sic] voting rights” of securities’ 
shareholders (Loss and Seligman 2003; Ferrarini 2006). Therefore, while new firms listing were 
allowed to have dual-class shares, dual-class recapitalizations were banned. But in a decision by 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the SEC rule was repealed (Ferrarini 2006). In 
comparison to the back-and-forth rulemaking in the US, the EU gathered together a group of 
experts to form the High Level Group of Company Law Experts who produced the well-known 
Winter Report on January 10, 2002. In light of existing corporate takeovers, the committee 
proposed a “break through rule,” which says that upon an investor acquiring a certain threshold 
of cash flow rights to a firm, 75 percent has been suggested, that investor should be able to 
successfully break through any control structures in place at the firm. According to Ferrarini, the 
creation of the rule was based on two main principles: first that during takeover bids, 
shareholders have the ultimate decision-making power vested in them; and second, that there 
exist proportionality between risk acceptance and control [of the firm] (2006). 
In essence, such a rule would be applied to pre-bid defenses and multiple voting rights 
would no longer be allowed. Thus, as Ferrarini states, “the bidder acquiring 75 percent or more 
of the risk bearing capital should have been able to control the affairs of the company” (2006, 3). 
Critics of the break through rule cited loss of control and then loss of compensation by those 
taking control. Subsequently, the Takeover Directive would cover this complaint by requiring 
due compensation. However the break through rule, as nullifying the effect of dual-class shares, 
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could then embolden companies to use a pyramiding mechanism for concentrating control, a 
particular tactic that has been found to be more difficult to regulate.  
Such tactics establish that one share-one vote may not be the only method of controlling 
vote shares within a company. Moreover, research from Coates (2003) has established that 
significant voting control can be found via a disproportionality seen in dual-class shares, but that 
it is instead from one share-one vote structures already in place. Consequently, there is 
significant debate about the extent of harm that dual-class share structures create when 
juxtaposed against the myriad of corporate governance structures and mechanisms that 
companies can employ to manipulate and retain control. The types of corporate governance 
provisions that companies can choose have changed over time and have been affected by 
globalized markets, different market opinions towards the Anglo-American and Continental 
European corporate governance systems, as well as the variety of mixing of tools in corporate 
governance arrangements that have been employed (Aguilera and Jackson 2010). When 
discussing levels of harm and the “good” or “bad” aspects of a mechanism for control, Aguilera 
and Jackson touch upon important aspects that must also be considered, such as the legal context 
that companies act within and the arrangements chosen therein (2010). 
Despite critiques of proposed dual-class share regulations, debate continues. Many 
corporate governance codes in the EU support the one share-one vote principle, however as a 
potential best practice, should it be codified into law and later harmonized across countries 
(namely the EU and to the US)? This question has yet to be firmly settled. 
Hart (1995) suggests that there are two different company valuations, the public value 
involving dividends and then the private value that insiders benefit from. One theory of dual-
class shares is that through centralizing control of the company with firm insiders, they are better 
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placed to create firm wealth and then shares held by those with fewer voting rights would see the 
value of their shares increase (Fischel 1987; Ferrarini 2006). This would then potentially increase 
both the public and private values of the firm in question. Yet firms are mostly valued by their 
public appearance. Fischel (1987) discusses proportional ownership as one of many possibilities 
that firms may consider when offering their company to the public. An IPO displays a company 
and subjects it to considerable public critique. This could potentially become an opportunity for a 
firm to improve its corporate governance appearance rather than taint or entrench it through 
implementation of control enhancing mechanisms. Yet, Fischel has also mentioned some 
differing CEM tools that were previously discussed. In a way, he speaks of them not from an 
entirely amoral, unethical or illegal perspective that taints the validity of exchanges and 
companies employing them, but as a mechanism to be used if and when necessary.  
Fischel writes from the perspective of the 1980s, when tides changed a second time. 
Since then, the US has seen considerable opposition from both sides of the debate: strong 
shareholder protections versus a friendly business environment. Proponents of dual-class shares 
have long suggested that during an IPO, prospective shareholders have access to security class 
information and if a firm has chosen a dual-class structure, it is actionable information and any 
investor who buys into a class of shares which bring with them limited voting rights, has made a 
conscious decision and must then live with the consequences. As long as the information was not 
hidden and is offered to investors in an open and transparent manner, many would and do argue 
that dual-class shares provide a benefit to companies in allowing them to retain control.  
This argument can be even more interesting when placed within the context of the US, 
which hosts a corporate governance structure comprised of mostly dispersed shareholders who 
support property rights-based arguments for shareholdings and their management (Aguilera and 
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Jackson 2003). The argument against dispersed shareholdings is that shareholders care less for 
the long-term health of a company and more for short-term incentives, whereas firm insiders 
may have personal and career liabilities tied to the firm and are better situated to make decisions 
that will ensure a firm’s long-term success. The insider-outsider debate still continues today, but 
one share-one vote reduces this conversation to a slightly more manageable issue.  
The NYSE stated that it would have enjoyed keeping its one share-one vote rule, but only 
if the other exchanges would also adopt it (Fischel 1987). A key part of this debate may be 
summarized by Fischel’s quote that “[t]he rules and trading technologies of each exchange 
reflect the set of conditions best suited for the firms listing on the exchange. Since firms issuing 
stock differ, the best exchange rules for them will differ as well” (1987, 127). There has been a 
constant shifting of listing rules and firm affinity towards one share-one vote. Similarly, public 
demands for better corporate governance have come and gone with corporate governance 
scandals from the 1980s to today. Recent technology IPOs of Google, Facebook, and Zynga may 
suggest the US is not tied-to one share-one vote and perhaps, may be experiencing a resurgence 
of firm use of this mechanism. Furthermore, with Manchester United’s move to the NYSE 
specifically on account of dual-class share allowances, it necessitates that we take another look at 
US opinions and valuations of best practices in corporate governance as it relates to one share-
one vote. 
 
C. Conclusion 
 
Heretofore, research has not shown any cohesive movement bringing both the US and EU 
together on one page. As noted by Aguilera and Gregory (2003), investors are not governed by 
one institutional framework and preferences among them will vary. Being impacted also by the 
rules of an investor’s parent organization alongside differing regulations from exchange to 
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exchange and country to country, the potential characteristics and ways in which decisions are 
concluded can create a web of outcomes (Aguilera, Kabbach-Castro, and Crespi-Cladera 2012). 
There are a variety of questions that may then be raised, such as: Why has the NYSE continued to 
allow dual-class shareholdings despite its history of strong corporate governance standards? In 
addition, Can the US learn anything from the EU in terms of broad-based rulemaking and 
implementation of one share-one vote reform? In fact, research by Aguilera and Williams (2009) 
suggests that thought-leaders running in mainstream corporate governance debates who support 
the idea of Anglo-American corporate governance exceptionalism (see works by La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer), and whose arguments have been widely accepted, may be 
reconsidered after analysis that “companies with controlling shareholders can actually 
outperform companies without, contingent on the nature of the owners” (Aguilera and Williams 
2009, 14). 
These questions along with those that may arise upon further analysis of current research 
on one share-one vote will continue to add to the debate and enlighten policy makers, 
corporations, and investors. As Fischel noted, “uninformed investors transact on the same terms 
as informed investors” (1987, 125).  Perhaps if enough momentum can be gathered, a 
harmonized rule or best practice will catch on and a majority of exchanges and firms will follow 
suit.     
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 METHODOLOGY 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Much of the literature on dual-class shares has taken a quantitative approach. Regression 
analyses have been used most often and sample sizes have been large across sectors or within a 
single sector and country. However, my research of dual-class shares was not focused on 
compiling a large swath of data across one sector, country or region. Instead, my research sought 
to fill a gap in the literature that had not focused on a study of dual-class shares across firms in 
the EU and US and within different industries. As this would have to be both comprehensive, but 
on a smaller scale and yet also pared down for maneuverability and taking into account 
potentially significant differences in legal and cultural frameworks, a qualitative approach was 
chosen. A qualitative analysis allowed me to consider multiple variables and notate potential 
alternative incentives to businesses that had not been noted in prior research.   
 
B. Qualitative Paradigm 
 
My research was based on a pragmatic paradigm that could ground the importance of 
rules and guidance firms previously and currently employ in their business, namely, for 
structuring their shares. Through centering my data gathering on the pragmatic paradigm, I was 
able to mix methods within the qualitative framework where appropriate and stay focused on the 
real-world utility of my data findings. Having additional flexibility through a pragmatic mindset 
fit my research question particularly well due to its higher likelihood of conflict when analyzing 
guidance across codes of corporate governance, company laws, federal, and supranational 
regulations as well as industry best practices. Being confined to a strict quantitative or qualitative 
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methodology was not appropriate to my research question and the inherent variability therein. 
Using mixed methods as they fit my research question with a pragmatic worldview aptly served 
the needs of my research question. 
A pragmatic paradigm is well suited to looking at dual-class shares and one share-one 
vote because as Duemer and Zebidi (2009) note, epistemological debates on the nature of truth 
have revolved around “Plato’s and Socrates’ universal truth, the Sophists’ relative truth, and 
Aristotle’s ‘golden mean’” (163), and how they relate to quantitative, qualitative, and mixed 
methods approach, respectively. Using a pragmatic paradigm, one is better equipped to use a 
mixed methods approach in order to comprehend our reality. That concept is further expanded 
upon by Duemer and Zebidi when they note that understanding the world is through our 
experience of it expressed in a holistic manner, not through a rote set of ideas or facts. To 
properly capture our world in this manner, context and comparison can and should be made 
thereafter from observation and data gathering. Then, where debate as to the nature of truth 
exists in methodological choice, one may be able to see that there exists interplay between 
universal and relative truth as well as the golden mean. The emphasis of a blending and real 
world understanding that one type of truth may not entirely exist is what the pragmatic paradigm 
best exemplifies.  
Pragmatism will help to convey data as it relates to the world as-is. However clean a 
quantitative study may be, it is extremely valuable to take into consideration intangible realities 
that are not suited for quantifiable methods. Therefore, through observation of nuances in reality, 
with their shifting and changing characteristics, one can better comprehend how they play a key 
role in how firms operate and corporate governance reacts and responds. By adopting a 
pragmatic paradigm, my research looked at firm and governmental behaviors with the goal of 
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obtaining a comprehensive understanding of dual-class shares, one share-one vote, their variable 
application, and implications that such behaviors have on corporate governance practices within 
and across the EU and US.  
 
C. Data Methods and Sources 
 
The methods I used included both legal and company document analysis and case studies 
of firms. Document analysis was utilized in order to understand the legal framework that the EU 
and US have created at the supranational and federal level, respectively. Case studies were used 
in order to focus my question to capture how public firms currently issuing shares for trading 
have used and disclosed dual-class shares and voting rights. 
 
1. Document Analysis 
 
Document analysis was a key source of information in my research and data gathering 
due to the legal nature of dual-class shares and voting rights. It provided a solid framework 
against which I could juxtapose my case studies against and compare different legal traditions as 
well as cultural mores that may have had an influence. Capturing this information in its written 
form also assisted my research in that it gave general ideas and theories more weight.  
 
a. EU Legal Sources 
 
To conduct this analysis for the EU, I gathered electronic versions of directives from 
“EUR-Lex,” the online portal to EU law and the Official Journal of the European Union. Where 
studies, working groups, meeting documents, and additional information that did not fall into the 
category of “law” were necessary to create a comprehensive framework of EU corporate 
governance, I used the European Commission’s website, its respective committee pages, and 
their document filings and notifications as listed.  
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In addition to EU-level law, I also gathered corporate governance codes from each EU 
Member State in order to have a secondary source of information that could assist in describing 
voting right guidance across Member States. I also gathered listing rules and requirements from 
stock exchanges being used by firms included in my case study. The use of these additional 
documents played a helpful role where a EU directive relied on the principle of subsidiarity. 
However, my research was focused on the EU as the operative set of institutions for corporate 
governance guidance and therefore, any ruling at the Member State level, while valuable, serves 
as a further explanation and descriptive factor where EU directives and guidance may be unclear. 
 
b. US Legal Sources 
 
 In my inquiry into US regulations, I looked at applicable federal securities laws and 
regulations from the US Securities and Exchange Commission, State-level company law, and 
stock exchange listing requirements that could be applied to firms considered in my case studies. 
In order to find federal laws, I used THOMAS, the online database of The Library of Congress. 
Where further discussion on rule creation and application was necessary, I referred back to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s website.  
 
2. Case Studies 
 
The case study method served the goal of my research by allowing me to look at firms 
across industries and countries in a comparative manner. This approach was adequate in that it 
provided a broad enough scope to consider firm variables in addition to industry-specific 
behaviors and differences in legal tradition and regulatory policy. However it also allowed me to 
narrow my scope to a smaller grouping of companies that would allow for a more in depth 
review. The benefit of taking an in depth view into firm use of dual-class shares and voting rights 
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is that it may better capture variables left untouched by a quantitative methodology like a 
regression analysis.  
My case studies consisted of 24 firms in the EU and US, reviewing their use of dual-class 
shares or one share-one vote for the years of 2006 to 2011. The firms were distributed evenly 
between the EU and US, with three for the US and three for the EU on a per-industry level. 
Firms were selected from four leading industries. The industries were chosen based first and 
foremost on their representation in the S&P 500, FTSE 100 and 350, as well as the S&P Euro 
350 indices. The industries that my case study considered included (1) Cable and Satellite, (2) 
Major Integrated Oil and Gas, (3) Packaged Foods, and (4) Software and Technology Services. 
These industries and their firm composition were first filtered through the Capital IQ database 
where I selected only the US and the 27 EU Member States to be included. Secondly, within 
industries, I also used Capital IQ to further narrow my pool of firms with selection criteria that 
ranked firms by capitalization levels, competitors within their industry and across countries, as 
well as the most important indicator: firm use of dual-class shares. I then crosschecked my initial 
group of firms and their competitors with data from Mergent Online and Morningstar for 
robustness of comparison.  
Chosen firms included: Cablevision, Comcast, Time Warner, British Sky Broadcasting, 
SES, ZON Multimedia, British Petroleum, Royal Dutch Shell, Total, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, 
ExxonMobil, General Mills, Hershey, Kellogg, CSM, Danone, Naturex, Apple, Google, IBM, 
Acando, Dassault, and SAP. Countries represented from the EU include: France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK. Their inclusion as case studies was a 
fine-tuned process after significant filtering for diversity of country of incorporation, reasonable 
competitors across the EU and US, use of dual-class shares as well as access to a full set of 
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annual reports that could be analyzed. I wanted to use industry leaders as well as a few EU firms 
that may not be as well known in the US for the sake of better illustrative points. Whereby a firm 
is larger and has greater presence in the market, there may be “box checking” for corporate 
governance practices and I wanted to see how smaller firms in different markets may compare.  
I used firms that did not have dual-class shares as an independent variable. In order to 
assess firms’ use and disclosure of dual-class shares and voting rights associated, I gathered data 
from company-issued annual reports and US SEC filings where applicable. There were some EU 
firms that did not have SEC filings under the foreign private issuer category.  
SEC documents used included proxy notifications (DEF 14A) as well as 10-K and 20-F 
filings.1 I did run into problems in creating an ideal firm comparison across industries and the 
EU and US that I will further expand upon in explaining the limitations of the study. However, in 
order to help remedy what problems I did find in creating a fair and sound set of firms to 
compare, I added in an analysis of other commonly accepted corporate governance best practices 
to act as an equalizing yet also explanatory factor across firms. The corporate governance 
provisions I considered included: (1) frequency of Boards of Directions nominations and 
elections; (2) existence of staggered boards; (3) existence of combined Chairman and CEO roles; 
(4) percentage of independent board members; (5) availability of cumulative voting; (6) 
existence of an advisory shareholder vote on executive compensation; (7) accounting standards 
used; and lastly (8) which corporate governance code(s) had been implemented.  
I chose to study the years of 2006 to 2011 in order to capture how SOX and some Dodd-
Frank reforms had been implemented within firms. I also wanted to look at a recent time period 
that would yield an up-to-date set of data that would be relevant to current shareholders.  
                                                
1 10-K is the form for US domestic firms to file their annual reports on; 20-F is the form for foreign 
private issues to file their annual reports on.  
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D. Limitations of the Study 
 
Through arranging my data gathering and analysis in these two manners, I was provided 
with the information necessary to take a more precise gaze onto the phenomenon of variable 
voting rights in different firms, industries, and countries. However, the industry and firm 
selection criteria created unique and unforeseen problems in the data gathering process. Due to 
my research question that considered operating behaviors across industries and the EU and US, 
creating a harmonious study with equal industry categorizations, firm capitalizations, and 
competitors in addition to choosing from this group only firms that had dual-class shares, made 
for very difficult selection of case studies. It was important to the legitimacy and ethics of my 
research to be as fair as possible, however given the variables I analyzed and multiple levels I 
had to consider, industries across countries and not within one country, there were inherent 
constraints that I was unable to work around.  
An example of this selection problem arose when I first considered the pharmaceutical 
industry. Within the EU, there were many firms that had been pinpointed within my Capital IQ 
results as having dual-class shares, but there were very few comparative firms in the US and 
none of them were listed as having dual-class shares. Comparing US pharmaceutical firms 
without dual-class shares to EU pharmaceutical firms with dual-class shares would not be an 
equal comparison and would bias my analysis against the EU. Using this comparison could be 
helpful to focus on industry-level trends alone, but that was not the goal of my research. This 
example begins to show how industries across countries can vary and that my research on dual-
class shares focuses on a cross-country angle that creates another level of difficulty when 
creating a fair and balanced study with multiple variables. This is, perhaps, an example of why a 
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gap in the literature exists. It is extremely difficult to create a strong comparison where each firm 
has similar market capitalizations, can be compared with another firm with similar voting rights 
and yet also comes from a different country where nuances within that realm can also be 
considered. The variables add up to create a mix that can be problematic. In order to best combat 
these problems, I used data triangulation to consider other information gathered to support or 
explain the findings that I did have. The data used for this triangulation came from the legal 
documents I gathered, SEC rules, as well as firm information provided through their annual 
filing documents and their website investor information. Through my use of data triangulation, I 
hoped to better capture the multiple perspectives that are at play when a firm chose to issue its 
shares for public listing and also, it assisted in cleaning up data inconsistencies and problematic 
aspects to my case studies.  
 
E. Summary 
 
In my research of dual-class shares and one share-one vote, I sought to understand and 
show how different corporate governance guidance and EU and US regulations may have an 
impact on firm use of these mechanisms. Through document analysis, I analyzed the state of play 
that these mechanisms exist within and potential future implications and directions of regulation. 
Through my case studies, I analyzed how firms currently listed for trading have organized their 
shares, disclosed their voting rights and how this varied across the EU and US. The difficulty I 
experienced in creating my case studies will be further expanded upon in my findings and will 
help to explain that in the process of trying to formulate a sound set of case studies, it revealed a 
telling finding and situation in and of itself. The approach and methodology I used took many 
variables into consideration and tried to fully capture the rich environment that corporate 
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governance lies within and the actors that all contribute to a rather complicated array of 
regulations, best practices, and assumptions on how firms should be monitored.   
This analysis is important because it begins to answer questions asking if there is a 
convergence or divergence between EU and US corporate governance practices. I suggest that 
neither action takes precedence over the other, but that this area is dynamic and movement is 
being made in new directions.  
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CHAPTER 4  
 
EU AND US LEGAL FRAMEWORK FINDINGS 
 
 
A. European Union Legal Framework 
 
 The EU is a complex set of institutions that over many years have added to the 
cornucopia of regulations existing within its acquis communautaire as well as the Member States 
that have signed on to be part of the EU. Due to the various layers of responsibility and 
oversight, it is important to lay an explanatory foundation that will assist in conveying where 
responsibility lies for company law, corporate governance standards, and setting best practices 
from here forward. With the advent of the European Single Market and the EU’s role in 
regulating competition policy, it is reasonable to predict that the EU may take a stronger position 
in its regulatory role. Indeed, it has incentive to both protect the internal market and maintain 
competitiveness, while also protecting shareholders and the EU region at large from potentially 
disastrous corporate governance failings.     
 
1. Background 
  
 The EU as an economic and political union does not have complete legislative authority 
over its Member States. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter 
TFEU) outlines the three levels of competence that the EU holds. It states that the EU has the 
ability to legislate and is the sole actor in its areas of exclusive competence.2 These areas allow 
for the EU to proscribe binding legislation on an issue. In areas where the EU shares competence 
with Member States, when the EU does not act is the only time when a Member State can act, 
however, where the EU has competence to support, coordinate or supplement actions with 
                                                
2 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 3, 2008 O.J. C 115/ 
49, [hereinafter TFEU]. 
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Member States, the EU cannot adopt legally binding rules that require Member States to 
harmonize with them. These differing levels of power between the EU and Member States 
exemplify and bring the principle of subsidiarity to the fore. Under subsidiarity, a decision must 
be made whether to legislate from the EU or Member State level. If Member State rules have 
been found to be insufficient and the EU can improve upon the status quo, it assumes rulemaking 
power and precedence. The EU institutions have two types of legislation that they can initiate: 
Regulations and Directives. In the EU, a Regulation is most similar to laws and statutes in the 
US, whereas a EU Directive is a binding instruction that Member States must then adopt and 
place into national laws and regulations that can carry out the directions put forth in the 
Regulation or Directive.  
 However, recent changes emerging from the Lisbon Treaty have made it possible for 
Member States’ national courts to issue an opinion on an EU proposal, thus allowing for 
potential changes and non-compliance from Member States in order to fit national needs and 
preferences.3  
 Although rule making within the EU may be reminiscent of the federalist system in place 
in the US, whereby states have their own governments and applicable rules, Member States of 
the EU should not be considered equivalent to US states. They are neither entirely covered nor 
supported by the Institutions. Member States are, first and foremost, sovereign nations capable 
and willing to deviate from EU policy.  
 
 
 
                                                
3 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, 2007 O.J. C 306/1, [hereinafter Lisbon Treaty]. 
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2. Key Findings 
 
 After taking a full appraisal of EU level Regulations and Directives applicable to dual-
class shares and one share-one vote, it became apparent quite quickly that many of the existing 
rules run alongside dual-class shares, but do not directly address them as being taboo or 
unethical. 
 By and large, the majority of rules that Member States must transpose into national law 
come from Directives out of Parliament and the Council. To an extent, these Directives are 
complicated and not easy to understand due to their layered nature. As the EU has grown since 
its inception, rules have been added, amended, repealed, and codified. It is possible for one 
Directive to take into consideration six additional Directives, which are then amended to account 
for the latest rule. The EU has recognized the pitfalls of such a system and within it, has a built-
in assessment period that occurs five years after a Directive or Regulation has been accepted. 
This is a helpful attribute given the rapidity of innovation in the securities sector and of some 
business sectors. In order to best ensure a well functioning internal market, it behooves the 
Commission to regularly revisit rules and analyze their performance.  
 There are a variety of Directives, Regulations, Communications and formal studies that 
address company law and corporate governance to some extent. In general, I found that the rules 
in place were quite stringent and had good intentions behind them. Furthermore, the EU was 
careful to note in each Directive or Regulation, the article from which they were given exclusive 
or shared competency. This aspect is very important because many times, critics of the EU have 
accused it of exercising a democratic deficit. The EU has in fact used the term “democratic 
accountability” in Directive 2008/22/EC on transparency requirements. There is 
acknowledgement within the EU that outsiders may doubt the amount of power conferred upon 
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the institutions. However, the EU institutions have made great strides in both disclosing their 
work to the public, but also creating rules that will protect the public as well.  
 The EU has moved swiftly to address corporate governance shortfalls. Figure 1 displays a 
timeline that highlights a few of the more acute scandals experienced in the EU and subsequent 
responses from the EU institutions thereafter. 
 
Figure 1. EU Corporate Scandals and Response Timeline 
 
Legend:  Red diamonds symbolize corporate and financial scandals, named directly below.  
Green circles symbolize legal remedies and formal reviews, named a level below 
scandals.  
Dashed line and italicized text indicates future dates and goals.   
 
There also exists a wider variety of rules that are applicable to company law and corporate 
governance standards. They are included in Table 2 on the next page. 
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Table 2. EU Company Law & Corporate Governance Rules 
Relevant EU Measures for Company Law & Corporate Governance 
Directive 2006/46/EC Annual and consolidated accounts of 
financial institutions 
Directive 2004/109/EC Harmonization of transparency requirements 
Directive 2007/36/EC Rights of shareholders in listed companies 
Directive 2004/25/EC Takeover bids 
Commission Recommendation of 15 
February 2005 
Role of directors on supervisory boards 
Commission Recommendation of 14 
December 2004 
Remuneration of directors for listed 
companies 
Commission Recommendation of 30 April 
2009 
Directive 2005/56/EC 
 
Complementing recommendations for 
remuneration of directors for listed 
companies 
Cross-border mergers of limited liability 
companies 
Directive 2001/86/EC 
 
Supplementing Statute for a European 
company and involvement of employees 
Directive 2009/102/EC 
 
Company law on single-member private 
limited liability companies 
Eleventh Council Directive 89/666/EEC 
 
Disclosure requirements for branches of other 
Member State companies 
Sixth Council Directive 82/891/EEC Division of public limited liability companies 
Directive 2011/35/EU Mergers of public limited liability companies 
Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC 
 
Protection of interests of members of public 
limited liability companies 
Directive 2009/101/EC 
 
Coordination of protections of interests of 
members of public limited liability 
companies 
Council Regulation (EC) 2157/2001 Statute for a European company (SE) 
Council Regulation (EEC) 2137/85 European Economic Interest Grouping 
(EEIG) 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1435/2003 
 
Statute for a European Cooperative Society 
(SCE) 
 Source: Roadmap “Communication on the Action Plan: European Company and Corporate Governance – 
a modern legal framework for sustainable and competitive companies, December 12, 2012. Compiled by 
author.   
 
However from all Directives and Regulations considered, in addition to policy papers and 
reports, the Takeover Directive must be singled out for putting forth great minority shareholder 
protections in the event of a takeover bid. Unfortunately, despite its ambitious goals, each feature 
of the Directive that was meant to ensure greater protection for minority shareholders became 
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optional for Member States to implement. This has been a running theme within the EU through 
its copious Directives – there is a desire to create harmonious rules and bring together disparate 
company law, but at every opportunity to do just that, rules become watered down in order to fit 
to Member State prerogatives. Instead of moving towards convergence over very clear corporate 
governance practices, there is a mass shuffle towards one direction, but then one strong wind can 
blow the mass into an array of autumn leaves, windswept and potentially rule weary.  
 
3. Analysis 
 
 Within the Single Market, the EU seeks to align policies affecting the operation and flow 
of commerce. Sharing competence with Member States, rules are discussed and different levels 
of collective action and state sovereignty are applied.  
 According to Verdun (2011), the creation of the Single Market allows the EU to establish 
itself as a force within the global political economy. Greater policy making authority through 
new treaties has given the EU an opportunity to regulate those businesses operating inside the 
Union. Because of the scope of countries involved in the Single Market and the reach of 
multinational corporations, the EU has now taken on the role of standard setting since businesses 
are faced with changing their operations to fit EU and Member State protocols. Within the EU, 
the Commission has initiated many reforms through Directives. It is the Directorate-General for 
Internal Market and Services (“DG MARKT”) at the Commission that has oversight on the 
issuance and trading of securities on regulated exchanges within the EU Single Market and has 
been very involved in corporate governance reforms. Therefore, looking at rules originating 
through the institutions will help to outline the direction and preferences that the EU holds 
regarding dual-class shares. 
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 In the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”), the Treaty sets the groundwork for EU policymaking. Article 2(3) of the TFEU states 
that “[t]he Member States shall coordinate their economic and employment policies within the 
arrangements as determined by this Treaty, which the Union shall have competence to provide.”4 
Exclusive competence is noted in Article 3(1)b and Article 3(1)e, which provide the EU with 
rule setting power in competition policy for the functioning of the internal market and for 
common commercial policy, respectively.5 Broadly speaking, the TFEU outlines opportunities 
for economic policy harmonization and regulation, starting at the EU-level. However it must be 
noted that in Article 2(5), the TFEU also states that certain areas will be further expanded upon 
which allows the EU to “support, coordinate or supplement” Member State actions without 
eradicating their given competence in an area. In this regard, it becomes apparent that area 
competence and coordination between the EU and Member States, although clear and concise, 
has been established in a flexible manner. The TFEU has established institutional and Member 
State competencies; it will now serve as our foundation for future policymaking within the 
Single Market.  
 
a. Directives and Regulations 
 
 EU Regulations are immediately binding on Member States as soon as they are passed. 
Member States do not need to take any additional action to ensure their implementation. Unlike 
Regulations, EU Directives go through Member State authorities for their implementation. 
Directives are often meant to bring different Member State laws into harmony and therefore, 
through amendment or creation of applicable laws in Member States, the Directives’ end goals 
can be captured. The Winter Report and Green Paper have heavily influenced many of the 
                                                
4 TFEU, supra note 1, art. 3, 2008 O.J. C 115. 
5 Id. art. 3, 2008 O.J. C 115. 
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Directives and Regulations analyzed below. The Winter Report emphasized the use of model 
laws and Directives that provide greater disclosure from securities issuers; these themes will be 
seen in the Directives and Regulations analyzed. Similarly, the Green report touched upon the 
importance that Member State stock exchanges can have on influencing firm behavior and 
disclosure of its corporate governance practices. Influencing future rulemaking at the EU level, 
the Green Paper also emphasized the need for detailed disclosure and incentivizing corporate 
governance practices that underscore long-term goals. 
The following list of Directives and Regulations have been created by the EU institutions 
and transposed into national law by Member State governments. I found the following rules in 
Table 3 below to be most applicable to the oversight of voting stock and maintenance of 
shareholder protections. These were reviewed and their descriptions follow. 
 
Table 3. EU Rules Covering Dual-Class Shares 
Relevant EU Measures for Dual-Class Shares 
Directive 2001/34/EC Stock Exchange Information Directive 
Directive 2003/71/EC Prospectus Directive 
Directive 2004/25/EC Takeover Directive 
Directive 2004/109/EC Transparency Directive 
Directive 2007/36/EC Shareholder Rights Directive 
Directive 2006/46/EC Enhanced Reporting Directive 
Directive 2010/73/EU Amended Prospectus Directive 
Regulation No. 1095/2010 Established a European Supervisory 
Authority 
Source: Internal Market and Services Directorate-General, European Commission; EUR-Lex 
Compiled by author. 
 
 
i. Directive 2001/34/EC 
 
 Council Directive 2001/34/EC (Stock Exchange Information Directive) requests that 
coordination be sought for admissions requirements of securities that will be publicly listed on 
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stock exchanges within the EU.6 By doing so, the EU can ensure greater investor protections and 
a more unified and level playing field for market participants. The directive also requires that the 
rule be applied to securities regardless of the issuers’ legal status – making it, essentially, 
nationality-blind. The Stock Exchange Information Directive also outlines specific 
categorizations for voting rights of a person or legal entity that must disclose the shares and votes 
that are held.7 Article 97 of the Directive establishes that in dealing with persons or legal entities 
that fail to disclose, they are to be dealt with by the designated authority within each Member 
State, to oversee information disclosures and address shortfalls when and where appropriate. In 
terms of the harmonization of listing requirements and its dissemination, the Directive notes that 
it is to be published and circulated either via Member State newspapers or through the printing of 
brochures made available through stock exchanges where listing is being conducted.8 
 The Directive also states specifically that “this coordination of the conditions for 
admission of securities to official listing should be sufficiently flexible [author emphasized] to 
enable account to be taken of present differences in the structures of securities markets” allowing 
for Member States to tailor the directive as necessary to fit the structures of their existing 
exchange(s).9 The EU recognized existing variations among Member States and exchanges on 
their different safeguards and disclosures, noting that they “inhibit the financing of the 
undertakings and investment throughout the Community”; therefore, it was the intent of the 
Directive to reduce the negative impact that the variance had created.10 The point of coordinating 
admissions rules to exchanges within the EU does not pivot on investor protection alone, but also 
                                                
6 Council Directive 2001/34/ EC on the Admission of Securities to Official Stock Exchange Listing and 
on Information to be Published on Those Securities, 2001 O.J. L 184/1 [hereinafter Stock Exchange 
Information Directive]. 
7 Stock Exchange Information Directive, supra note 4, art. 92, 2001 O.J. L 184/1, at 32. 
8 Id. art. 93, at 33. 
9 Stock Exchange Information Directive, supra note 4, ¶ 5, 2001 O.J. 184/1 at 7. 
10 Id. ¶ 10, at 8. 
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harks back to the proper functioning of the internal market. It is the aim of the EU in having a 
Single Market, to reduce barriers to trade and the flow of capital. Therefore, in creating more 
efficient markets, it is important to reach consensus on how securities are judged “fit to list.” The 
Stock Exchange Information Directive recognizes that Member States will have enacted their 
own safeguards regarding listing requirements for securities and the publishing of equivalent 
informational documents on those securities. 
 However the Directive also notes that disclosure is not required for shares already 
admitted for trading if they compose only a portion of a new admission of shares, so long as the 
public is informed of their existence prior to admission and that those preexisting shares will not 
adversely affect shareholders seeking admission.11 In terms of different voting classes, where 
public trading is sought, more stringent reporting requirements are required through the 
Directive, but so long as voting blocks are comprised of non-trading shares and they still disclose 
their existence, the Directive does not cover them.  
 Obligations relating to the information to be published when a major holding in a listed 
company is acquired or disposed of are mentioned in Article 87(1),  
 ...‘controlled undertaking’ shall mean any undertaking in which a natural person  
 or legal entity: (a) has a majority of the shareholders’ or members’ voting rights;  
 or (b) has the right to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the  
 administrative, management or supervisory body and is at the same time a  
 shareholder in, or member of, the undertaking in question; or (c) is a shareholder  
 or member and alone controls a majority of the shareholders’ or members’ voting  
 rights pursuant to an agreement entered into with other shareholders or members  
 of the undertaking.12  
 
There is considerable detail and recognition of the importance of proper disclosures of voting 
rights that are held in publicly traded firms through shares that are both listed and unlisted. 
                                                
11 Id. art. 49, at 21. 
12 Stock Exchange Information Directive, supra note 4, art. 87, at 30. 
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Where there are changes in share ownership that could change the power distribution, adequate 
disclosures are also notated and required.  
 The Stock Exchange Information Directive shows that in 2001, there was a strong 
motivation from the EU to harmonize disclosure policies for securities listed for trading. The EU 
Directive shows that fundamental rules on disclosure policy were being made and an emphasis 
was being placed on disclosing the ownership structure of firm shares and their requisite voting 
rights.  
 
ii. Directive 2003/71/EC 
  
Council Directive 2003/71/EC was created to legislate that firms produce and 
disseminate a Prospectus when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a 
stock exchange.13 This Directive amended Directive 2001/34/EC. Prior to the Directive on 
securities admission to regulated stock exchanges (Directive 2001/34/EC), the Council set up the 
“Committee of Wise Men” on the regulation of securities markets. The outcome from the 
Committee was a recommendation of several changes that could be made to better improve the 
regulation of securities markets across the EU and ground them in firm political reasoning. In an 
attempt to streamline Directives and have the most up to date regulations, Directive 2003/71/EC 
(Prospectus Directive) amends the Directive from 2001. The Prospectus Directive reveals a 
shortcoming of the previous Directive, namely that it did not allow for a Member State, its 
oversight authority or its stock exchange to implement additional requirements that would fall 
under the scope of corporate governance. According to the Prospectus Directive, allowing such 
                                                
13 Council Directive 2003/71/EC on the Prospectus to be Published When Securities Are Offered to the 
Public or Admitted to Trading and Amending Directive 2001/34/EC (amended), 2003 O.J. L 345/64 
[hereinafter Prospectus Directive].
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flexibility would serve to better protect investors where a Member State sought more stringent 
requirements.  
 Mandated prospectus issuances would “enable them [shareholders] to make an informed 
assessment of…risks. ”14 Furthermore, the Amended 2003 Prospectus Directive refers to the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) and states that best practices 
are accepted at the EU and thus, establishing a single, standard set of disclosures for issuers 
would best ensure free movement of cross-border equity offers.15 The main thrust of the 
Directive is to guarantee equal and coordinated disclosure for securities issued in Member States, 
but in a more uniform and self-contained manner. Instead of simple disclosure of information, 
such disclosure would be held within a known document, the Prospectus. Information contained 
within such documents from within each Member State would be uniform and coherent; 
meanwhile, giving due appreciation and flexibility for different types of securities structures 
within firms. Where the IOSCO makes an appearance is when an issuer’s registered office is in a 
third country but the issuer is seeking admission to a Member State exchange. In this case, the 
prospectus must then be drawn up in accordance with international standards via international 
securities commission organizations, such as the IOSCO.16  
 
iii. Directive 2004/25/EC 
  
 By 2004, the Council and Parliament initiated a Directive that sought to harmonize firm 
takeovers within Member States. This Directive is one of the most important for our 
consideration of dual-class shares since it outlined a revocation of special and multiple voting 
rights of shareholders during the takeover process. The intent of the law was to protect 
                                                
14 Prospectus Directive, supra note 11, ¶ 19, at 3. 
15 Id. ¶ 20, 4. 
16 Prospectus Directive, supra note 11, art. 20, at 16. 
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companies and shareholders across the Union. Under Article 2 of the Takeover Directive 
(2004/25/EC), a “takeover bid” is a public offer made to those who hold securities in a firm for 
which some or all of them are sought and timely notification to shareholders and the responsible 
oversight authority designated by the Member State should follow therein.17 On the other side of 
takeover bids, defensive mechanisms that firms have in the event of a takeover bid should be 
properly disclosed on a regular basis through regular company disclosure requirements.  
 Coming back to dual-class shares, of particular note is paragraph 19, noting that Member 
States should ensure that “...restrictions on voting rights, extraordinary appointment rights and 
multiple voting rights should be removed or suspended during the time allowed for the 
acceptance of a bid” but where disabling of rights carried forth a loss, shareholders should be 
compensated.18 This is the break through rule that Ferrarini (2006) had mentioned in his 
research. However this break through rule is not mandatory for Member States to implement and 
thus, where shareholder rights have been taken away, they may not be equitably compensated as 
the rule would demand.  
 
iv. Directive 2004/109/EC 
  
Also in 2004, the Council approved a Directive on harmonizing transparency 
requirements for issuers who are listed on a regulated exchange to release information of holders 
of significant voting rights.19 Then in 2007, a sister Directive was issued laying out the 
provisions for the proper implementation of the Transparency Directive among Member States. 
The Directive as outlined in 2004, required that when voting structure or rights held changed, 
                                                
17 Council Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids, 2004 O.J. L 142/12 [hereinafter Takeover Bids]. 
18 Takeover Bids, supra note 15, ¶ 19, 2004 O.J. L 142/12, at 2. 
19 Council Directive 2004/109/EC on the Harmonization of Transparency Requirements in Relation to 
Information About Issuers Whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and 
Amending Directive 2001/34/EC (amended), 2004 O.J. L 390/38 [hereinafter Transparency Directive of 
2004]. 
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disclosure of such changes would be released to the public.20 Paragraph 22 holds that ongoing 
releases of information to securities holders should be based on equal treatment of those party to 
the same class of shares; therefore, preventing any possible prejudice that would be encountered 
when comparing shares of different voting rights.21 Moreover, Article 10 lists a long line of 
necessary disclosures attributing to holders of significant voting rights. Although I will not list 
every requirement here, it is a thorough list and goes quite far to make sure that both the public at 
large and investors have access to voting rights held within a firm and how that may affect their 
interests or holdings in a firm. The general thrust of the Transparency Directive is to require 
firms to release any change in voting rights held and the structure of them within the firm. To do 
this, firms are required to disclose such information in their periodic financial reports, including 
the annual report.  
 The Transparency Directive could be considered one of the key legal remedies for 
shareholders who are concerned about the dispersal of shares and the voting rights attached to 
firm stock. However an ex post remedy that does not place any ban on potentially 
disproportional voting rights, it does harmonize rules on what is disclosed on vote holdings and 
the manner in which the information is disseminated across Member States. Both the Prospectus 
and Transparency Directives aim to inform shareholders, potential investors, and the public on 
the structure of firm shares, their own shareholdings as well as the rights that are attached to 
shares being issued on a stock exchange. Both Directives seek to create a thorough disclosure 
framework that can capture a variety of firm actions and maneuvers that they may implement 
when dealing with various structures of shares for public consumption. 
 
 
                                                
20 Transparency Directive of 2004, supra note 17, ¶ 18 2004 O.J. L 390/38, at 2. 
21Id. ¶ 22, at 3. 
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v. Directive 2007/36/EC 
 
 Immediately working from the Transparency Directive, the Parliament and Council put 
forth the Shareholder Rights Directive (2007/36/EC).22 This Directive required that Member 
States do more to ensure that shareholders outside the borders of the Member State, but who held 
a voting stake in a firm incorporated in the Member State of concern, ensure that means are 
available for a shareholder to exercise their shares, where voting rights are attached, on a cross-
border basis. The Directive noted that although the disclosure requirements outlined in the 
Transparency Directive were helpful, they did not provide for shareholders to exercise their 
proxy rights when they were outside of a Member State where a firm for which they had invested 
in, was incorporated. This additional rule also notes that where Member States are unable to 
secure such voting rights and electronic voting platforms, the EU will take over, but only to a 
minimal extent that is necessary.23  
 
vi. Directive 2006/46/EC 
  
Slightly wedged between these Directives, a rule was passed that necessitated enhanced 
disclosure of transactions between firm executives, their spouse and other persons or entities that 
have previously been exempt. In addition, the Directive provided that firms disclose their 
compliance with a code of corporate governance. The listing of such information was set to be 
included in their corporate governance report, which, could often be found in their annual reports 
as well.24  
                                                
22 Council Directive 2007/36/EC on the Exercise of Certain Rights of Shareholders in Listed Companies, 
2007 O.J. L 184/17 [hereinafter Shareholder Rights Directive]. 
23 Shareholder Rights Directive, supra note 20, ¶ 14, 2007 O.J. L 184/17, at 3. 
24 Council Directive 2006/46/EC amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC on the Annual Accounts of 
Certain Types of Companies, 83/349/EEC on Consolidated Accounts, 86/635/EEC on the Annual 
Accounts and Consolidated Accounts of Banks and other Financial Institutions and 91/674/EEC on the 
 66 
vii. Directive 2010/73/EU 
  
Following these Directives, in 2007 the European Council determined that in light of all 
reporting requirements put forth by the Union, there was agreement that a review of the 
disclosure obligations in the Amended 2003 Prospectus Directive should be enacted in order to 
reduce the burden of reporting that some companies may have experienced thus far.25 The 
original Directive had a mandatory review date set for 5 years after the date of its application. 
Per the mandated review, the Commission decided to simplify reporting procedures without 
compromising investor protection.  
 The amended Directive (2010/73/EU) does not repeal Directive 2003/71/EC that created 
the Prospectus requirement, but instead called for a review of agreed upon changes and the 
existing Directive by January 1, 2016 in-line with its ongoing review. This review process is 
built into the EU legislative system and has been used to pinpoint redundancy among the layered 
structure that Directives have taken on within the EU.  
 
viii. Regulation No. 1095/2010  
 
 There has also been significant attention given to protecting the internal market from 
predatory or falsified acts from companies. Additionally, there has been an emphasis on ensuring 
that the internal market is protected from inefficiencies all while creating Regulations and 
Directives that will assist in spurring efficiency through harmonization and investor protection.  
 Further reforms and recommendations were put forth in 2010, when Council Regulation 
No. 1095/2010 established a European Supervisory Authority, amended Decision No. 
716/2009/EC and repealed Commission Decision 2009/77/EC that created the Committee of 
                                                                                                                                                       
Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts of Insurance Undertakings (amended), 2006 O.J. L 224/1 
[hereinafter Enhanced Reporting Directive]. 
25 Council Directive 2010/73/EU on the Prospectus and Transparency Directive (amendment), 2003 O.J. 
L 354, 2004 O.J. L 390 [hereinafter Amended Prospectus and Transparency Directive of 2010]. 
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European Securities Regulators.26 Prior to and following the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-
2008, the European Parliament was requesting further integration of the EU’s financial markets. 
Following the Larosière report, titled after its chair, Jacques de Larosière, a Group tasked by the 
Commission to submit recommendations on how the EU could better structure supervision over 
the financial system and promote investor confidence, came to the conclusion that a new 
structure of supervisory authorities should be created. 
 As the Directive states,  
[t]he Union has reached the limits of what can be done with the present status of 
the Committees of European Supervisors. The Union cannot remain in a situation 
where there is no mechanism to ensure that national supervisors arrive at the best 
possible supervisory decisions for cross-border financial market participants.27  
 
This is quite a serious statement by the EU and clearly shows that where competence was shared, 
Member State authorities and rulings had yet to aptly share information and harmonize rules in a 
manner that protected investors and increased the ease of doing cross-border business. In this 
respect, complaints from the EU about lack of sufficient harmonization and application of rules 
can be remedied.  
 The Regulation created the European Supervisory Authorities (“ESAs”) and made them 
directly accountable to the Council and Parliament. Its mandate was to “protect public values 
such as the integrity and stability of the financial system, the transparency of markets and 
financial products and the protection of investors.”28 The ESAs would have the responsibility to 
work with complementary Member State authorities to properly implement EU rules. Grounding 
the ESAs authority in Article 114 of the TFEU, the EU maintains exclusive competence and is 
                                                
26 Council Regulation No. 1095/2010 Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European 
Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No. 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission 
Decision 2009/77/EC, 2010 O.J. L 331/84 [hereinafter ESA Directive]. 
27 ESA Directive, supra note 24, ¶ 8, 2010 O.J. 331/85.  
28 Id. ¶ 11, at 86. 
 68 
able to administer its rulings on the security of the internal market through the proposed ESAs. 
The TFEU also gives Member States the ability to disagree or complement a Regulation or 
Directive at the Member State level through a notification procedure through the Commission. If 
a decision made through such procedure is deemed to be unsatisfactory by the Member State, 
then proceedings with the Court of Justice of the European Union can be arranged. 
 Despite the increased power held by the Union, there remain options for Member States 
to depart from EU law where necessary. Also, the Lisbon Treaty has created a potential escape 
route for Member States to also utilize courts to challenge decisions made by the EU, giving 
further authenticity to the separation of powers between EU institutions and Member States. 
Even in the face of these potential disagreements, the spirit of the Directive and the authority of 
the ESAs suggest that the EU seeks to ensure harmonization via its own supranational authority 
and that can use the power of the TFEU to enforce regulations and directives. With the creation 
of the ESAs, they may ultimately have the final say on how securities information is reported 
within and among Member States of the EU.  
 With respect to dual-class shares and voting rights, the ESAs have the authority to 
enforce rules when the Commission chooses to create additional laws that speak to the fairness 
of the securities markets and the investors operating within them. To this end, it is not 
unreasonable to think that disproportionate voting rights could be regulated. However at the 
moment, the Regulation simply creates a set of authorities that have the power to rule and 
oversee the Regulations and Directives created thus far.  
 
b. Papers, Actions Plans and Communications 
 
 In addition to Directives that have been proposed by the Commission and affirmed by 
both the Parliament and Council, DG MARKT of the Commission has promulgated an array of 
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statements and action plans aimed at improving company law and corporate governance within 
the EU. Earlier Directives often link to a study done in 2003 titled “Modernising [sic] Company 
Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A Plan to Move Forward”. 
From an historic standpoint, it is important to take these earlier studies into consideration as they 
have laid the foundation for current discussions on corporate governance practices. However, I 
have chosen to aim my focus on the most up to date papers, conferences and laws in order to best 
approximate where the EU corporate governance rules stand today and where they may be 
headed tomorrow.  
 
i. Winter Report 
 
 One of the seminal reports that set the stage for EU corporate governance rules was the 
“Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts” of January 10, 2002, known 
colloquially as the Winter Report (Winter et al. 2002). The Commission organized the Group and 
tasked it with taking stock of company law and submitting recommendations for the creation of 
an updated, modern framework. With an eye towards cross-border business, it concerned itself 
with many issues relating to rules that could harmonize rules among Member States. The Winter 
Report found that upon its consultation with experts and Member States, there was hesitation 
towards relying too much on Directives and model laws. Concern for these two options was 
explained by potential difficulties that could arise where rules that do not fit well with different 
legal systems across Member States, could cause additional burdens (Winter et al. 2002). 
Nevertheless, the Winter Report stated that model formats might be of most help for fostering 
convergence among national rules within the Union.  
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 The report also states that disclosure may be a valuable tool that could catalyze firms to 
adopt best practices among peers. Where existing rules may be overly burdensome, the Winter 
Report (2002) suggests amendments rather than repealing rules to create efficiency.  
 Chapter three of the Winter Report looked specifically into corporate governance and 
what role the EU should take in strengthening rules in this area. Naturally, the report’s issue date 
was from 2001 and it mentions Enron and acts as a slight reaction to it. Specifically addressing 
the Commission and the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (“ECOFIN”), additional 
mandates for these actors to further review auditing standards was advised. Alongside auditing 
practices, the corporate governance section of the report highlights shareholder responsibility and 
again, emphasizes disclosure as playing a “pivotal role in company law” (Winter et al. 2002, 7). 
With disclosure practices, firms and Member States are recommended to provide adequate 
facilities and means by which shareholders in cross-border situations can properly vote their 
shares and remain informed of firm activity (Winter et al. 2002). Where electronic options exist, 
smaller shareholders will be able to exercise their voting rights, where applicable, but also have 
position alongside institutional investors who, might have previously had a better position in 
regards to ease of voting their stock holdings. Together, both minority shareholders and 
institutional investors will be better placed to remain active in company business. Moreover, the 
report questioned in what way the role of institutional investors could possibly be formally 
codified in rules or guidance. However, the Group ultimately decided that this was not a 
necessary issue to impose as an obligation. The Group did decide to recommend a mandatory 
corporate governance statement to be issued by listed firms, improved Member State alignment 
of corporate governance codes and the monitoring of them, firm disclosure of AGM information 
on their website, additional shareholder right to submit proposals, availability of electronic 
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voting facilities and an option to cross-border vote (Winter et al. 2002, 10). Additionally, it was 
recommended that companies have the right to choose either a one-tier or two-tier board 
structure as well as a requirement for firms to outline their remuneration policy alongside a 
variety of others that, although important, are not as closely related to my research topic on dual-
class shares and voting rights (Winter et al. 2002, 10).   
 Although the Winter Report is quite thorough, it does not touch upon the value or view 
towards dual-class shares as a corporate governance risk. This may suggest that in terms of 
corporate governance issues, use of dual-class shares is not the number one concern in the EU 
institutions or by those in charge of governance reforms. What it does say is that corporate 
governance statements by firms should contain information on share classes and the rights 
associated with them. In terms of other mechanisms that have been targeted for assisting insiders 
maintain control, the report does remark that pyramid structures should be better regulated 
through their delisting or banishment from stock exchanges where their only use is to maintain 
control and their economic value is not legitimized (Winter et al. 2002).  
 Generally, the Winter Report proposed a number of reforms to company law in the EU 
and corporate governance practices. The report did comment on the creation of an EU corporate 
governance code, the adoption of such a document would form the basis of corporate governance 
codes across all Member States, however this option was relinquished due to concern that 
guidance would be watered down and ineffective. The Group did state, however, that the EU has 
a strong role to play in corporate governance practices and that convergence would be beneficial 
within the EU as they also recognize developments in the US.  
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ii. Green Paper 
 
 Moving from the Winter Report that laid a strong foundation for corporate governance in 
the EU, the Green Paper of April 5, 2011 was an update from a 2003 report, but instead of 
focusing on financial services, looked at business more broadly and addressed issues that still 
had yet to be solved.29 Specifically, the Green Paper shows that the Commission found that a 
significant problem revolved around the ‘comply or explain’ aspect of many corporate 
governance codes in circulation. They found that when a firm departed from code guidance, its 
explanation was subpar and that sufficient monitoring of code acceptance and application by 
firms from the proper Member State authority was also insufficient.30 In 60 percent of cases 
where firms chose to not comply with a code recommendation, the study found that either an 
explanation was not given at all or it only provided a very limited or general reason.31 There was 
consideration of current EU level rules’ applicability to listed companies only and a question was 
raised as to whether or not these rules should now become binding to private companies as well. 
However, the Commission recognized differences between public and private companies and 
demurred from coming to a conclusion that further harmonization was necessary.32 However 
they did offer a potential remedy to ‘comply or explain’ issues by suggesting that monitoring 
bodies such as stock exchanges, would be well positioned to review corporate governance 
statements issued by firms, if such a body was given the authority to do so.33   
 Another recurring point of contention is executive remuneration. Although it might seem 
outside the scope of my research, there has been debate as to the extent to which shareholders 
                                                
29 The EU Corporate Governance Framework, Green Paper from the European Commission, COM (2011) 
164 Final (April 2011) [hereinafter Green Paper]. 
30 Green Paper, supra note 27, at 3. 
31 Id. at 18.  
32 Id. at 4. 
33 Id. at 19. 
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should be able to vote and approve of executive remuneration. Having a mandatory vote is one 
part of the conversation, but another is whether the vote should be on an advisory or binding 
basis. Furthermore, the importance of this point is belied by the fact that proportions of votes tied 
to shares and who holds those voting rights can potentially cause significant effects on voting 
outcomes if and when shareholders have a remuneration vote. Where companies also allow for 
cumulative voting on board directors, such a practice could also have a tangential affect on 
remuneration packages.  
 In terms of those voting rights and usage of a dual-class share structure, the Green Paper 
does make mention of dispersed versus concentrated ownership, the latter often thought of as 
being joined with dual-class structures. It said that findings display a lack of shareholder 
involvement that is noteworthy in dispersedly owned firms and further, firms with concentrated 
ownership have a challenge with fully protecting the economic interests of minority 
shareholders.34 Where shareholders fail to engage, there may be an incentive to free ride, 
problems seeing a value from engagement as well as an uncertainty that being an active investor 
will reap real time rewards. Institutional investors may play a larger role here given that their 
share positions tend to be larger and they are considered to be sophisticated investors; better 
equipped to be engaged, institutional investors are a new likely target for potential transparency 
rules on their voting behavior, which, disclosure of may then help lead small investors to engage 
more.  
 Short-termism has also been marked as a significant contributor to corporate governance 
failures. As the Green Paper highlights, “[i]nnovations such as high-frequency and automated 
trading seem to have resulted in increased liquidity but also helped to shorten shareholding 
                                                
34 Green Paper, supra note 27, at 11. 
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periods.”35 There is discussion of regulatory policy that may have lead towards a bias towards 
short-term oriented shareholding, however specific Regulations or Directives at the EU level 
were not mentioned. One Directive that was mentioned as being problematic was the 
Shareholders’ Rights Directive (2007/36/EC). It greatly improved the position of shareholders to 
exercise their voting rights, but problems have arisen in how slowly it was transcribed in 
Member States.36 Therefore, shareholders have not had the intended access to cross-border 
voting as the Directive aimed to achieve when it was implemented.  
 To further address issues around minority shareholders, the Green Paper suggests that in 
controlled companies where a controlling shareholder is present on a board, some seats on the 
board should be reserved for minority shareholder representatives. 
   
iii. Proportionality Impact Assessment 
 
 The Commission released an impact assessment on proportionality between shareholder 
ownership and control rights.37 This directly refers to different voting rights attached to shares 
and the equity that they carry with them. The release of this assessment was paired with another 
requested by the Commission through ISS (“Investor Shareholder Services”) Europe, and an 
opinion by the Impact Assessment Board at the Commission.  
 Looking at the Commission assessment first, their executive summary opens with a 
statement that says disproportionate voting rights create an incentive for shareholders who hold 
greater control and less equity, to extract private benefits from the firm.38 The Commission cites 
the ISS study by noting their documentation of control enhancing mechanisms (“CEMs”) in 44 
                                                
35 Id. at 12. 
36 Id. at 14. 
37 Impact Assessment on the Commission Recommendation on the Proportionality Between Capital and 
Control in Companies, D (2007) 9803 Draft (November 2007) [hereinafter Proportionality Impact 
Assessment]. 
38 Proportionality Impact Assessment, supra note 35, at 4. 
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percent of listed firms in the EU, not only dual class firms and this is contrasted with only 6 
percent of firms in the US using CEMs.39 40 From the firms using them, ISS found that the most 
often used CEMS included “pyramid structures, multiple voting rights shares, and shareholders 
agreements (ISS et al. 2007, 6).”41 In response to this, the Commission notes that EU legislation 
on CEMs has already been created and is in the form of countering these actions through 
information disclosures. This is in line with the Transparency and Shareholders’ Rights 
Directives mentioned earlier, as well as the recommendations from both the Winter Report and 
Green Paper. Although neither made specific mention of disproportionality, the Winter Report 
had an interest in creating rules on pyramid structures.  
 The Commission’s impact assessment essentially outlines and expands on the results 
from the ISS study. It is then, for the sake of ease, to report on the ISS findings and Commission 
responses at the same time. According to ISS, the highest proportions of CEMs were used in 
France, Sweden, Spain, Hungary, and Belgium (given in decreasing order) (ISS et al. 2007, 12). 
Although the Commission notes that the ISS did not collect a comprehensive set of data for non-
EU countries, they still report that ISS findings show that 0.2 percent of companies sampled 
from the US grant loyalty votes and 24 out of 4,399 companies place a ceiling on voting rights.42 
Helpful to my assessment, the Commission and ISS note that there are different ways of 
changing voting rights without using dual-class shares alone.  
 The ISS study also considers the role of institutional investors, a minority shareholder 
group that the EU has shown keen in, as well as the role of shareholder activism. Indeed, even 
the OECD as cited by the Commission’s report, stated that “investors are mostly sophisticated 
                                                
39 Id.  
40 Report on the Proportionality Principle in the European Union, External Study Commissioned by the 
European Commission, ISS, 2007 [hereinafter ISS study].  
41 Proportionality Impact Assessment, supra note 35, at 4.  
42 Proportionality Impact Assessment, supra note 35, at 12. 
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enough to assess the risks and expected losses that may arise” (OECD 2007, 36).43 This seems to 
suggest that there is an expectation that shareholders still conduct due diligence and buy shares at 
their own risk to an extent. An interesting finding from the ISS and Commission study was that 
when institutional investors were surveyed on their investment priorities, they rank ordered 
CEMs and found that priority shares to be the most negatively viewed CEM while multiple 
voting rights and non-voting shares were closer to the bottom.44 Where these mechanisms are 
still being used, the Commission stated that it found the Transparency Directive, Shareholders’ 
Rights Directive, and Takeover Bid Directive as having some teeth that will place shareholders 
in a better position to make smart investment decisions easier and without as great a concern 
about firms withholding information that could detract from their future share value. Additional 
suggestions were made by the European Corporate Governance whereby it was recommended 
that the existing legal framework could be bolstered if language was included in Directives that 
singled out CEMs and attached specific transparency and disclosure requirements to them.45  
 The Commission believes that if the responses from institutional investors that were 
contained in the ISS report are to be believed and valued, rules that address the negative effects 
of CEMs should be dealt with at the EU level. They believe that the EC Treaty would provide for 
adequate legal basis to begin legislative action on disproportional ownership and control. 
However, in response to the Commission’s analysis of the ISS study, the Impact Assessment 
Board released an opinion on the Commission’s perspective and gave a few succinct and critical 
recommendations. The Board took issue with the quality of data reported on and felt that 
although the theoretical basis for the study could be compelling, the combination of data and 
theory did not result in concrete results. This lack of compelling evidence to truly find that 
                                                
43 Id. at 17.  
44 Id. 
45 Proportionality Impact Assessment, supra note 35, at 25. 
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disproportional ownership and control rights will incite criminal behavior from those 
shareholders does signify a real legitimacy problem from the policymaking perspective. Despite 
the position of ISS in corporate governance debates as a supporter of best practices and theories 
that argue control without ownership is a disincentive, will enthuse shareholders with control to 
make decisions that will strip minority shareholder value among other issues has yet to be fully 
quantified in data and research thus far. Therefore the Board made a point to say that although 
this is an interesting topic and one that should be considered given the EU’s role in corporate 
governance so far, more research and more concrete evidence of a material link between CEMs 
and shareholder value destruction or criminal behavior on the part of controlling shareholders, is 
very much a necessary component of studies and future rulemaking.  
  
iv. Corporate Governance Action Plan 
 
 Following the previous studies, on December 12, 2012 the Commission released the 
Communication  “Action Plan: European Company Law and Corporate Governance - A Modern 
Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and Sustainable Companies” (hereinafter “the 
Action Plan”).46 Acting as a framework for the EU to move forward on corporate governance 
reforms, it has laid out recommendations and was followed up by a Roadmap document, also put 
forth by the Commission.47  
 Many initiatives dealing with corporate governance reforms suggested in the 2003 Action 
Plan have since been implemented. Even with numerous updates of existing Directives and 
                                                
46 Company Law and Corporate Governance - A Modern Legal Framework for More Engaged 
Shareholders and Sustainable Companies, COM(2012) 740 Final (Dec. 2012) [hereinafter Corporate 
Governance Action Plan]. 
47 According to the European Commission, a roadmap is a first description of a future initiative planned 
by the Commission. It is used to lay out its impact and applicability to legislative proposal, non-
legislative initiatives and some implementing procedures (see Impact Assessment page of the 
Commission website for further information 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/planned_ia_en.htm) 
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reviews from the Commission, changes are still necessary since developments never fail to arise 
in this arena. The EU has every reason to ensure the proper functioning of its internal market and 
the Corporate Governance Action Plan hits squarely upon the most recent financial crises as a 
hallmark of how rules can be improved where loopholes and weaknesses exist. The current 
Action Plan notes that there is skepticism towards further Regulation and Directive creation, but 
the Parliament has made its position known that something should be done. One area that seems 
to be the most problematic is company law. In many other areas, consensus and harmonization 
has been reached at the EU level, yet this is not the case for the adoption of company law 
initiatives.48  
 The Action Plan has outlined three general areas that it intends to work on: (1) enhancing 
transparency (2) engaging shareholders and (3) supporting companies’ growth and 
competitiveness.49 Where revisions to current Regulations and Directives are appropriate, the 
rules and improvements will still be applicable only to companies listed on stock exchanges. 
Moreover, the Commission will still implement impact assessments to ensure the proper fit and 
scope of agreed upon rules.50 A specific issue raised in the Green Paper as well as the Action 
Plan is of firms’ lack of thorough explanations when they depart from a corporate governance 
code recommendation. Following this finding in the Green Paper, some Member States have 
made moves to eradicate this problem. Namely, Finland issued specific guidance that outlines 
what a proper explanation is and Belgium sponsored a study on defining what contributes to a 
quality explanation and thereafter proposed recommendations at its conclusion.51 The UK has 
                                                
48 Corporate Governance Action Plan, supra note 44, COM(2012) 740 Final, at 4.  
49 Id. at 5. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 6. 
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also started a conversation between firms and investors on what explanations should entail and 
guidance on properly following the ‘comply and explain’ principle.52   
 There was discussion in the Green Paper on shareholder identification and it is still an 
issue in the Action Plan. Despite mixed opinion on whether or not all shareholder names should 
be released where bearer and name shares have had different privacy rights, the Commission has 
opted to go forward with a proposal that would enhance shareholder ownership visibility.53 On a 
related note, institutional investors are considered shareholders that can carry a significant voting 
power. There is motivation to align EU level policy with that accepted by the UK and Denmark 
that already recommends institutional investors to be forthcoming with their voting history.54 
Also on the topic of voting, the Action Plan is considering modifying the Shareholders’ Rights 
Directive to require mandatory shareholder voting for approval of remuneration packages.55 If 
this were to become part of the Directive, the Commission has also debated having firms list 
comparable remuneration packages at competitor firms.  
 In addition to problems that have spawned from outside EU level rules, the Action Plan 
notes that EU company law has been comprised of a variety of Directives and legal acts that 
would be well served if codified into a “single instrument.”56  
 The Roadmap document on the Action Plan was issued by the Commission’s impact 
assessment arm and was quite clear and to the point on the key points of the Action Plan, where 
the EU will go and answered key questions that interested parties might have. As previously 
noted in the Green Paper, the Roadmap highlighted a few key points and this was one of them. 
Citing lack of shareholder engagement, the Roadmap outlined shareholder engagement as a top 
                                                
52 Id. at 7. 
53 Corporate Governance Action Plan, supra note 44, COM(2012) 740 Final, at 7. 
54 Id. at 8. 
55 Id. at 9. 
56 Id. at 15. 
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priority of the Action Plan. As a quick reference guide, the Roadmap summarizes many of the 
key points of both the Green Paper and the Action Plan. It is interesting to note that the EU has 
produced not only the Green Paper, but also the Roadmap document, a much shorter and to-the-
point review of the Action Plan’s main objectives. Through providing these two documents, the 
public is better able to understand the minutia of corporate governance problems the EU faces 
with the Action Plan while also having some of the broader questions and concerns answered 
quickly through the Roadmap document. Combining the two creates a reasonably clear and 
robust set of goals that the EU appears to be serious in pursuing.   
 
B. Member State Corporate Governance Codes  
  
 Codes of corporate governance practices act as another set of guidance for companies to 
use when operating their business and creating a functioning corporate structure. Examining 
codes within Member States will give me an understanding of how dual-class shares and one 
share-one vote are codified within these recommendations. Additionally, it will allow me to 
discover Member States that specifically recommend against the use of dual-class shares.  
 
1. Key Findings 
 
 Member States have shown dedication towards the creation of codes of corporate 
governance and applying best practices.  Thus far, having 15 codes speak directly on the use of 
voting rights is progressive, but by and large, the codes emphasize disclosure of rights. Only four 
codes coming from Finland, Germany, Hungary, and Sweden specifically noted a preference for 
one share-one vote and suggested that companies employ it when choosing the structure and 
associated rights of their shares. France discouraged multiple voting rights and the doubling of 
voting rights, also known as granting “loyalty shares,” however my case studies of the French 
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companies Danone, Dassault, Naturex, and Total revealed that each company disregarded the 
recommendation from the code and utilized loyalty shares.  
 
5. Analysis 
 
 Member State codes of corporate governance vary slightly, but not significantly. Many 
have been modeled after the OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance and therefore, apply 
similar guidance for businesses to consider. I reviewed Member State codes to understand the 
regulatory environment companies in the EU were operating in during the years I reviewed. In 
total, only 26 codes were gathered since Ireland accepts and applies the United Kingdom’s 
Corporate Governance Code.  
Through my review, I found that despite codes giving recommendations that had been 
accepted to some extent as “best practices,” companies did not align their policies to fit code 
guidance. France is a notable example where the Commercial Code allows doubling of voting 
rights for some shares and the AFEP-MEDEF code of France discourages the practice, yet every 
French company I examined employed double voting rights for shares that fit the requirements 
laid down by the Commercial Code.  
  Regarding separate classes of shares and differentiated voting rights, the following 
fifteen corporate governance codes had recommendations that were directly applicable to 
shareholder voting rights.  
 
a. Member State Corporate Governance Code Recommendations 
 
 Austria: recommended that where the distribution proportion that can be applied to 
multiple classes of shares would create a disadvantage to one class, a resolution and 
approval by the disadvantaged shareholders would be required (Austrian Code 2012). 
  
 Cyprus: recommended that all shareholders of the same class of shares be treated equally 
and should carry the same number of voting rights and all voting rights should be 
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disclosed and any changes should be approved by the class affected (Cyprus Stock 
Exchange Code 2011) 
 
 Czech Republic: required disclosure of any voting caps being used to redistribute 
control...changes in voting rights (Czech Code 2004).  
 
 Denmark: recommends that a firm’s governing body review their capital structure and 
rights attached to ensure best fit for firm goals (Danish Code 2010). 
 
 Estonia: forbids the creation of classes of shares that would result in different treatment 
of shareholders in voting (Estonian Code 2005). 
 
 Finland: recommends that “one share shall carry one vote” for use during AGMs, but 
articles of association may create shares that have different voting rights (Finnish Code 
2010, 7).  
 
 France: recommends abandoning the granting of double or multiple voting rights due to 
concern that it might lead to abuses of minority shareholders and is not in line with one 
share-one vote (AFG Code 2012).  
 
 Germany: states that “in principle, each share carries one vote” and that shares not in 
agreement with this should not exist (German Code 2012, 3).  
 
 Hungary: recommends that a company follow the one share-one vote principle and not 
issue any type of share that affords any shareholder extra or fewer voting rights than 
another class of shareholders (Budapest Stock Exchange Code 2012).  
 
 Lithuania: recommends that a company create share structures that only grant the same 
rights to all shareholders, including voting rights (NASDAQ Vilnius Code 2010).  
 
 Luxembourg: recommends that a company should disclose the rights of shareholders with 
an emphasis on voting rights (Luxembourg Stock Exchange Code 2006).  
 
 Malta: recommends that the Board should ensure that all shareholders of each class are 
treated fairly (Maltese Code).  
 
 Romania: recommends that all shareholders of a class be treated fairly and upon any 
changes to voting rights, their approval be sought (Bucharest Stock Exchange Code 
2008).  
 
 Slovakia: recommends that shareholders be notified where voting caps are used and could 
limit their votes available for exercise... and shareholders within a class should be treated 
fairly, but share votes should be proportional to the equity owned (Slovakian Code 2008). 
**most stringent thus far -- tied to Commercial Code provisions 
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 Sweden: recommends that each share carry one vote unless a company’s articles of 
association say otherwise and in such a case, the share can carry no more than ten times 
the voting rights (Swedish Code 2010).  
  
b. France 
 
 France is an interesting consideration due to his legal heritage as a civil law-based nation. 
Looking at the French Commercial Code, Article L225-125 provides for a company’s articles of 
association to limit the voting rights of shareholders at meetings so long as every shareholder, 
regardless of share class, is equally treated to the reduction in voting rights.  
 According to the Association Française de la Gestion Financière (“AGF”), which created 
corporate governance recommendations for asset management companies in France, 
management firms have a responsibility to their clients to exercise the voting rights they hold 
with the companies they have invested in. If these companies fail to utilize their votes, then they 
are required to give an explanation under the Financial Security Law of 2003. In doing this, the 
role of institutional investors is raised to a guardian-like level. 
 AGF specifically says that it can see the benefit of loyalty shares to reward long-term 
shareholders, however it then declares that as an organization that supports one share-one vote, it 
recommends that the use of double voting rights be abandoned.57  
 
c. United Kingdom 
 
 The United Kingdom’s (“UK”) corporate governance system has often been likened to 
the Anglo-American one in the US however there has been divergence between the UK and US. 
Following the release of the Cadbury Report in 1992 that highlighted the relationship between 
the CEO and Chairman and also the role of non-executive directors (“NEDs”) in firms. A policy 
response was formulated within the listing requirements of the London Stock Exchange, calling 
                                                
57 AFG 2012 Recommendations on Corporate Governance, B (4), p.11.  
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for a disclosure rule that issuers had to implement stating their compliance with Cadbury Report 
recommendations and an explanation where they did not (Barker 2008). According to “best 
practice” within the UK, preference is given to separation of powers between the CEO and 
Chairman, at least 50 percent of NEDs are independent, and remuneration pegged to 
performance criteria (Barker 2008). As best practices in corporate governance, they are not 
binding in UK company law, but contained in the former Combined Code, which has now been 
renamed the UK Corporate Governance Code.  
Looking for specific guidance on one share-one vote, the corporate governance code 
through the Financial Reporting Council does not recommend one share-one vote. The code does 
recommend providing shareholders with the ability to vote at an AGM, but the code does not go 
beyond that. Companies House in the UK is the arbiter of the nation’s company law. Their laws 
do not ban dual-class shares and the SH01 Return of allotment of shares form requires disclosure 
of share transactions, their value and specification of rights attached to them.58 Where the US has 
relied on its federal legislative acts to enforce sound governing practices within firms, the UK 
has taken a different approach, utilizing institutional investors to hold firms accountable to 
standards (Barker 2008). Like France, the UK tries to ensure supervision from within industry. 
Barker notes that this governance policy has allowed the UK government to keep compliance 
relatively high but cost low. Evaluating SEC filings and annual reports from companies in my 
case studies revealed that US firms did favor combining the roles of CEO and Chairman whereas 
UK firms reviewed separated these positions.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
58 SH01 Return of Allotment of Shares form, Companies House, 
http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk/forms/generalForms/SH01_return_of_allotment_of_shares.pdf 
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C. United States Legal Framework 
 
1. Key Findings 
 
 The legislative acts created heretofore show that the US, like the EU, has also focused on 
disclosure practices for the benefit of shareholders. There is a recognition of the impact that 
corporate governance failings can have on commerce that cross borders, even when those 
borders are domestic in nature and not international. The EU is not alone in its concern for 
creating efficiencies within its internal market – the US, too, has operated an internal market 
since its inception and continues to be first and foremost, mindful of its health and proper 
functioning.  
 Each law reviewed plays a key role in distinguishing how dual-class shares have been 
legally framed, how disclosure requirements have set the stage for investor intelligence and also, 
how one share-one vote may be viewed. The JOBS Act eases cumbersome disclosure rules and if 
it is any indication, there seems to be a slight schism between creating a safe and sound 
marketplace through disclosures and lessening the regulatory burden that may be particularly 
tough for SMEs and startups today. 
The US has taken decisive action towards closing loopholes and creating more stringent 
penalties for companies after corporate scandals with the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002 and 
Dodd-Frank in 2010. It appears that from the Acts passed, the SEC still has many rules to create 
from Dodd-Frank. Implementation and review of these future rules will be a necessary part of 
discovering the effects of this legislation on business and hopefully, in better preventing future 
corporate governance failings. 
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2. Analysis 
 
 The US has strong security laws that have allowed rule making at the Federal and State 
level in order to capture the range of business practices throughout the US. However, as 
evidenced by the subprime mortgage collapse that was a major contributor to the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, regulators spread across agencies at both the Federal and State 
level missed or failed to act when warning signs erupted. Harmonization between Federal and 
State regulators was not necessarily a priority throughout agencies charged with oversight and 
many even felt defensive over their authority and territory. Ideally, a Federalist system that was 
supposed to spur the sharing of best practices and documents where regulation was necessary, 
was mired in bureaucracy and at times, stonewalling behavior by the gatekeepers. In an attempt 
to understand how rules on corporate governance practices have progressed following various 
scandals, I analyzed the key Federal laws that are most appropriate to my question. Looking at 
dual-class shares and rules that speak to securities regulation and shareholder rights, there are 
seminal laws that may provide a better understanding of why companies in the US operate in the 
manner that they do.  
 
a. Federal Acts 
 
 The US Federal acts are the primary sources of guidelines for businesses issuing 
securities. I have analyzed those that are key to my research on dual-class shares and one share-
one vote.  You will see in Figure 2 on the next page, how US laws have been a response to a 
number of corporate scandals.  
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Figure 2. US Corporate Scandals and Response Timeline 
Legend:  Red diamonds symbolize corporate and financial scandals, named directly below.  
Green circles symbolize legal remedies and formal reviews, named a level below 
scandals.  
Dashed line and italicized text indicates future dates and goals.   
  
 
i. Securities Act of 1933 
 
 Following the stock market crash of 1929, the US government recognized need for 
reform of securities laws and the companies that issued under them. In the wake of the crash, the 
US government passed the Securities Act of 1933 as a foundation for offering shareholders the 
means by which they could access greater information on the securities they might invest in and 
remedies if a fraud were perpetrated. In line with my research of how dual-class shares and rules 
on voting rights are handled, the Act cites necessary company disclosures.  According to the Act, 
an issuer is required to disclose their ownership and capital structure alongside the rights 
associated to the class of securities being offered by the issuer, the ways in which those shares 
may be at risk to dilution, existing shareholders that carry 20 percent or more of any share class, 
how share valuations are determined, and any potential risks that a minority shareholder might 
face.59 The Act does not distinguish between good and bad voting right rules, but does say that 
what rights and risks may be attached to any class of shares should be disclosed to investors.  
                                                
59 15 USC 77 SEC 4A. 
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 According to Sec. 19(b), the Act calls for “greater Federal and State cooperation” to 
better ensure maximized use of effective regulation, harmonized and uniform regulatory 
standards across the Federal and State levels, less interference into capital formation in 
businesses, and decreasing the reporting burdens for firms raising capital and the administrative 
burdens of government agencies with oversight. However, a very important note follows that 
states “[n]othing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing preemption of State Law.”60  
 
ii. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
 
 In support of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created the 
SEC and gave it power to regulate broker-dealers and stock exchanges. A motivation behind 
creating the 1934 Act was the risk that speculators posed to both companies and citizens alike 
when their activities ended in failure rather than success. The US had already experienced the 
aftershocks of a massive stock market failure and noted its acute affect on employment and 
serious destruction to the health of companies and national economies. The Exchange Act was 
enacted in an effort to stave off another crisis that could create additional problems in and 
outside of markets.  
 The Exchange Act of 1934 requires that any person who has acquired beneficial 
ownership of at least 5 percent of a share class must report ownership within ten days to the 
SEC.61 This is another example of how important disclosure practices had become and their 
emphasis in the federal laws.  
 
 
 
                                                
60 15 USC 77 § 19b, at 65. 
61 15 USC 78 § 13(7).  
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iii. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
 
 Following Enron’s magnificent hoodwinking of the mass populous, many in finance 
shook their heads while those in government may have shook their hands, stretched their muscles 
and asked themselves, “How do we prevent this from happening again?” The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (“SOX”) was their legislative response and has been the mother of many accounting 
standards changes and stiffer penalties for white-collar crime.  
 Sec. 16 (a)(1) mandates that every person who directly or indirectly is a beneficial owner 
of more than 10 percent of any class of registered equity security must file a statement disclosing 
their ownership with the SEC. The Act also requires that disclosure filings be accessible 
electronically and can be submitted by companies to the SEC in the same manner.  
 SOX was also meant to be a strong response to the audit business that had experienced 
great reductions in competition and subsequently, were comprised of a handful of large, global 
accounting firms. Another actor that SOX considered was the role of credit rating agencies. Both 
auditing firms and credit rating agencies are considered to be gatekeepers whose job is partly 
relegated to making sure that businesses are not acting in an irresponsible manner. SOX is 
important to dual-class shares and the one share-one vote debate because it symbolized a wakeup 
to businesses and regulators that accounting standards from within a company could be 
manipulated and that the gatekeepers thought to be another line of defense, in fact, were 
accessories to fraud. Where dual-class shares might have an adverse reaction to share price and 
executive management may have a remuneration incentive to augment share prices, it is valuable 
to have additional accounting releases and greater clarification on what actions and practices 
may be suspect. If variable voting rights are more susceptible to executive mismanagement, it is 
helpful to discover this through additional reporting and auditor independence.  
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iv. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
 
 Touching upon the importance of having independent actors that can monitor firm 
behavior, the Dodd-Frank Act created a provision on the independence of compensation 
committees in firms and their use of compensation consultants. The provision calls for members 
of Boards of Directors and the compensation committee to be sufficiently independent. When 
defining “independence,” Dodd-Frank recommended that associations and stock exchanges 
should have the ability to offer their own guidance and description of independence for issuers 
who fall under their authority.  
 The way in which a company chooses to compose its compensation committee must then 
be disclosed to shareholders in annual proxy documents. These proxy materials should then be 
available to the public through the SEC’s website and their directory of company filings. 
However, this same provision includes an exemption for controlled companies. SOX defines a 
controlled company as an issuer “that is listed on a national securities exchange or by a national 
securities association; and that holds an election for the board of directors of the issuer in which 
more than 50 percent of the voting power is held by an individual, a group, or another issuer.”62  
 
v. Jumpstart Our Businesses Startups Act of 2012 
 
 Another important piece of legislation and the most recent one for the US is the Jumpstart 
Our Business Startups Act. Approved in 2012, it was intended to increase job creation and ease 
SME and startup entry into capital markets. The Act outlined “emerging growth companies” as 
issuers with gross revenues of less than $1B that had not yet issued its shares prior to December 
                                                
62 15 U.S.C. § 7262.  
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8, 2011.63 If a firm qualifies as an emerging growth company, there are a number of disclosures 
that it is then exempt from submitting.  
 According to Sec. 102(a), emerging growth companies are exempt from submitting 
compensation information for executives and others; in addition, registration statements for 
securities need not provide financial statements dating beyond the last two years. Another 
important exemption is that emerging growth companies are not bound to an internal controls 
audit. Moreover, where rules require a rotation of auditing firms within a firm, any emerging 
growth company is not subject to this requirement either. However, with this being said, the 
JOBS Act does provide for an opt-in provision whereby emerging growth companies can still 
comply with previously legislated disclosure rules. Furthermore, in the event that an emerging 
growth company takes the exemptions, they will only last insofar as the company does not reach 
any threshold stipulated by the JOBS Act that would no longer render it an emerging growth 
company. The thresholds that would nullify emerging growth status for a company include: the 
last day of the fiscal year when the company reaches a gross revenue of $1B, the last day of the 
fiscal year in which the company has its fifth anniversary of its IPO, the date when the firm has 
issued more than $1B in non-convertible debt over the past three years and finally, when the firm 
has been considered a “large filer.”64 
 These changes have motivated younger and perhaps smaller companies to seek public 
funding, but in them doing so, they have forgone some disclosures the public has come to expect.  
 
b. US State Level Laws 
 
 Prior to the creation of the Federal securities laws, many States in the US had already 
created their own rules regulating securities, these were known as “Blue Sky laws” and they still 
                                                
63 15 U.S.C. § 78.  
64 Id. § 78(80).  
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exist today. Many Blue Sky laws have been modeled on the Uniform Securities Act of 1956, but 
despite this, States have tailored securities regulation to fit their needs. Harmonization within the 
States of the US has been found through application of the Universal Commercial Code 
(“UCC”). States are free to make adjustments to the UCC as they see fit, but an “acceptable 
degree of uniformity in application has been achieved” (Honnold 1987, 182).65 
Documenting every incarnation of both EU Member State and US State level securities 
laws is outside of the scope of my research. My question focuses on the broader issue of the 
direction of EU and US corporate governance on one share-one vote. My analysis of the use of 
dual-class shares in the EU and US will begin to signal how they affect and are affected by law 
of higher obligation – EU Directives or Regulations and US Congressional Acts.  
There is one notable example of State level regulation that is useful for enunciating 
results from my case studies, however. Delaware has achieved the most flexible interpretation of 
the UCC and allows business much breadth for the structure of their company and ownership. 
Analysis of 12 US companies I examined shows that eight have been incorporated or 
reincorporated in Delaware. For every company action there is a reaction and reason. Analysis of 
the EU companies in my case studies shows that those from France have all used a loyalty share 
provision available in the French Commercial Code.66  
The use of company law in France and Delaware may be further explained by phrases 
used by Jacobs (2011), “activist capital” versus “patient capital,” whereby activist capital is 
comprised of investors who are impatient for quick returns, searching for any opportunity they 
may use to influence management and patient investors are more hands off, activist investors 
                                                
65 For a more in depth analysis of the relationship between US State application of the UCC, see the 
explanation by John Honnold, “The United States Uniform Commercial Code: Interpretation by the 
Courts of the States of the Union” International Uniform Law in Practice, Oxford University Press, 
September 1987.  
66 Article L225-123, Book II, Chapter IV, Public Companies. Commercial Code.  
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hope to incite management and directors into making decisions that will benefit their stock and 
dividend returns. This lies in contrast to the patient capital investor of Jacobs’ “golden era” from 
the 1950s to early 1970s, who recognizes that profit from innovation may not be gleaned until 
five years later (2011).  
Our modern day understanding of activist investor, champion of good corporate 
governance, may be off key. Indeed, it may be more likely that activist investors want their 
hands in the cookie jar. Delaware’s corporate law is popular because it has given businesses 
greatest flexibility in structure and ownership. Where investors used to let companies be the 
judge of their own business, a need for quarterly gains has created the activist investor, keen on 
reaping greater profit. Corporate governance in a way, then, may not be seen as a means to 
ensure greater ethics within a company, but an attempt to closely monitor it in hopes of spawning 
higher profits with changing leadership and “incentivized” compensation schemes – suddenly 
pay for performance makes sense to impatient investors.  
Dual-class shares may appear unfair, but my case studies show that they are no longer 
used at all times to rip-off or deceive investors. For some companies, if dual-class and loyalty 
shares allow them to protect their core business interests, safe from short-term investors, perhaps 
the company is creating the ideal environment for its long-term viability and profit.   
i. Delaware 
Delaware has one of the most flexible corporation laws of all States in the US. More than 
50 percent of all publicly traded firms in the US are incorporated in Delaware while 64 percent 
of Fortune 500 companies have incorporated in Delaware as well. These numbers attest to the 
desirability of the State’s corporate laws and their flexibility. The Delaware General Corporate 
Law (“DGCL”) is consistently updated and refined to acknowledge court rulings on business 
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matters and federal legislative acts. The DGCL is meant to provide businesses with as much 
flexibility as possible for the structure of their business without coming off as being thought of as 
a traditional set of regulations. Additionally, the case law developed over the years from 
Delaware’s Court of Chancery for its corporation law, has been a significant provider of 
favorable Board and Director decisions that have since been codified in DGCL over the years. A 
notable example was the decision of Caremark that found Directors to be liable for oversight 
failure and lack of disclosure.67 Such refinements in how Directors and management may act add 
to a body of law for the DGCL to pull from and use. The DGCL states “[u]nless otherwise 
provided in the certificate of incorporation and subject to § 213 of this title, each stockholder 
shall be entitled to 1 vote for each share of capital stock held by such stockholder.”68 Delaware 
provides for shareholder votes, but allows companies to structure their stock as they see 
appropriate.  
In total, 8 out of 12 US companies used for my case studies have either incorporated or 
reincorporated in Delaware as shown by Table 4 on the next page.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
67 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–71 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
68 Title 8, Ch. 1, § 212 Voting rights of stockholders; proxies; limitations. 
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Table 4. US Firms in Delaware 
Firms Incorporation Reincorporation 
Chevron Delaware, 1926  
ConocoPhillips Delaware, 2001  
Google California, 1998 Delaware, 2003 
Hershey N/A, 1893 Delaware, 1927 
General Mills Delaware, 1928  
Kellogg N/A, 1906 Delaware, 1922 
Cablevision Delaware, 1987  
Time Warner Delaware, 1985  
Source: Mergent Online; compiled by author 
 
 
E. Stock Exchange Listing Rules  
 
In addition to federal and state laws in the US, stock exchange listing rules are another 
potential influencing factor for dual-class share usage. Firm behavior will change if a listing is 
sought on a stock exchange that has admission requirements counter to what a firm has already 
implemented. Analyzing higher-end stock exchanges will indicate which ones, if any, have rules 
banning dual-class shares.  
1. Key Findings 
 
 Both the NYSE and NASDAQ exchanges provide listing requirements for prospective 
firms. Both exchanges grant the right for companies to utilize multiple classes of shares and 
voting rights when issuing for the first time. However, both exchanges also forbid a company 
already listed on either exchange from issuing another class of share that may have fewer or 
greater voting shares attached and would in some manner bolster or harm the existing 
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shareholder class.69 70 It was stated that Manchester United’s potential IPO was deemed 
“impossible” for issuance on the London Stock Exchange because of Manchester United’s 
decision to implement a dual-class share structure.71 The Council of Institutional Investors has 
said that dual-class shares are “essentially prohibited,” but this does not necessitate an outright 
ban.72 After close evaluation of London Stock Exchange rules, I could not find a single statement 
within their by-laws that disallowed dual-class shares. It appears that there may be a possibility 
that companies wishing to issue an IPO on the London Stock Exchange for the first time may be 
greeted with some resistance if presenting a dual-class share structure with disproportionate 
voting rights. Equally challenging to find, NYSE Euronext controls the Amsterdam, Belgium, 
and Paris stock exchanges and beyond the listing rules available for New York, similar 
applicable rules that state recommendations against multiple voting rights or dual-class shares 
have yet to be found.  
 
E. Discussion and Comparison of EU-US Legal Frameworks and Guidance  
 
 After reviewing the ways in which the EU and US have provided for shareholder rights 
and responded to the one share-one vote debate, it is clear that both hard and soft law are the 
main actors at play. However, neither hard nor soft law places an outright ban on the use of dual-
class shares.  
 Hard law protecting shareholders’ voting rights is most apparent in the US where non-
compliance with federal securities laws will result in criminal penalties. However the EU’s 
                                                
69 NASDAQ Listing Rules, 5640 Voting Rights. 
70 NYSE Listing Rules, 313.00 Voting Rights.  
71 Michael J. De Le Merced, “Manchester United Sets Price Range for I.P.O. at $16 to $20 a Share,” New 
York Times, July 30, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/manchester-united-sets-price-range-
for-i-p-o-at-16-to-20-a-share/. 
72 Joe Mont, “Dual-Class Shares Get Double Teamed by Critics,” Compliance Week, October 2, 2012, 
http://www.complianceweek.com/dual-class-shares-get-double-teamed-by-critics/article/261916/. 
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binding Regulations and Directives are considered soft law in comparison. Despite their 
mandatory nature, non-compliance by a firm is not punishable through the EU institutions via 
criminal charges and a prison sentence to be carried out in Brussels. Where the US has stronger 
hard law, the EU has stronger soft law with the addition of Member State corporate governance 
codes being used. The US has no such State level corporate governance codes and instead, leaves 
this area for firms to create at will. In the EU where corporate governance code use is robust, if a 
company fails to comply with a recommendation, it must then explain why it chose not to. The 
comply and explain system has been singled out by the Green Paper as mechanism that renders 
weak explanations from companies when they deviate; their explanations have been deemed 
insufficient and yet penalties for poor explanation do not exist to give these codes teeth.  
Nevertheless, the EU has signaled in its continual review of corporate governance 
policies that it will seek to further align Member State company law. Where hesitation towards 
greater EU level decision-making may exist, the Roadmap document reviewing the EU’s Action 
Plan for corporate governance was a fitting example that gave a succinct answer and justification 
to the Commission’s plan to secure greater rule harmonization for company law. It emphasized 
the need for enhanced coordination when it stated that, “[m]ore and more European businesses 
operate on a cross-border basis and for that reason the corporate governance and company law 
framework at EU level is growing in importance” (Roadmap 2012, under “Who will be 
affected?”).  
 Creating more effective reforms to EU company law is difficult since Member States are 
dealing across issues that can be seen and felt in a variety of ways. For example, where one 
Member wants a particular policy in agriculture, another will agree to it in order to get their 
preferences in a company law issue (Winter 2009). This creates a consensus at times, but not 
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truly, a “best fit.” Directives and Regulations can thereby be watered down and truly lack might. 
Political wrangling within the EU occurs within the institutions, Member State governments, and 
also with associated lobbying groups, unions and others. Finding the right balance between EU-
lead legislation and Member State decision-making with this array of actors can be difficult. This 
can be especially trying when an actor may recommend sending an issue to be decided on at the 
EU level, not for the sake of a more harmonious or clarified ruling, but in order to stave off 
decision-making altogether; knowing, that due to the difficulties of coming to an agreement 
within the EU institutions, a well fitting rule or consensus will be near to impossible to secure. 
 The US on the other hand has the benefit of clear disclosure policy for companies and the 
authority of the SEC to ensure that companies comply. Despite shortfalls by the SEC to catch 
some of the misbehavior emanating from recent scandals, Dodd-Frank should ensure that the 
SEC has thorough oversight and power to execute their investigative power and work with the 
Department of Justice should criminal penalties be fitting. It is striking and noteworthy that the 
US has not made the effort to start a conversation on one share-one vote that the EU institutions 
have. This, if nothing else, should signal that the EU and US are moving in different directions 
on one share-one vote.  
 Concentrating, then, on EU opinions towards shareholder voting rights, the group of 
Directives, Rules and reports that have been shown here represent a concerted effort to improve 
laws already constructed. It also shows greater desire to continue improving in light of the 
financial crises seen in the US in the EU.  
If we look at the rules heretofore, a few themes are revealed. First, the EU has made 
strong rules that seek harmonization across Member States. The transposition of Directives and 
Regulations has been ordered for all Members and greater clarity in mechanisms available for 
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shareholders to act across borders. Second, disclosure practices have been emphasized to a great 
extent. The EU makes a strong argument both in its messaging and rulings that disclosure of firm 
policies, share structures, rights, and remuneration policies are to be placed in a clear and easily 
accessible manner to shareholders and the public. Third, the EU highlights the need for long-
term goal recognition from shareholders and firms. The most recent of crises have made business 
and governments acutely aware of the use of financial instruments that reap short-term gains but 
yield significant long-term pain if they sour.   
 Taken altogether, it cannot be underscored enough that the regulations put forth by the 
EU have been moving a moderate pace since 2001 and Enron’s collapse. The US has also put 
forth strong reforms. However both the EU and US do not ban dual-class shares. The interest in 
improving corporate governance is increasing in the EU from the institutions. US law shows a 
desire to close loopholes, but not create a corporate governance dialogue like the EU has 
initiated.  
 According to a study by the RiskMetrics Group, “efforts to ensure that shareholders are 
provided with sufficient rights are only relevant if shareholders actually exercise these rights.... 
[A]s already indicated many shareholders do not.... Rather they rely on others to provide 
effective monitoring” (RiskMetrics 2009, 17). This hits precisely on an enduring issue: how to 
engage shareholders and incentivize them to be active monitors of firm behavior? It is not 
unreasonable to assume that to some extent, they make an investment in a company with a 
baseline level of concern for their return on investment. Yet, are the shareholders heeding the 
advice of years of legislation and becoming more active? Who is responsible for igniting the 
flame that will lead shareholders to the AGMs?  
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 Some would say that shareholder rights regulations at the EU supranational and US 
federal levels are already moving in a direction towards convergence within their own 
jurisdictions. On this point alone, harmonizing rules within the EU and US first would be a 
logical first step towards securing clarity of corporate governance practices. However “[t]he 
adoption of a federally imposed one share-one vote corporate governance requirement would be 
a pre-emption of state law” states Peters (1986, 5). Although Peters counters his statement that 
action at the Federal level could occur, at the time of his statement, he recommended that 
significant consideration be taken to analyze the proper balance of interests at play on the matter 
of voting rights.  
 Tricker (as cited in Bagaric et al. 2011) notes four areas of possible convergence beyond 
the corporate governance models debate. Two are of particular note for my study: corporate 
governance codes of good practice and securities regulation. Both of these entities have been at 
the root of reform measures in the EU and US. Within the EU we can already see there are a 
wide variety of corporate governance codes being created and updated whereas in the US, 
companies are responsible for creating their own corporate governance guidelines. There is an 
opportunity to create a deeper and more harmonized set of rules for issuers in the US, but the 
will to embrace this might not be supported by business given the existing freedom that US 
companies may already feel when creating their own guidance on corporate governance “best 
practices.”  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
 
 
A. Findings 
 
 In my case studies, I appraised four separate industries by analyzing a total of twenty-
four firms. These firms held slightly different market positions from each other but generally all 
performed well financially with positive outlooks. The firms selected also offered the 
opportunity to identify potential operational differences across the EU and US. After carefully 
studying the corporate governance practices of these companies, I found important similarities 
and differences.  
 Firms from France (Danone, Dassault, Naturex, and Total) have taken advantage of a 
provision of the French Commercial Code that allows companies to issue double voting rights 
where it can be proven that a share has “been registered in the name of the same shareholder for 
at least two years.”73 The value of this finding is that it displays a different method that a 
company may use to manipulate voting rights and distribute them in a way that is antithetical to 
one share-one vote.  Known as loyalty shares, this mechanism may have been separated for the 
dual-class share literature under an assumption that it is only used to reward long-term oriented 
shareholders. However, whereby Boards of Directors are not elected on an annual basis, there is 
greater incentive for them to hold a higher percentage of double-voting shares simply on account 
of their time with the firm. The average term length for a director on a Board of a French 
company is four years. Where executive compensation packages have also integrated share 
options that emphasize longer vesting periods and exercise dates, there could even be an even 
                                                
73 C. Com. L225-123 
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higher pay-off for those that work for the firm to seek extra voting rights above and beyond 
shareholders outside of the firm.  
The case studies show that a firm does not have to have dual-class shares to have 
disproportionate voting rights. France’s application of double voting rights for shares that have 
been held for two years or more is a glaring example of alternatives to multiple share classes. 
However, double voting rights as reward for a long-term outlook may not be the worst act ever 
despite France’s AFP recommending that companies abandon the practice of awarding extra 
voting rights. The EU has emphasized the importance of shareholders keeping a long-term 
perspective in mind when they invest. Although not all shareholders are interested in portfolios 
that only focus on long-term rewards, the use of double voting rights could serve as a decent 
enticement for potential investors to sign on and invest in a company.  
 Another difference was the varied accounting standards used. The importance of this 
difference is that potential voting rights can be captured or ignored based on the accounting 
system used. Therefore, the influence of a shareholder with voting rights may not be entirely 
captured or understood since the two systems are different and typically people understand one 
or the other, not both and cannot converge the two as of today. There was a strong split between 
EU and US firms, the former using IFRS and the latter using US GAAP. There has been debate 
lately regarding a potential convergence of accounting standards. Where dual-class shares and 
voting rights are concerned, different standards have caused a slight murkiness. Between the two 
accounting methods, there is a rift when valuing potential voting rights in equity investments. 
According to PricewaterhouseCoopers (2012), US GAAP does not consider potential voting 
rights when analyzing the influence that an investor might have, however IFRS considers the 
influence of potential voting rights attached to an investor and how they might exert control over 
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an investee, but these potential rights are not considered when determining an investor’s equity 
earnings. Although this may not appear as a glaring problem, it could signify great disunity 
between the accounting standards for multinational companies with shareholders spread across 
the EU and US. There has been movement and discussion from within the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission to harmonize the standards between the EU and US. The SEC has listed 
on its site that “[it] has long promoted the development of a single set of high-quality, globally 
accepted accounting standards and in February 2010 directed staff to develop and execute a 
Work Plan regarding this process.”74 Both EU and US authorities, the IASB (EU) and FASB 
(US) have been working together. However, lately conversations have fallen silent and it remains 
to be seen if there will be movement towards rule convergence.  
My case studies also exemplified the difference in frequency of elections for Boards of 
Directors (BoD). The most striking difference for this provision appeared between the EU and 
US. In Table 5 on the next page, the number of firms from the EU using staggered boards versus 
those in the US is very apparent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
74 Spotlight on Work Plan for Global Accounting Standards, 2012, Securities and Exchange Commission, 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/globalaccountingstandards.shtml 
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Table 5. Frequency of Elections for Boards of Directions: EU vs. US 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU Firms 
British 
Petroleum ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ 
Royal Dutch 
Shell ✕ ✕     
Total       
Acando ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ 
Dassault       
SAP       
Naturex       
Danone       
CSM       
SES       
British Sky 
Broadcasting       
ZON 
Multimedia       
US Firms 
Chevron ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ 
ConocoPhillips ✕ ✕ ✕    
ExxonMobil ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ 
Google ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ 
Apple ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ 
IBM ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ 
Hershey ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ 
General Mills ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ 
Kellogg       
Comcast ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ 
Cablevision ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ 
Time Warner ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ ✕ 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
 = 3+ year term; staggered board 
✕ = annual elections 
 
 
As you can see from Table 5, the EU prefers to use Board elections as a method for maintaining 
control within the firm. Jacobs (2011) makes a case for protecting business interests against 
short-term oriented investors after new legislative acts such as Dodd-Frank have given 
shareholders a greater role in firm oversight and influence. Rule 14a-11 of Dodd-Frank, if 
implemented, would give shareholders the ability to nominate their own director choices at an 
AGM and also give shareholders the right to propose rules regarding director nomination 
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procedures (Jacobs 2011). In light of these increasing shareholder powers and an incentive 
structure emphasizing short-term gain, it is important that firms still have options to secure some 
power within the company. With diverse, fluctuating shareholder bases, firms may find that dual-
class shares in their classical form, provide much needed influence that has been eroded away 
through expanded shareholder rights. As my case studies show, US firms with dual-class shares 
have operated under their Anglo-American corporate governance system, stylized by diverse 
shareholding. In each case of US firm dual-class usage, their strict adherence to disproportionate 
voting rights may be a partial reaction to decreased influence over firm decisions. Whereas my 
case studies examining firms in the EU with dual-class shares have results signaling different 
applications of dual-class shares and usage other CEMs.  
 Jacobs offers a remedy for US companies, namely that State corporation law allow firms 
to remove the yearly election of BoDs. He recommends instead that Board terms last for five 
years. Evidence from my case study suggests EU firms tend to use longer terms for their Boards. 
Table 5 shows the use of longer Board terms by EU firms versus those in the US.  
Another issue that my case study found surrounding the dual-class share and one share-
one vote debate was the use of cumulative voting rights. Although not highlighted in the 
individual breakdown and assessment of industry companies, cumulative voting is a lasting issue 
among many of the firms. Table 6 shows the seven firms that listed a specific notation in either 
their annual report or proxy statement stating that cumulative voting was not allowed.  
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Table 6. Cumulative Voting Bans in EU and US Companies 
Firms Director Voting Procedure 
British Petroleum OSOV; MVPS (Preference Shares)^ 
Chevron OSOV 
ConocoPhillips OSOV 
SAP OSOV 
Google OSOV; MVPS (Class B)* 
Naturex OSOV; DVR 
General Mills OSOV 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
MVPS: Multiple Votes Per Share; DVR: Double Voting Rights 
^ 2 votes for every £5 of Preference Shares 
* 10 votes for every Class B share 
 
Four of the firms listed above are US firms (Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Google, and General 
Mills), while the other three are from the EU. Although this is an interesting finding, because it is 
only four against three, it would be difficult to suggest that there might be a larger trend here. 
However, as a matter of future research, it might be interesting to analyze the use of cumulative 
voting proposals at AGMs and the voting records from institutional investors. There have been a 
variety of shareholder proposals made over the years requesting the allowance of cumulative 
voting during AGMs. However, the firms have never supported these proposals and they have 
subsequently failed to pass during each meeting. Therefore, seeing how activist institutional 
investors have responded to cumulative voting proposals might yield an interesting debate on 
institutional investors’ reaction to possible minority shareholder protections. 
A benefit to cumulative voting is that it assists minority shareholders in having a larger 
say in the election of directors. However, most companies I considered gave the defense that if 
they allowed cumulative voting to occur, minority shareholders’ rights would be placed in 
jeopardy due to the influence that larger investors would have. Whether or not this is true can be 
debated. However, it is another factor that must be considered.  
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Table 7. EU vs. US – Firms Implementing Dual-Class Shares 
 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
✔ = implemented 
✕ = did not implement 
 
 
In Table 7 above, I show EU and US firms from my case studies that have used a dual-class 
share structure. I compare them across eight corporate governance provisions and find that a 
trend towards worse corporate governance does not occur. Both Royal Dutch Shell and SES have 
dual-class share structures without giving shareholders disproportionate voting rights. 
Shareholders of these two companies are given equal voting rights and the one share-one vote 
principle is used. Comcast and Google both combine the role of CEO and Chairman, but elect 
their directors on an annual basis, unlike SES and Royal Dutch Shell which have both utilized 
the staggered board structure at some point within the 2006 to 2011 time period I examined. 
Furthermore, of all companies using a dual-class structure, Cablevision had the most classical 
example of a concentrated ownership structure whereby a family had voting control of the 
 108 
company. The proxy documents filed by Cablevision are very clear in disclosing the control 
exerted by the Dolan family, the founders of Cablevision. However even Cablevision establishes 
a Board with annual elections and a separated CEO and Chairmanship roles despite their 
controlling power over the Board.  
 Although my case studies are descriptive in nature and cannot draw broad conclusions 
about the true nature of dual-class shares across all firms employing them, the information I have 
gathered does contribute interesting insights into how dual-class shares can be variable in their 
implementation. Moreover, my research yields the finding that mechanisms for control are not 
necessarily focused on hurting shareholders (loyalty shares). Instead, they can be used to create 
long-term incentives that may assist the firm to cultivate a shareholder base that will be engaged 
but not to the extent that they pressure or bully management into making short-term goals that 
could have adverse effects on the firm’s business.  
Dual-class shares are not indicative of bad corporate governance practices across a firm. 
Where firms I considered had dual-class shares, there were only a few (namely Cablevision) that 
truly had questionable practices and minority shareholder protections. Otherwise, many firms 
that had issued a single class of stock had engaged in other corporate governance practices that 
could be argued as being questionable. Moreover, the differences in corporate governance 
practices and voting proportions did not split clearly between the Anglo-American and 
Continental European governance systems.  Almost every firm could have been considered as 
having a shortcoming in its corporate governance choices. There is not a winner-take-all result 
from my case studies. This suggests that perhaps neither a convergence nor divergence is being 
pursued. Firms across the EU and US are utilizing laws in place in their respective jurisdiction. 
Whereby a law enforces a corporate governance principle such as loyalty shares in the 
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Commercial Code of France and mandatory advisory shareholder voting on compensation 
packages through Dodd-Frank in the US, firms take advantage. The EU could take a more 
significant role for improving corporate governance standards where it used Regulations to 
dictate best practices and enforce them from the EU Institutions. As is, the EU has created a 
rulemaking system that favors subsidiarity that has a watering-down affect on EU goals and the 
ultimate implementation of Directives. The US rulemaking process has created law that can 
come with severe penalties and it is in this that the US system, although perhaps not as focused 
on the corporate governance debate like the EU, is potentially achieving greater reform.  
Nevertheless, both the EU and US lack a consensus on one share-one vote and have not 
implemented any ban on dual-class shares.  
 
B. Analysis 
 
 I wanted to capture a different perspective that had not yet been considered. In order to 
answer my research question and determine if differences do exist between how EU and US-
based firms use dual-class shares, a case study approach was the best way to focus the question 
and seek detailed answers within a relatively short timeframe. As noted in Chapter 3: 
Methodology, arranging the case study turned out to be a difficult process and telling of why 
research has focused through broader lenses that look at stock valuations rather than perfect 
pairs. Indeed, the case study following is not perfect and it could benefit from further analysis 
and potentially, more industries. However, I am confident that in its current form and the process 
by which it came to be, have bold yielded interesting results that are meaningful to report on and 
will contribute to the debate on one share-one vote.  
 The chapter is organized as follows: Section B analyzes the Cable and Satellite industry, 
Section C analyzes the Major Integrated Oil and Gas industry, Section D analyzes the Packaged 
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Foods industry, and Section E analyzes the Software and Technology industry. My case study 
industries each have three companies from the EU and three from the US. The companies and 
countries considered are laid out in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Case Study Countries and Companies  
Country Company 
France Danone 
Dassault 
Naturex 
Total 
Germany SAP 
Luxembourg SES 
Netherlands CSM 
Royal Dutch Shell 
Portugal ZON Multimedia 
Sweden Acando 
United Kingdom British Petroleum (“BP”) 
British Sky Broadcasting  
United States Apple 
Cablevision 
Chevron 
Comcast 
ConocoPhillips 
ExxonMobil 
General Mills 
Google 
Hershey 
IBM 
Kellogg 
  
 
 
B. Cable and Satellite: Analysis 
 
 The Cable and Satellite industry compared across the EU and US yielded an interesting 
array of companies that are prime examples of how vastly different share class and voting 
structures can be. In the EU, I looked at British Sky Broadcasting of the United Kingdom, SES 
of Luxembourg, and ZON Multimedia of Portugal. In the US, my comparison companies 
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included Comcast, Cablevision, and Time Warner. All six are strong performers in the EU or US 
and have a well-known presence in their markets.  
 
1. EU Companies 
  
 For the companies in the EU, SES was the only firm to have two separate classes of 
shares as of 2011. Both British Sky Broadcasting and ZON Multimedia issued a single class of 
“ordinary shares.”  
 
a. SES  
 
 Considering SES only, it has split its shares into Class A shares, which are traded on the 
Luxembourg and Paris Stock Exchanges, and Class B shares which are wholly owned by the 
State of Luxembourg and also by two entities that are also owned by the State of Luxembourg. 
Class B shares are not traded on an exchange and according to company by-laws, must always 
represent one-third of all outstanding shares (SES 2006, SES 2011).75 However, for my analysis 
of the years 2006 and 2007, SES had a third share class, Class C. This share class held 15.57 
percent of the total voting share of SES, but was purchased by SES from its then owner General 
Electric (GE). Those shares were then changed into Fiduciary Deposit Receipts (“FDRs”), given 
to shareholders party to the GE transaction and all remaining shares moved into Class B shares. 
By 2011, two share classes still remained with ownership tightly controlled, but what is most 
interesting is that each class of shares holds the same voting rights. During SES shareholder 
meetings, each share is given one vote. Although party to the dual-class share structure, SES has 
committed its shares to the one share-one vote principle. Class B shareholders only receive 40 
                                                
75 Outstanding shares are all shares that have been authorized to trade, issued and purchased by shareholders 
whereby their voting rights, where applicable can be exercised during shareholder meetings. 
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percent of the dividend or if the company finds itself in bankruptcy, only 40 percent of net 
proceeds.  
 Another interesting aspect of my study of SES was that, upon comparing their share 
structure and voting policy to the selected corporate governance variables I had chosen to 
consider, I found that the election of their Board of Directors (“BoD”) has been split between 
share classes. Between 2006 and 2011, Class A shareholders were entitled to elect 11 directors 
while Class B State shareholders were entitled to elect only 6 directors. While this arrangement 
may not seem fair at face value, it might soften the effect that the State of Luxembourg’s 
ownership may have on the functioning of the firm. Another important corporate governance 
variable to consider is that SES also has a BoD whose re-election is voted on as a slate every 
three years. This contrasts to British Sky Broadcasting, which also utilized BoD elections every 
three years, but in a slightly different manner. Finally, SES adheres to an independently created 
code of ethics for itself rather than a separate corporate governance code.  
 
b. British Sky Broadcasting 
 
 Incorporated in the United Kingdom, British Sky Broadcasting (“BSB”) has revenue of 
£6.96B and recently, it announced its bid to acquire Telefonica UK Ltd (Financial Times 2013). 
In terms of its share structure, it issues only one class -- its ordinary shares trade on the London 
Stock Exchange and it had issued ADSs to trade on the NYSE through 2010. After 2010, BSB 
delisted its ADSs from NYSE and they are now trading on the over-the-counter market. This 
move has allowed BSB to lose some of the additional reporting requirements that NYSE required 
from ADRs.  
 As referred to earlier, the elections of BSB’s Board of Directors are initiated every three 
years, like SES’s, however BSB has a staggered board structure. As a corporate governance 
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variable, staggered boards can be seen negatively and their use has been questioned (Bebchuk 
and Cohen 2005; Rose 2009). However Stout (2002) reviewed staggered boards and other 
antitakeover mechanisms and found that they can have significant benefit to a company at the 
beginning of its lifecycle. Indeed, Stout found that between 44 and 82 percent of firms that went 
public had a staggered board provision in their charter. Stout emphasizes the importance of this 
finding by noting that since the IPO stage is so critical for firms to raise capital, they would not 
have such a structure in place if investors objected ostensibly to it.  
In addition to a staggered board structure, British Sky Broadcasting also has an 
interesting voting arrangement with News Corps that entitled the latter to a cap of 37.19 percent 
of votes at an Annual General Meeting (“AGM”). In terms of the independence of BSB’s Board, 
between 2006 and 2011 independent non-executive directors varied between 62 and 69 percent.  
 
c. ZON Multimedia 
 
 To round out the EU group, ZON Multimedia is a firm in Portugal, listing only on the 
Portuguese Stock Exchange that has also issued Ordinary Shares, also has elections for its BoD 
every three years, but does not have a staggered Board. Instead, ZON also elects its BoD as a 
slate every three years. However in its annual report, ZON noted that at shareholder meetings, all 
shareholders are given one vote per 400 shares. Moreover, a 10 percent cap has been placed on 
all voting share capital open to a vote at each AGM. ZON follows the Portuguese Securities 
Market Commission (“CMVM”) recommendations and in fact, ZON outlined the ways that it 
had complied with CMVM’s recommendations and where it had taken an alternative approach or 
policy. Indeed, on voting rights specifically, ZON made a point of noting its preference for 400 
shares per vote for every annual report it issued between 2006 and 2011. It noted that although 
one share-one vote had become an oft-discussed issue, the EU had yet to formally recognize it as 
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a requirement in any of its legislated Directives. In the words of ZON Multimedia, “the ‘one 
share, one vote’ principle does not represent an incontestable best practice” (ZON Multimedia 
2009, 160).  
 Regarding director independence, ZON Multimedia did not help itself to legitimize its 
decisions with independence levels varying between 36 and 56 percent. Although not terrible, it 
could be improved.  
2. US Companies 
 
 In the US, Cablevision has issued dual-class stock, Comcast has two versions of Class A 
stock and one version of Class B stock Time Warner has only issued Common Stock.  
 
a. Cablevision 
 
 Cablevision issues two classes of shares: Class A shares that carry one vote per share and 
are listed on the NYSE, and Class B shares that carry 10 votes per share, are unlisted and are 
owned by the Dolan family. This is the classic understanding of dual-class share structures and 
what many firms in Europe have been criticized for having, where a family holds control of a 
firm and can exercise significant power. The Dolan family owns 100 percent of Cablevision’s 
Class B shares and less than 2 percent of Class A shares. Their significant share ownership 
carries a voting premium, such that Class B shares also afford the Dolan family the right to elect 
75 percent of the BoD. Class A shares are only allowed to elect 25 percent of the BoD 
(Cablevision 2011).  
 In the Form 10-K filing from 2011, the firm outlines potential ramifications that such an 
ownership structure can have by stating that “[the] family is able to prevent change in control of 
Cablevision and no person interested in acquiring Cablevision will be able to do so without 
obtaining the consent of the Dolan family” (Cablevision 2011, 29). That is a significant 
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statement that carries weight to potential shareholders. Howe it affects firm value would have to 
be analyzed, perhaps, with an event study related to Dolan family decisions at an AGM. In 2004 
the family requested that Cablevision be considered a “controlled company” under the listing 
standards of the NYSE in order to avoid the requirements that a majority of its BoD be 
comprised of independent directors. In addition to this exemption, Cablevision has also created 
its own corporate governance guidance. 
 
b. Comcast 
 
 Comcast has issued multiple classes of stock, each with different rights attached. Its Class 
A shares carry 0.1364 of a vote for every share and Class B shares carry 15 votes per share with 
a 33 1/3 percent non-dilutable voting interest. Class A special shares do not have voting rights. 
Again, this is a significant departure from other versions of dual-class shares with variable voting 
rights, indicating how complex and variable “dual-class shares” may be.  
 Both Class A and Class A special shares are listed with NASDAQ. However Class B 
shares are not listed and are wholly owned by the CEO and Chairman of Comcast, Mr. Brian 
Roberts. His ownership of the shares alongside his position as CEO and Chairman reinforce the 
negative connotation that such structures have created. Comcast has a Board structure that does 
not separate CEO and Chairman positions. This is another corporate governance factor that can 
be analyzed. In a variety of ways, having a CEO as Board Chairman can create conflicts of 
interest and may not ensure that the CEO is being held fully accountable to his or her 
management actions where an independent non-executive Chairman might.  
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c. Time Warner 
 
 Time Warner’s Common Stock issuance on the NYSE allows shareholders to participate 
in AGMs with a proportional amount of voting rights; to each share owned, one vote also 
accompanies it. In addition to their adherence to one share-one vote, Time Warner also has 
annual elections of its BoD, but has had combined CEO and Chairman positions for each year 
surveyed. 
 
3. Cable and Satellite Key Findings 
 
 A key finding from comparing EU and US Cable and Satellite companies included the 
time difference separating elections for Boards of Directors. Each company in the EU favored a 
three-year term for their directors while US companies elected their Boards annually. Both SES 
and Cablevision, perhaps the two most “controlled” firms out of those studied, had specified 
election rights attached to different share classes for BoD elections. However where SES was not 
favoring the State of Luxembourg that had shares that could not be diluted, Cablevision’s 
election scheme clearly benefits the controlling Dolan family to exert their control over the 
Board of Directors. This shows that dual-class shares do not necessitate that they will be used to 
exert control over other corporate governance variables or further concentrate control with a 
shareholding group.  
 A second interesting factor involved the roles of CEO and Chairman. Two of three US 
firms combined the position whereas zero firms from the EU group placed the roles together. In 
a similarly divided vein, every EU firm used the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(“IFRS”) as outlined by the International Accounting Standards Board (“IASB”), whereas US 
firms applied the US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“US GAAP”). However small 
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this difference is, there are larger implications that differences in accounting standards can have 
on the understanding of equity that I will note later.  
 
C. Major Integrated Oil and Gas: Analysis 
 
 The second industry I analyzed was Major Integrated Oil and Gas. Given the financial 
clout of companies in this industry and their position in holding strategic resources, I was curious 
to see whether their governance practices might tell an interesting story. The firms considered 
included British Petroleum (“BP”) of the United Kingdom, Royal Dutch Shell of the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands, and Total of France; and from the US, Chevron, ConocoPhillips 
and ExxonMobil.  
 
1. EU Companies 
 
 By considering BP, Royal Dutch Shell (hereinafter “Shell”) and Total, I was keen on 
seeing what differences might exist between BP and Shell might vary in their share and voting 
practices since Shell has a Dutch past whereas BP is strictly a UK firm, however the former has a 
decidedly British arm as of today. Total would be an introduction into French firm practices 
since none of my sample firms from Cable and Satellite included French companies.  
 
a. British Petroleum 
 
 BP has issued three classes of shares: Ordinary Shares that carry one vote per share and 
then two classes of preference shares. There are Cumulative First Preference Shares and 
Cumulative Second Preference Shares. Together, the preference shares entitle shareholders to 
two votes for every £5 held in preference shares. BP’s Ordinary Shares have been issued on the 
London Stock Exchange and as ADSs on the NYSE. The BoD at BP is elected on an annual 
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basis and is comprised of 100 percent independent non-executive directors. BP’s CEO and 
Chairman positions are separated.  
 In terms of some of the corporate governance standards I have considered, BP has stayed 
in-line with commonly accepted principles by separating the CEO and Chairman roles is ideal 
and giving shareholders the ability the re-elect directors on an annual basis. However the voting 
issue still appears as the preference shares allow for additional votes.  
 
b. Royal Dutch Shell 
 
 Royal Dutch Shell issued two classes of shares, Class A and Class B. Both classes are 
listed on the Euronext Amsterdam stock exchange and the London Stock Exchange as Ordinary 
Shares and as ADS Class A and ADS Class B on the NYSE where one ADS, regardless of class, 
is the equivalent to two Ordinary Shares. Shareholders of ADSs do hold rights to their shares for 
the sake of voting practices, but must request proxy materials from Shell or from the Depositary. 
There is a bit of grey area regarding the extent to which ADS holders can formally exercise their 
voting rights and Shell has not outlined the votes to which they would be party. In this respect, 
Shell’s intent regarding their shareholder base is unclear.  
 Looking at their other corporate governance variables that may give us any indication of 
their operations, from 2006 to 2009, Shell had a staggered Board with directors being elected on 
a three-year rotational basis. However, the role of CEO and Chairman were separated, and 93 
percent of their directors were independent. Interestingly enough, the last year that Shell had a 
staggered board and rotating directors, shareholders voted down the executive compensation 
package that was presented to them. Reading through Shell’s annual reports, they cited the 
economic downturn as a problem for their operations and profits. Perhaps that was a source of 
shareholder ire on remuneration practices.  
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c. Total 
 
 Total issued Ordinary Shares for every year considered, but they did have a few 
interesting corporate governance practices. Regarding their shares, Total adheres to a one share-
one vote policy, but caps voting at 10 percent of voting share outstanding at an AGM. That 
voting cap is lifted to 20 percent, however, for shareholders who have held their Ordinary Shares 
in name for at least two consecutive years. The reasoning for this maneuver is because Total has 
decided that whereby a shareholder has held their stock for at minimum two years, they are 
rewarded with double voting rights. Shares with these additional voting rights are known as 
“loyalty shares.” Given the double voting rights, the voting rights ceiling is also raised for those 
shareholders. Total has also listed ADSs on the NYSE in addition to its Ordinary Shares that 
trade on the Euronext Paris and Brussels exchanges and the London Stock Exchange.   
 In addition to the new incarnation of loyalty shares, Total also has a staggered board with 
directors who hold three-year terms. During the years 2006, 2010 and 2011, Total also combined 
the roles of CEO and Chairman. Their directors varied in independence from a low of 71.4 
percent to a high of 80 percent. Altogether, Total falls in the middle of corporate governance 
practices. Although the firm offers a single class of shares, voting rights double after two years 
for a select group of shareholders. The practice of loyalty shares adds to the dual-class and one 
share-one vote debate in that it causes investors to consider what their short and long-term goals 
are. Shareholders with different goals may prefer having the option of various classes of shares. 
Loyalty shares may also attract investors that Total prefers. 
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2. US Companies 
 
 For the US, an interesting comparison occurred. None of the three firms analyzed in this 
study incorporated a dual-class share structure into the organization of their capital. 
Nevertheless, for the sake of comparison of such a significant sector, their inclusion could still 
have important results.  
 
a. Chevron 
 
 Chevron has issued Common Stock that is listed on the NYSE. Alongside its Common 
Stock, Chevron applies the one share-one vote principle for all of its shareholders. Every AGM 
brings with it an election for the BoD, but the roles of CEO and Chairman are also combined for 
Chevron. Nevertheless, the BoD is composed of 100 percent independent non-executive 
directors and this fact may serve as a strong offsetting factor to the powerful position that 
Chevron’s CEO and Chairman holds.  
 
b. ConocoPhillips 
 
 ConocoPhillips also issues Common Stock for trading on the NYSE. Similar to Chevron, 
the CEO of ConocoPhillips is also the Chairman and this structure held for each of the years I 
looked at, 2006 through 2011. The Board of ConocoPhillips has been elected on an annual basis 
since 2009, but prior to that, it was elected on a staggered basis every three years. For my entire 
sample period, ConocoPhillips maintained a 100 percent independent Board. Taken at face 
value, the corporate governance practices of ConocoPhillips in terms of Board composition, how 
often directors are elected, and the voting rights of shareholders are encouraging.  
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c. ExxonMobil 
 
 Issuing only Common Stock on the NYSE, ExxonMobil finishes the group of US-based 
oil and gas companies that have relied on Common Stock issuances as the source of their capital 
and shareholder base. ExxonMobil has also combined the role of CEO and Chairman, citing that 
“The Board believes the interests of all shareholders are best served at the present time through a 
leadership model with a combined Chairman/CEO position and an independent Presiding 
Director” (ExxonMobil 2011a). Beyond this factor, Common Stock with ExxonMobil votes in a 
proportional manner with each share attached to one vote. 
 
 
3. Major Integrated Oil and Gas: Key Findings 
 
 Comparing EU and US Major Integrated Oil and Gas companies was fruitful and yielded 
another dichotomy in a corporate governance factor. Whereas there was a stark contrast between 
EU and US BoD election intervals, for oil and gas companies the contrast appeared in CEO and 
Chairman positions. In the EU, companies kept the roles separate throughout the time period 
studied, with the exception of a few years that Total had a combined CEO/Chairman. In contrast, 
in the US the roles were combined in every company analyzed.   
 
D. Packaged Foods: Analysis 
 
 For the EU-US comparison, the third industry I considered was Packaged Foods. The EU 
companies included CSM from the Netherlands, and Danone and Naturex from France. For the 
US, I looked at General Mills, Hershey, and Kellogg.  
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1. EU Companies 
 
 For the EU companies, CSM had Common Stock, and both Danone and Naturex had 
Ordinary Share issuances. However, some additional changes were noted in the structure of their 
shares. 
 
a. CSM 
 
 Incorporated in the Netherlands, CSM is the first company in the case study that uses a 
two-tier board structure. In this structure, there is a Supervisory Board and then a Management 
Board. Often the Supervisory Board is where employee representatives will have a seat, and 
there may be trade representatives in addition to an independent director or two, as well. The 
Management Board is straightforward and is composed of executive-level employees.  
 CSM has issued Common Stock that is listed on Euronext Amsterdam. These shares 
carry voting rights that are proportional to the number of shares held. CSM has a staggered board 
with directors being elected on rotational basis every four years, a slight increase from the three-
year term that has become quite prevalent in the companies studied. With staggered boards, a 
combined CEO and Chairman role has not followed suit. Also, the Board has 100 percent 
independent non-executive directors. All in all, CSM has a Board that may be very happy with 
their terms, but their shareholders get the one share-one vote principle that some scholars 
promote as best practice.  
 
b. Danone 
 
 Danone has issued its Ordinary Shares on the Euronext Paris and Swiss Stock Exchanges 
and recently it had its ADSs on the NYSE, however due to low interest, it delisted them in 2007. 
Like Total’s Ordinary Shares, Danone’s voting rights for their Ordinary Shares go from a single 
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vote per share to double votes after two years of being held by a registered shareholder. Danone 
requires that directors be re-elected after their three-year terms on a rotational basis; therefore, 
the Board is also staggered. In addition, the Board has a combined CEO and Chairman. Only 50 
to 57 percent of directors on the Danone Board have been determined to qualify as independent. 
Though there have been lower percentages, combined with the use of staggered boards and the 
combination leadership role on the BoD, there seems to be some work that Danone could do to 
improve its corporate governance.  
 It is worth noting, though, that Danone also keeps a voting rights ceiling for its 
shareholders. Shareholders who hold one-vote shares and double voting shares are only allowed 
to exercise between 6 and 12 percent of the voting share capital available at the AGM, 
respectively.  
 
c. Naturex 
 
 Also a French company listed on the Euronext Paris stock exchange, Naturex was listed 
as a “dual-class” firm, having issued both Ordinary and Preferred Shares, however Ordinary 
Shares issue one vote, Preferred Shares do not vote and if Ordinary Shares are held for at least 
two years, they are awarded double voting right, similar to Danone’s Ordinary Shares. Not to be 
a twin of Danone, Naturex’s Board has six-year terms, the Board is staggered and the position of 
CEO is combined with Chairman. Moreover, the BoD is one of the smallest from the entire case 
study, having between 4 and 5 members only. This creates an interesting set of standards by 
which to compare dual-class shares so far. Although not what we would initially consider a dual-
class structure, there is still the concern or interest of doubled voting rights and what influence 
they may have on firm operations, especially in relation to Boards whose directors have long 
terms and are not elected altogether.  
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2. US Companies 
 
 The US firms considered included General Mills, Hershey and Kellogg. Out of these 
companies, only Hershey had a dual-class share structure.  
 
a. General Mills 
 
 Common Stock is issued by General Mills on the NYSE. Their BoD is elected annually 
and they have combined their CEO and Chairman positions. However, their Board is made up of 
only independent non-executive directors, which may serve to offset the influence of the 
combined leadership position. General Mills otherwise did not have too many outliers in terms of 
corporate governance factors.    
 
 
b. Hershey 
 
 Hershey is a slightly different case because it has issued dual-class shares that hold 
varying voting rights. Trading stock is their Common Stock listed on the NYSE, but Hershey’s 
Class B shares are not listed and hold 10 votes per share unlike Common Stock that only holds 
one vote per share. The Board is elected annually. All members are independent and Hershey 
separates the CEO and Chairman positions.  
 Holders of Common Stock are entitled to dividends 10 percent higher than those given to 
shareholders of Class B stock. There are slight tradeoffs to holding Common Stock, but Hershey 
has made an attempt to sufficiently remedy shareholders monetarily through dividend payments 
and other governance safeguards.  
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c. Kellogg 
 
 Kellogg’s directors hold their positions for three years and on rotation. Therefore, the 
board is staggered and it is more difficult for shareholders to clear a Board if they are 
exceptionally unhappy with their performance. However, apart from 2006 when the CEO was 
also the Chairman of the Board, Kellogg has kept those positions separate.  
 Trading on the NYSE, Kellogg has heeded the recommendations of the NYSE listing 
standards and has kept a majority of their board independent, with a variance between 90 and 
100 percent independence.  
 
3. Packaged Foods: Key Findings 
 
 A key finding from my brief analysis of selected major companies in the Packaged Foods 
industry across the EU and US is that dual-class shares are much less prevalent with the 
exception of Hershey. French companies have used loyalty shares more often, consistent with 
results seen in previous industries from my case study. However, it does appear that boards have 
longer terms in the EU thus far, and the split between EU and US firms combining the roles of 
CEO and Chairman has broke about even heretofore. However, one industry analysis remains to 
conclude my case study.  
 
E. Software and Technology Services: Analysis 
 
 The final industry that I analyzed was Software and Technology services. I was 
particularly interested in focusing on this sector instead of other potential sectors due to recent 
press attention that a variety of tech firms and IPOs have received upon their issuance of dual-
class shares and shares with multiple voting rights. It is on account of such media attention that 
interest in one share-one vote has again arisen. The firms considered from the EU are Acando of 
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Sweden, Dassault of France and SAP of Germany. In the US, I looked at Apple, Google and 
IBM.  
 
1. EU Companies 
 
a. Acando 
 
 The first Swedish firm of the case study, Acando fits many previous studies on 
disproportionate voting rights and carries with it a dual-class share structure. Class A has 10 
votes per share and does not publicly trade while Class B shares carry one vote per share and are 
listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, now called NASDAQ OMX Nordic. Directors eligible 
for reelection to Acando’s Board are considered annually during each AGM and the roles of 
CEO and Chairman are split. Additionally, a majority (75 to 100 percent) of their Board is 
composed of independent directors.  
 
 
 
b. Dassault 
 
 Dassault also offers Ordinary shares for trading on the Paris Stock Exchange as well as 
ADSs and Common Stock on NASDAQ. For its Ordinary Shares, each share carries one vote 
unless a registered shareholder holds it for at least two years. Following the French tradition of 
double voting rights after two years, Dassault also follows another trend by having its Board of 
Directors on 4-year staggered terms. This latter arrangement represents a change from the six-
year terms enjoyed by Dassault’s directors during 2006 to 2009, when there was much less 
opportunity for Board turnover than at other French firms. Dassault does not, however, maintain 
a single CEO and Chairman. Nevertheless, their Board has a 56 percent representation of 
independent non-executive directors.  
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 Perhaps on account of their share issuance on NASDAQ, Dassault did change its 
accounting standards in 2006 and 2007, using US GAAP instead of IFRS, the predominant set of 
accounting standards used by firms in the EU.  
 
c. SAP 
 
 SAP has listed its Ordinary Shares on the German stock exchange and its ADSs on the 
NYSE. Each Ordinary Share represents one vote to be used at SAP’s AGM alongside the ADSs 
issued in the US, which are the equivalent to one Ordinary Share with normal voting rights, too. 
There are zero voting rights ceilings, but directors hold five-year terms and are elected on a 
staggered basis. The role of CEO and Chairman are separated, however, and in terms of Board 
independence, SAP has a different standard for independence. Recognizing the listing rules of 
NYSE, SAP explains how its use of a two-tier board brings with it a different type of checks and 
balances. Due to the use of employee-nominated directors, a one-tier Board structure with the 
same type of director would not be deemed independent. However, within a two-tier structure, 
balance of power is attained through a complete separation of powers between executive-level 
employees of the firm held within the Management Board and then employee and union-
representatives and independent directors held on the Supervisory Board. Therefore, in this 
respect, SAP has shied away from robust adherence to NYSE’s comprehension of Board 
independence.  
 Similar to Dassault, SAP also submitted financial information in accordance with US 
GAAP from 2006 to 2009 and then it also switched to reporting according to IFRS only.  
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2. US Companies 
 
a. Apple 
 
 Apple has listed its Common Stock on NASDAQ and with it, has attached the one share-
one vote principle to all shares. Electing its board on an annual basis, despite also being on the 
smaller side, it has mostly held only independent non-executive directors with the exception of 
2006 and 2011. Apple does not have a Chairman, but has instead elected to have two 
independent co-lead directors alongside a CEO.  
 
b. Google 
 
 Of all firms, Google is perhaps the one company in my entire case study that has received 
the most media attention. This attention is attributable to both its success in the market on the 
one hand, and its use of dual-class shares on the other. This combination has created much 
interest and perhaps also confusion about the arguments that have been made supposing that 
disproportionate voting rights destroy share value.  
 Issuing their Class A stock on NASDAQ, it carries one vote per share. Google’s Class B 
stock is neither traded nor listed and it carries exactly 10 votes per share. Again, this is a very 
classical organization of dual-class shares, but it does not follow classical assumptions of how 
dual-class shares are normally expected to operate, that is, to lose value or to be traded at a 
deficit. It is widely known that Google’s stock has done exceptionally well in the marketplace.  
 In terms of their Board, Google has annual elections and from 2006 to 2010, had 
combined the position of CEO and Chairman. Since 2006, its Board independence has stayed at 
a steady 75 percent and until recently, the three main holders of Class B stock remained in place 
at Google. Recently, Eric Schmidt who is Google’s Executive Chairman announced his intention 
to sell 42 percent of his stake in the firm (Schaefer 2013).   
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c. IBM 
 
 Finally, I looked at IBM and found that it issued its Common Stock on the NYSE as well.  
IBM also gives each of its shares one vote at the AGM and elects its Board members annually. 
The CEO and Chairman positions are joined at IBM, however, and the independence rate on the 
BoD has shifted slightly during the time period analyzed, ranging between 93 and 95 percent. 
 
3. Software and Technology Services: Key Findings  
 
 Analyzing the Software and Technology Services companies, I found that there existed 
fewer differences existed between the companies across the EU and US. EU-based firms shifted 
to US accounting methods for a number of years, and both the EU and US sample had a single 
firm with dual-class shares. More prominent yet again were the use of staggered boards by EU 
companies and the combining of CEO and Chairman roles on Boards of Directors by US firms.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 As I have considered dual-class shares and the principle of one share-one vote across the 
EU and US, I have cast a wide net across many legal provisions and viewpoints. Taking stock of 
past and current debates, there is much that can be said about how shareholder rights are viewed 
today. For quite some time, debate has revolved around the broader issue of corporate 
governance models as they vary between countries. Today, the EU has helped to cull some of the 
variability in governance practices, but has not fully harmonized guidance. The US, in contrast, 
has a system whereby firms by and large create their own corporate governance guidelines based 
roughly on stock exchange listing rules, SEC provisions and federal acts. There have also been 
conversations about levels of economic development and how rule of law is organized in a 
country or region that can have greater impact on firms applying corporate governance practices 
and thus, creating an environment for fewer scandals. Yet as Marnet (2008) notes, “Failures in 
corporate governance appear to occur far more frequently than the presumably high standards of 
corporate governance in countries with a well-developed system of property rights, law, and 
regulatory agencies might suggest” (Marnet 2008, 116; Clark, Dean, and Oliver 2003; Turnbull 
2000). Therefore, my research comparing company use of dual-class shares in light of different 
corporate governance rules and historical practices between the EU and US appropriately looks 
at two regions that, although considered to have well-developed legal systems and regulatory 
agencies, nevertheless have both experienced significant corporate governance failures. It is of 
value to analyze how those who seek to lead corporate governance best practices and have also 
experienced spectacular tumbles in this realm, view the contentious issue of one share-one vote.  
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 Additionally, a portion of the friction that revolves around the one share-one vote issue is 
that dual-class shares can also be viewed as an anti-takeover measure, thereby calling into 
question the vilification by many scholars of dual-class shares as examples of bad corporate 
governance. As Peters (1986) articulates so well, this qualification can “obscure the fact that the 
question of what voting rights must be given to shareholders is ordinarily a matter of state 
corporation law” (3). The stratification of powers existing between EU institutions and Member 
States, likewise, exists between the US federal government and states. The securities laws of the 
US have made clear statements that federal law would not preempt state law. Similarly, EU rules 
are still governed by the principle of subsidiarity and can be argued. There is a delicate balance 
between legislating out structural options that businesses can have and giving them the flexibility 
necessary to anticipate changing market dynamics, investor and customer needs and the best 
interests of the firm itself.  
 
B. Summary 
 
 Across the EU and US, the prevailing corporate governance policy is disclosure. 
Authorities and laws in the EU and US are demanding the creation, dissemination, and access to 
firm financials, their share structure, and corporate governance practices. In gathering company 
information on the firms selected for my case study, it was apparent very quickly that the EU and 
US have taken their own paths towards harmonizing information disclosure and how investors 
may access this information. For the EU, the Prospectus Directive has required that firms publish 
a document that outlines their share structure and rights associated therein. All Member States 
have had to transcribe this rule and apply it to any company listing on an official stock exchange. 
This Directive has formally organized share information to be held in one document and listed 
on firm websites. This harmonization has made it very easy to find share-specific information for 
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EU companies. In the US, the SEC has created a set of forms that create a somewhat uniform 
rubric for firms to follow and disclose share-specific information. The SEC’s 20-F form for 
foreign private issuers is also noteworthy. This form is only required for firms listing shares or 
ADSs on US stock exchanges. This form acts as a stand-in for the 10-K form that US companies 
fill out and use as annual reports. The 20-F form can be seen as a harmonizing rule that allows 
share information and disclosure to be clear and mostly uniform, where the information 
requested in the form is pertinent to firm activities.   
 With the exception of these forms and rules that the EU and SEC have created, there does 
not exist a transatlantic rule on disclosure of share information or a declarative statement of a 
best practice in adhering to one share-one vote.  
Beyond further improving disclosure practices, the EU has expressed interest in 
motivating shareholders to be active in firm operations and during AGMs. Instead of simply 
providing for shareholder protections, it appears that there is a movement towards re-imagining 
the shareholder as a gatekeeper. In the past, the shareholder has had a stake in being aware of 
company policy, executive remuneration, and the rights that they have in relation to shares they 
held for affecting change in firm behavior. Yet, in terms of how the role of gatekeepers was 
considered, shareholders were not placed at the same level as traditional regulators, politicians or 
auditors, for example. However, given the breadth of investor protections that are being created, 
it now seems appropriate to have shareholders take a more active role instead of creating 
additional and possibly redundant regulation for firms.  
 Varying corporate governance standards across the EU and US have not ensured an equal 
application of one share-one vote nor multiple voting rights or dual-class shares. The case studies 
showed that a variety of corporate governance factors might be important to consider beyond the 
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votes given to a share. Additionally, there were US firms that did not appear to be exemplars of 
corporate governance in a system favoring dispersed ownership. Convergence on one share-one 
vote has yet to occur as evidenced by the varying opinions in corporate governance codes in the 
EU and also, the remaining use of multiple voting rights in EU firms, despite the EU’s emphasis 
on the validity and superiority of a one share-one vote principle. Harmonization may have 
occurred with a few securities and company law rules within the EU, but harmony between the 
EU and US on one share-one vote as a best practice does not appear in my results. Instead, it 
seems that the status quo is being maintained. Different corporate governance regimes do not 
appear to be key players in the decisive action regarding a firm’s use of dual-class shares or 
disproportional voting rights. Although it is clear that a framework will provide the testing 
ground necessary to employ these measures, the Anglo-American and Continental European 
models are changing based on EU and US security law changes and so it is becoming less 
reasonable to pin voting rights on a historical or “embedded” system of corporate governance 
alone. Furthermore, the number of firms that do employ disproportional voting rights are on the 
low end and release all necessary information on vote counts attached to shares. 
 
C. Implications 
 
In November 2007, the Impact Assessment Board of the European Commission took an 
opinion on the “Commission Recommendation on the Proportionality Between Capital and 
Control in EU Companies.”76 The Commission’s report looked precisely at disproportional 
voting rights in firms and their effect on shareholders and firm value. In its assessment, the 
Board explained the basic premise of the Commission’s report, concluding recommendations and 
then went on to analyze how the Commission felt the EU should proceed while critiquing 
                                                
76 Impact Assessment on the Commission Recommendation on the Proportionality Between Capital and Control in 
Companies, D (2007) 9803 Draft (November 2007) [hereinafter Proportionality Impact Assessment]. 
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weaknesses it found. The Board credited the Commission for the work done and the worthy 
review of all applicable legislation, but recommended that the report submitted to them would 
benefit from greater specificity in the problems that can arise from the separation of ownership 
from control. The extent to which control-enhancing mechanisms (“CEMs”) are unfair should 
also be explained better if they in fact do create an incentive to perpetrate fraud or other criminal 
behavior. Generally, the Board found that concrete evidence against the separation of ownership 
and control was lacking and therefore, it would not be prudent to proceed further until reports 
were cleaned up and these problems resolved. The EU, thusly, still has more research to do until 
it comes to a solid opinion on voting rights. 
 Criticism can also be waged against loyalty shares. When loyalty shares award double 
voting rights on account of the duration for which shares have been held, they may open the door 
to a disproportionate amount of inside executives holding additional votes at a level that may not 
have otherwise been possible. Touching upon earlier arguments of strict proportionality, any 
variance in voting allowances between shareholders could be deemed unfair unless everyone’s 
rights are stripped and each shareholder, no matter his or her holding, is given the exact same 
number of votes.  
 The potential implications include complete revocation of the double voting right 
allowance in the French Commercial Code if the EU institutions gain enough traction to push 
through a rule enforcing the one share-one vote principle. However, the likelihood of this 
occurring soon is low considering there are existing problems between Member States fully 
applying existing EU Directives and Regulations. If a ban on multiple voting shares were issued, 
it would be antithetical to allow any other type of reward that would create another 
disproportionality in rights.  
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 An additional finding and implication to consider from my case studies were the 
corporate governance provision of cumulative voting rights available to shareholders at AGMs. 
Cumulative voting was often promoted as a key minority shareholder protection and during the 
first half of the 20th century, a debate raged over its utility. After the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 gave shareholders increased access to firm information and rights to litigation, cumulative 
voting lagged in its absolute necessity in light of new alternatives.  
Opponents to cumulative voting cited its emergence in government as ill fitted to the 
corporate board atmosphere. Moreover, they argued that the Board was not a testing ground for 
representative democracy for shareholders since a firm’s mandate is altogether different and 
smaller than that of a national government (Gordon 1994).  
The composition and power structure of shareholders has changed over the years and as 
Gordon (1994) states, shareholders have been pitted against management more recently. Where 
cumulative voting may be an option, it gives potentially extensive and unchecked power to a 
minority group over firm management. “In short, the absence of a majority check on minority 
power and without adequate monitoring of management by the majority, the minority’s power 
under a cumulative voting regime made the firm vulnerable to hold-up” (Gordon 1994, 169). 
Cumulative voting, despite benefits that it can give to minority shareholders, can cause serious 
detriment to the functioning of a business and its ultimate ability to thrive.  
However, given the role that institutional investors have accepted today, often owning 
half to a majority of a firm’s stock, cumulative voting would allow institutions to exercise their 
power to protect shareholder welfare. Gordon outlines a convincing argument on behalf of 
institutional use of cumulative voting power, suggesting that due to ownership constraints placed 
on institutions already, they would be prevented from seeking power for private gains. Moreover, 
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such a constraint would also necessitate institutions to work together and such an endeavor 
would increase “cross-monitoring of institutional behavior,” making for an even stronger 
argument for a balanced system that could protect minority interests in a balanced and efficient 
manner (Gordon 1994, 171).  
Taken today this argument and those made by Chung and Zhang (2009) on the impact of 
institutional investors contribute to and support the findings of my research in a variety of ways. 
Chung and Zhang’s study looked at the impact that corporate governance practices in firms had 
on institutional investment. Their findings revealed that the quality of information released from 
each firm paired with the level of outside monitors were more influential on institutional 
decisions to invest than were specific corporate governance practices (2009). In my case studies, 
I looked at specific corporate governance provisions and found that out of the 24 firms, only 
seven specifically mentioned that cumulative voting was not available during AGMs. The 
remaining 17 firms did not mention cumulative voting and only stated that each share came with 
one vote unless otherwise specified.  
From my case study firms, four had shareholder-proposed votes on introducing 
cumulative voting for shareholders at the AGM. The firms included Comcast, ExxonMobil, IBM 
and Time Warner. Looking at data compiled by ProxyDemocracy, funds reported for voting on 
the cumulative voting proposal were quite split. Institutional investors split their votes around the 
50 percent mark for most of the years ProxyDemocracy listed. This is only a cursory glance at 
recent institutional investor behavior on minority shareholder protections for voting rights, but it 
may be representative of an exhausted institutional investor class. Businesses are choosing to 
structure their firm in the way that they want to and institutional investors are not organizing well 
enough to push through the corporate governance measures they may want. Moreover, the near 
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50/50 split between for and against votes suggests that even among institutional investors, taking 
particular corporate governance provisions on their own may not hold too much weight. These 
measures should be taken together in the context of the monitoring environment (Aguilera and 
Williams 2009; Chung and Zhang 2009).  
 Another implication I foresee on the basis of my analysis is that dual-class shares will 
remain, as will multiple voting rights, since shareholders still have access to registration 
statements. They are widely accessible in EU companies’ annual reports and US companies have 
disclosed a significant amount of information in their proxy documents. Research from Rabin 
(2002) and Thayer (2011) support the idea that a rational actor model may not be the most fitting 
in securities markets. Rabin remarks that evidence from behavioral economics displays humans’ 
preference for delaying present day discounts to their well-being more so than delaying future 
drops in well-being 90 to 91 days out. Tomorrow is not seen the same way as a few months from 
now and people act accordingly, even if the evidence and information they read about the 
company they have invested in, is saying otherwise. Research from Thayer (2011) supports 
evidence that this behavior exists. She found that investors tend to look at and prefer less 
credible information after receiving unfavorable stock information in order to better support their 
preferences for holding the stock and to reinforce their previous decision to invest or take a stock 
position. Therefore, shareholders still remain the first and last line of defense once they have 
invested in a firm. 
 
D. Recommendations 
 
The EU has called for greater shareholder engagement in firm operations. In one respect, 
the EU believes that shareholders will be better stewards if ensured a vote for every share they 
own. However, I would like to suggest an alternative. Shareholders already have an opportunity 
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to purchase many more shares that already adhere to the one share-one vote principle and yet 
investment into shares that carry disproportionate voting rights continues. If shareholders are 
doing their due diligence before investing, they already understand the risks involved in the 
investments they make. Furthermore, there is risk in every investment and even very well 
ordered firms and government companies can fall prey to a bad seed. Companies and 
shareholders alike are seeking to find the best in each other. Companies would like shareholders 
that care about company business and its long-term success while shareholders would like a 
company to maximize their investment. It is difficult to know the true intent behind a company’s 
or shareholder’s goals. It is naïve to assume that requiring all shares carry one vote will suddenly 
entice shareholders to be more engaged and companies to be on there best behavior.  
Recently, a former CEO of CalPERS (the California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System) was indicted on charges of fraud. A leading pension fund, CalPERS is known for 
enacting corporate governance reforms on firms it invested in that have fallen prey to a corporate 
governance shortfall. This is a prime example that corporate governance is not automatically 
found through a “box ticking” of set of official disclosures, but perhaps corporate governance 
starts from inside the firm and yes, with each and indeed, extends immediately to the 
shareholder. Instead of thinking of shareholders as entities that must be protected, we should 
consider shareholders as the new gatekeeper. They are one of the first lines of defense given that 
they have invested in a company.  
 
E. Conclusions 
 
 Although it is tempting to believe that we are all created equally, that we all have equal 
access to opportunities, investments, and the process of policymaking, the fact is that we do not. 
Creating a more equal and fair system has been a paramount goal for government and society in 
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many places, but not all. Understanding which systems are best equipped to ensure equality is 
not easy and with the depth of complexity arising from social and economic problems, the 
diversity of theories and people create an interesting mix of disparate needs and desires. Business 
is not exempt from these problems and is often mired in the middle. Corporate governance as an 
area of research and practice seeks to solve some of the unfairness that can arise in business. One 
of the hot topics of today’s corporate governance debates is one share-one vote. Dual-class 
shares have been thought of as taking away shareholder power through the use of 
disproportionate voting rights. Is this the case?  
 It might benefit us if we place ideal systems aside for a second and recognize that “…at 
any given time the value of a share depends on the discounted future earnings, there is no 
difference between the short and the long-term when investing in shares, because the price of the 
share reflects its long-term value” (Hansen 2009, 154). Thus far, thinking beyond the use of 
dual-class shares as a control enhancing mechanism, their use as a protection against short-term 
oriented investors whose portfolios are highly diversified and thus, are less exposed to risk may 
be a valuable tradeoff between a company’s desire to gain capital while also keeping some 
decision-making internal and closed-off from the public.  
 As Nobel (2009) points out, some who have chosen to enunciate a property rights-based 
argument, supporting proportional voting rights, are debating from a shareholder dominant 
position. This raises the question: Who or what facet is most important across all stakeholders in 
a business? If we consider the business as having its own legal personality, then some would say 
it is the employees, or stakeholders, that should be raised above all others. If a business cannot 
exist, then the stakeholders that work to support that business are voided. The conversation that I 
would like to codify is one that already attributes value to shareholders that cannot be replicated 
 140 
without them, i.e. the ability to use shareholders as capital-raising instruments to ensure the 
business is liquid enough to continue its work. Thus, when Nobel argues that the notion of a 
business operating on behalf of capturing pure shareholder wealth is counter to democracy 
because of their ability to corrupt and exert overt control over employees, we are finally placed 
at the modern day debate – the extent and proportion that shareholders and management control 
the operations of a company. In the words of Nobel, looking to corporate law as a source of 
guidance as to how businesses should be ruled and governed, it is difficult to apply it given that 
“it is (only) concerned with the structure of main command over the firm” and not each and 
every decision carried out thereafter (171).  
This is perhaps, why law has remained sufficiently flexible to allow a business to 
structure its share and voting rights in a matter most befitting of its business and industry. As the 
case studies show, there are observable variations in trends among industries in the EU and US. 
Moreover, perhaps the most compelling logic that one can take from the literature and my 
analysis is that endless disclosure methods have been put forth in both the EU and US. Also, 
crises have continued to occur after reforms to securities laws were made. Across the EU and 
US, there have been shortfalls in corporate governance while disclosure has been growing in its 
breadth and detail. Both the EU and US are enacting more laws to regulate business, but whereas 
the US also wants to give flexibility to SMEs (JOBS Act), the EU is searching to further define 
specific corporate governance best practices. There is agreement between the EU and US on the 
importance of disclosure, but the two are moving in different directions on how best to do this.   
Neither the Anglo-Saxon or Continental European corporate governance models win in 
my analysis. Both have positive and negative elements that should be considered by investors. 
However, do not expect a convergence of EU and US corporate governance practices anytime 
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soon. The schism between accounting standards used in the EU and US shows that where 
systems differ and are embedded with the countries using them, it is extremely difficult and 
cumbersome for them to merge practices. We see within the EU that the UK and France 
approach best practices differently. Likewise, Delaware has also departed from guidelines in 
federal acts from the US government. These examples show that within a system, the players 
operating in it are not guaranteed to play by the rules or agree to every recommendation. 
However, there is greater likelihood that a firm will implement policy where there is a binding 
rule that can be enforced. While the EU is keen on pursuing greater reform and harmonization in 
corporate governance, the US is seeking reform, but at a different pace. The US is also not 
necessarily seeking to align its policies with the EU. Both the EU and US corporate governance 
systems are changing, but not converging. No single winner emerges and there are failings on 
both sides.   
Meanwhile, some firms holding dual-class shares with disproportionate voting rights 
have performed well and have attained new highs on stock exchanges. Recognizable companies 
such as Google and Facebook continue to issue shares with multiple voting rights and investors 
continue to buy-in to their share offerings. This suggests that dual-class shares are still a matter 
of debate. The media in the US has taken a keen interest in emboldening shareholders to question 
this policy. The European Commission has begun its own mission against dual-class shares, yet 
within the EU and US, the debate is still divided. Because shareholders are privy to information 
on share rights and company governance protocols, the argument falls to their responsibility 
towards due diligence. At the end of the day, there are a variety of standards and opinions that 
must be taken into consideration when one is considering an investment, but if we look at EU 
and US corporate governance policies alongside their use of multiple voting rights, it appears 
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that one share-one vote has yet to be accepted by policymakers, regulators, or firms across the 
Atlantic as an undisputed best practice.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
CASE STUDY DATA TABLES 
 
Table C.1 Frequency of Elections for Board of Directors: Cable and Satellite 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS 
SES 3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
British Sky 
Broadcasting 
Annual 3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
ZON 
Multimedia 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
US FIRMS 
Comcast Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual 
Cablevision Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual 
Time 
Warner 
Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
 
Table C.2 Frequency of Elections for Board of Directors: Major Integrated Oil and Gas 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS 
British 
Petroleum 
Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual 
Royal Dutch 
Shell 
Annual Annual 3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
Total 3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
US FIRMS 
Chevron Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual 
ConocoPhillips Annual Annual Annual 3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
ExxonMobil Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
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Table C.3 Frequency of Elections for Board of Directors: Packaged Foods 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS 
Naturex 6 year 
rotation 
6 year 
rotation 
6 year 
rotation 
6 year 
rotation 
6 year 
rotation 
6 year 
rotation 
Danone 4 year 
rotation 
4 year 
rotation 
6 year 
rotation 
6 year 
rotation 
6 year 
rotation 
6 year 
rotation 
CSM 4 year 
rotation 
4 year 
rotation 
4 year 
rotation 
4 year 
rotation 
4 year 
rotation 
4 year 
rotation 
US FIRMS       
Hershey Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual 
General 
Mills 
Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual 
Kellogg 3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
3 year 
rotation 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
 
Table C.4 Frequency of Elections for Board of Directors: Software and Technology 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS       
Acando Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual 
Dassault 4 year 
rotation 
4 year 
rotation 
6 year 
rotation 
6 year 
rotation 
6 year 
rotation 
6 year 
rotation 
SAP 5 year 
rotation 
5 year 
rotation 
5 year 
rotation 
5 year 
rotation 
5 year 
rotation 
5 year 
rotation 
US FIRMS       
Google Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual 
Apple Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual 
IBM Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
 
Table C.5 Combined CEO/Chairmanship Role: Cable and Satellite 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS       
SES - - - - - - 
British Sky 
Broadcasting 
- - - - - - 
ZON 
Multimedia 
- - - - - - 
 US FIRMS       
Comcast ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Cablevision - - - - - - 
Time Warner ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
 -  = CEO and Chairmanship held by two separate individuals 
✔ = CEO and Chairmanship held by one person 
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 Table C.6 Combined CEO/Chairmanship Role: Major Integrated Oil and Gas 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS       
British 
Petroleum 
-  - - - - - 
Royal Dutch 
Shell 
- - - - - - 
Total ✔ ✔ - - - ✔ 
US FIRMS       
Chevron ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
ConocoPhillips ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
ExxonMobil ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
 -  = CEO and Chairmanship held by two separate individuals 
✔ = CEO and Chairmanship held by one person 
 
Table C.7 Combined CEO/Chairmanship Role: Packaged Foods 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS       
Naturex ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Danone ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
CSM - - - - - - 
US FIRMS 
Hershey - - - - - - 
General Mills ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Kellogg - - - - - ✔ 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
 -  = CEO and Chairmanship held by two separate individuals 
✔ = CEO and Chairmanship held by one person 
 
Table C.8 Combined CEO/Chairmanship Role: Software and Technology 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS 
Acando - - - - - - 
Dassault - - - - - - 
SAP - - - - - - 
US FIRMS 
Google - ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Apple - - - - - - 
IBM ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
 -  = CEO and Chairmanship held by two separate individuals 
✔ = CEO and Chairmanship held by one person 
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Table C.9 Percentage of Independent Boards of Directors: Cable and Satellite 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS 
SES 55% 53% 59% 59% 59% 47% 
British Sky 
Broadcasting 
67% 67% 67% 69% 67% 62% 
ZON 
Multimedia 
42% 36% 42% 42% 56% N/A 
US FIRMS 
Comcast 100% 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 
Cablevision *“controlled 
company” 
“controlled 
company” 
“controlled 
company” 
“controlled 
company” 
“controlled 
company” 
“controlle
d 
company” 
Time Warner 92% 92% 85% 85% 85% 71% 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
* controlled company as defined by NYSE listing rules; specific independence levels not reported 
 
Table C.10 Percentage of Independent Boards of Directors: Major Integrated Oil and Gas 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS 
British 
Petroleum 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Royal Dutch 
Shell 
93% 93% 93% 93% 93% 93% 
Total 80% 80% 73% 75% 71.4% 73.3% 
US FIRMS 
Chevron 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
ConocoPhillips 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
ExxonMobil 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
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Table C.11 Percentage of Independent Boards of Directors: Packaged Foods 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS 
Naturex 20% 25% N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Danone 50% N/A 57% 54% 54% 54% 
CSM 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
US FIRMS 
Hershey 100% 100% 100% “majority” “majority” “majority
” 
General Mills 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Kellogg 90% 90% 90% 90% 100% 100% 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
 
Table C.12 Percentage of Independent Boards of Directors: Software and Technology 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS 
Acando 100% 71% 75% N/A N/A N/A 
Dassault 56% 56% 56% 56% 56% 56% 
SAP N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
US FIRMS 
Google 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 
Apple 33% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
IBM 92% 92% 93% 94% 95% 92% 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
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Table C.13 AGM Voting Rules: Cable and Satellite 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS 
SES OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV 
British Sky 
Broadcasti
ng 
OSOV/ 
News Corp 
37.19% 
share cap 
OSOV/ 
News Corp  
37.19% 
share cap 
OSOV/ 
News Corp 
37.19% 
share cap 
OSOV/ 
News Corp 
37.19% 
share cap 
OSOV/ 
News Corp 
37.19% 
share cap 
OSOV/ 
News Corp 
37.19% 
share cap 
ZON 
Multimedia 
1 vote per 
400 shares 
1 vote per 
400 shares 
1 vote per 
400 shares 
1 vote per 
400 shares 
1 vote per 
400 shares 
1 vote per 
400 shares 
US FIRMS 
Comcast Proportional 
Class A: 
0.14 vote 
Proportional 
Class A: 
0.14 vote 
Proportional 
Class A: 
0.14 vote 
Proportional  
Class A: 
0.14 vote 
Proportional  
Class A: 
0.14 vote 
Proportional
;  
Class A: 
0.14 vote 
Cablevision OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
Time 
Warner 
OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
OSOV: One Share One Vote; MVPS: Multiple Votes Per Share 
 
Table C.14 AGM Voting Rules: Major Integrated Oil and Gas 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS 
British 
Petroleum 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
Royal Dutch 
Shell 
OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV 
Total 10% share 
cap  
/DVR 
10% share 
cap 
/DVR 
10% share 
cap 
/DVR 
10% share 
cap 
/DVR 
10% share 
cap 
/DVR 
10% 
share 
cap 
/DVR 
US FIRMS 
Chevron OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV 
ConocoPhillips OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV 
ExxonMobil OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
OSOV: One Share One Vote; MVPS: Multiple Votes Per Share; DVR: Double Voting Rights 
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Table C.15 AGM Voting Rules: Packaged Foods 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS 
Naturex OSOV/ 
DVR 
OSOV/ 
DVR 
OSOV/ 
DVR 
OSOV/ 
DVR 
OSOV/ 
DVR 
OSOV/ 
DVR 
Danone OSOV/ 
6-12% 
share cap 
OSOV/ 
6-12% 
share cap 
OSOV/ 
6-12% 
share cap 
OSOV/ 
6-12% 
share cap 
OSOV/ 
6-12% 
share cap 
OSOV/ 
6-12% 
share cap 
CSM OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV 
US FIRMS 
Hershey OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
General Mills OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV 
Kellogg OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
OSOV: One Share One Vote; MVPS: Multiple Votes Per Share; DVR: Double Voting Rights 
 
Table C.16 AGM Voting Rules: Software and Technology 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS 
Acando OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV
/ 
MVPS 
Dassault OSOV/ 
DVR 
OSOV/ 
DVR 
OSOV/ 
DVR 
OSOV/ 
DVR 
OSOV/ 
DVR 
OSOV
/ 
DVR 
SAP OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV 
US FIRMS 
Google OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV/ 
MVPS 
OSOV
/ 
MVPS 
Apple OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV 
IBM OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV OSOV 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
OSOV: One Share One Vote; MVPS: Multiple Votes Per Share; DVR: Double Voting Rights 
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Table C.17 Shareholder Vote on Compensation: Cable and Satellite 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS 
SES - - - - - - 
British Sky 
Broadcasting 
✔ - - - - - 
ZON 
Multimedia 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ - 
US FIRMS 
Comcast ✔ - - - - - 
Cablevision ✔ - - - - - 
Time 
Warner 
✔ - - - - - 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
 -  = did not hold a vote for shareholders 
✔ = held a vote for shareholders 
 
Table C.18 Shareholder Vote on Compensation: Major Integrated Oil and Gas 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS 
British 
Petroleum 
✔ ✔ - - - - 
Royal Dutch 
Shell 
✔ ✔ ✔ did not 
approve 
✔ ✔ ✔ 
Total - - - - - - 
US FIRMS 
Chevron ✔ - - - - - 
ConocoPhillips ✔ - - - - - 
ExxonMobil ✔ - - - - - 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
 -  = did not hold a vote for shareholders 
✔ = held a vote for shareholders 
 
Table C.19 Shareholder Vote on Compensation: Packaged Foods 
Shareholder Vote on Compensation Package 
Industry: Packaged Foods 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS 
Naturex N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Danone - - - - - - 
CSM - - - - - - 
US FIRMS 
Hershey ✔ - - - - - 
General 
Mills 
✔ ✔ - - - - 
Kellogg ✔ - - - - - 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
 -  = did not hold a vote for shareholders 
✔ = held a vote for shareholders 
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Table C.20 Shareholder Vote on Compensation: Software and Technology 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS 
Acando N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Dassault ✔ ✔ N/A - - - 
SAP ✔ ✔ - - - - 
US FIRMS 
Google ✔ - - - - - 
Apple ✔ ✔ - - - - 
IBM ✔ - - - - - 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author 
 -  = did not hold a vote for shareholders  
✔ = held a vote for shareholders 
 
Table C.21 Accounting Standards: Cable and Satellite 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS 
SES IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS 
British Sky 
Broadcasting 
IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS 
ZON 
Multimedia 
IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS 
US FIRMS 
Comcast US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US 
GAAP 
Cablevision US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US 
GAAP 
Time 
Warner 
US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US 
GAAP 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
IFRS: International Financial Reporting Standards; US GAAP: US Generally Accepted Accounting 
Standards 
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Table C.22 Accounting Standards: Major Integrated Oil and Gas 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS 
British 
Petroleum 
IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS 
Royal Dutch 
Shell 
IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS 
Total IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS 
US FIRMS 
Chevron US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US 
GAAP 
ConocoPhillips US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US 
GAAP 
ExxonMobil US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US 
GAAP 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
IFRS: International Financial Reporting Standards; US GAAP: US Generally Accepted Accounting 
Standards 
 
Table C.23 Accounting Standards: Packaged Foods 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS 
Naturex IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS 
Danone IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS 
CSM IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS 
US FIRMS 
Hershey US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US 
GAAP 
General 
Mills 
US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US 
GAAP 
Kellogg US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US 
GAAP 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
IFRS: International Financial Reporting Standards; US GAAP: US Generally Accepted Accounting 
Standards 
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Table C.24 Accounting Standards: Software and Technology 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS 
Acando IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS 
Dassault IFRS IFRS IFRS IFRS US GAAP US GAAP 
SAP IFRS IFRS IFRS US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP 
US FIRMS 
Google US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP 
Apple US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP 
IBM US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP US GAAP 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
IFRS: International Financial Reporting Standards; US GAAP: US Generally Accepted Accounting 
Standards 
 
Table C.25 Corporate Governance Codes: Cable and Satellite 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS 
SES Code of 
Ethics 
Code of 
Ethics 
Code of 
Ethics 
Code of 
Ethics 
Code of 
Ethics 
Code of 
Ethics 
British Sky 
Broadcasting 
UK CGC UK CC UK CC UK CC UK CC UK CC 
ZON 
Multimedia 
CMVM CMVM CMVM CMVM CMVM CMVM 
US FIRMS 
Comcast SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
Cablevision SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
Time 
Warner 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
UK CGC: UK Corporate Governance Code; UK CC: UK Combined Code 
CMVM: Portuguese Securities Markets Commission recommendation   
SER: Stock Exchange Rules; BSL: Blue Sky Law; SEC: Security and Exchange Commission [rules] 
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Table C.26 Corporate Governance Codes: Major Integrated Oil and Gas 
Corporate Governance Codes 
Industry: Major Integrated Oil and Gas 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
British 
Petroleum 
UK CGC UK CGC UK CC UK CC UK CC UK CC 
Royal Dutch 
Shell 
UK CGC UK CGC UK CC UK CC UK CC UK CC 
Total AFEP –  
MEDEF  
AFEP –  
MEDEF 
AFEP –  
MEDEF 
AFEP –  
MEDEF 
AFEP –  
MEDEF 
AFEP –  
MEDEF 
Chevron SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL
/SEC 
Self-made 
Conoco 
Phillips 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/S
EC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL
/SEC 
Self-made 
Exxon 
Mobil 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL
/SEC 
Self-made 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
UK CGC: UK Corporate Governance Code; UK CC: UK Combined Code 
AFEP-MEDEF: Association Française des Entreprises Privées – Mouvement des Entreprises de France 
SER: Stock Exchange Rules; BSL: Blue Sky Law; SEC: Security and Exchange Commission [rules] 
 
Table C.27 Corporate Governance Codes: Packaged Foods 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
US FIRMS 
Naturex FR CC/ 
MiddleNext 
FR CC/ 
MiddleNext 
FR CC/ 
MiddleNext 
FR C/ 
MiddleNext 
FR CC/ 
MiddleNext 
FR CC/ 
MiddleNext 
Danone AFEP –  
MEDEF 
AFEP –  
MEDEF 
AFEP –  
MEDEF 
AFEP –  
MEDEF 
AFEP –  
MEDEF 
AFEP –  
MEDEF 
CSM NL CGC  NL CGC NL CGC NL CGC NL CGC NL CGC 
US FIRMS 
Hershey SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
General 
Mills 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
Kellogg SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
FR CC: French Commercial Code; MiddleNext: Small & Mid-Cap Corp. Gov. Code 
AFEP-MEDEF: Association Française des Entreprises Privées – Mouvement des Entreprises de France 
NL CGC: Dutch Corporate Governance Code 
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Table C.28 Corporate Governance Codes: Software and Technology 
 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
EU FIRMS 
Acando SE CGC SE CGC SE CGC SE CGC SE CGC SE CGC 
Dassault AFEP –  
MEDEF 
AFEP –  
MEDEF 
AFEP –  
MEDEF 
AFEP –  
MEDEF 
AFEP –  
MEDEF 
AFEP –  
MEDEF 
SAP DE CGC/ 
SER  
DE CGC/ 
SER 
DE CGC/ 
SER 
DE CGC/ 
SER 
DE CGC/ 
SER 
DE CGC/ 
SER 
US FIRMS 
Google SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
Apple SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
IBM SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
SER/BSL/ 
SEC 
Self-made 
Source: SEC filings and companies’ annual reports; compiled by author  
SE CGC: Swedish Corporate Governance Code; DE CGC: German Corporate Governance Code 
AFEP-MEDEF: Association Française des Entreprises Privées – Mouvement des Entreprises de France 
SER: Stock Exchange Rules; BSL: Blue Sky Law; SEC: Security and Exchange Commission [rules] 
 
